1914–18: THE DEATH THROES OF CIVILIZATION THE ELITES OF LATIN-AMERICA FACE THE GREAT WAR

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The historiography of twentieth-century Latin America has neglected the years 1914–1918. Most of those who seek to define the century in terms of identifiable periods choose to concentrate less on the two world wars than on two turning points that mark a true break in continuity in the sub-continent's contemporary history: one consists of the social and political effects of the economic crisis that began in the United States in October 1929, the other is Fidel Castro's assumption of power in Havana in January 1959.[1] The natural conclusion of this approach is that the Great War did not have the same formative role in Latin America that it is held to play in Europe. Yet this proposition does not mean that the First World War in Latin America remains a completely neglected topic. For example, within the framework of a traditional diplomatic history it is possible to analyse why certain nations sustained a prudent neutrality until November 1918, or why other states finally rallied to the Allied cause; it has also been possible to measure the impact of the war on the economy of certain countries, such as Argentina, Chile or Brazil, which profited from reduced agricultural production in Europe by seizing new markets and fundamentally modernising their structures.[2] Yet the chronology of 1914–1918 has undoubtedly been very little studied to date, rather as if the absence of any collective memory of the Great War in Latin America condemned the period to complete oblivion.

Having established these factors, this paper does not claim to introduce a historiographical revolution and present the First World War as a major break in the specific chronology of Latin America. More

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[1] Skidmore and Smith (1999); Halperin Donghi (1996); Manigat (1991).

[2] Albert and Henderson (1988); Dean (1969); Fritsch (1992); Coyoumdjian (1986); Weinmann (1994).

modestly, it seeks to suggest some ways in which the impact of the years 1914–1918 across the Atlantic can be re-evaluated as part of a cultural and intellectual history. For although the Latin American nations did not experience warfare within their own territory, nor live through the suffering of war, they were the privileged spectators and ultimate new participating entrants in the cultural confrontation that engulfed the chief belligerent nations—led by France and Germany. This was intensified by Latin America's nineteenth century, mostly lived with eyes fixed on European civilisation—in all its many forms—and with their identity as newly emancipated states constructed from it, frequently in mimetic style.[3] Perceived as the death-agony of Belle Epoque Europe (as it was possible to imagine and dream of it across the Atlantic), the Great War helped to destroy images, to transform the imagination of the Latin American élites and to strengthen a questioning of identity that was already emerging in the earliest years of the century. Without being a true mould of the Latin American twentieth century, the war thus appears to have influenced some fundamental tendencies and to have acted to some extent as an accelerator.

The War as a Stake of Civilisation

A brief retrospective glance at the pre-war period is necessary in order to understand the scale of the cataclysm which struck the Latin American élites in the second decade of the century. Following the series of independences in the early nineteenth century, a majority of intellectuals and political operators violently rejected the Spanish model of civilisation, turning instead towards the 'enlightened' civilisation that they felt they could perceive in north-west Europe. Among these new European points of reference, France held a well-recognised and privileged place, in terms of both intellectual influence and cultural presence.[4] The impact of French culture was initially linked to the influence of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, then of 1789 on the Independences. This was noted in 1851 by the Argentinian Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810–1884), recalling the American revolutionaries' debt to French ideas:

[3] Badie (1992).
[4] Lempérière (1998); Rolland (2000).

> We owe our inspirations of liberty and independence to French science. Through its language, sister to our own, through the clarity and abundance of her books, as in our shared faith, France will always have an immense influence on this part of America.[5]

And even beyond the substantialist approach to the history of ideas, the new forms of socialisation and political practices that appeared with the French Revolution achieved widespread recognition throughout Latin America. For the whole of the nineteenth century the considerable success of the works of Comte or Renan, for example, not to mention the correspondence in French between Victor Hugo and Stendhal, or between Mallarmé and Zola, or again the various schools of painting, corresponds to the importance accorded to the French language in the various national teaching programmes, which naturally directed the upper levels of Latin American societies towards French culture. More precisely, from 1870 the sons of good families and the scions of the intelligentsia were brought up in the Comte cult of positivism and scientism, whose most fully developed embodiment seemed to them to be the Belle Epoque and the Paris of the Universal Exhibition. All travelled to France regularly, convinced that there they would find the heart of civilisation and the place where the future of humanity was being formed. One of the important figures of contemporary Argentinian literature, Victoria Ocampo (1890–1979), effectively summed up the elective affinities uniting the generality of Latin American élites with France when she affirmed that "There is not a single American, lover of art or literature, or simply of civilisation, who does not build bridges between France and ourselves. I cannot imagine life without the interchanges that they make possible".[6]

This wide-spread Francophilia explains why a large proportion of the Latin American intelligentsia took the side of France and her allies from the first declaration of war. We must none the less be wary of automatic assumptions, and look carefully at studies of what is in fact a little understood body of opinion. The absence of close studies means that it is impossible to understand precisely how local populations responded to the policy of neutrality and then the involvement of some Latin American nations in the Great War from 1917

[5] Gaillard (1918), p. 301.
[6] Bonnefous (1953), p. 64.

onwards.[7] By superimposing a study of migratory movements from Europe to Latin America on to systematic opinion surveys it would no doubt be possible to establish a geographical pattern of Germanophilia and pro-Allied feeling; but in the current state of research we must be satisfied with scraps of information and theories which may be restricted to common knowledge. For example, we may read sometimes that a cultural dividing line existed among the Latin American élites between the legal professions, shaped by the influence of German law, and the literary professions, more sensitive to the Parisian intellectual life; that Catholic circles showed evidence of a clear sympathy for the Central powers, insofar as Germany ultimately showed greater respect for Roman Catholicism than did republican and anti-clerical France, Anglican Great Britain or Orthodox Russia; or that the military caste turned unanimously towards Germany, recognising the technical and financial aid given by Germany to certain Latin American governments to help them modernise their forces. But there are equally numerous counter-examples that make any generalisation impossible. We do know that the Italian community in Buenos Aires demonstrated enthusiastically in 1915 to celebrate the mother country's entry into the war, that a large number of demonstrations took place in Montevideo which brought together intellectuals and the ordinary population and during which the Marseillaise was sung beneath the French tricolour; and that the French diplomatic archives are overflowing with messages of friendship from well-known public personalities or unknown individuals. But the feeling that most people in Latin America were sympathetic towards the Allies during the Great War, often formed by reading the press of the day, should be reconsidered in the light of the monopoly held by a few large news agencies such as Havas or Reuter in the transmission of news.

Whatever the basis of truth in these shades of opinion, it is certain that for many intellectuals the war could initially be summed up as a confrontation between German barbarity embodied in a mil-

[7] It should be recalled that all Latin American countries remained neutral until the United States entered the war. Panama, Cuba and Brazil declared war on Germany in 1917, followed the next year by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti and Honduras. Six other nations broke off diplomatic relations with Germany without actually declaring war: Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Uruguay, El Salvador and Ecuador.

itarism to the death on the one hand, and the eternal French civilisation on the other. Many personal records held by consuls or ambassadors *en poste* in Latin America confirm this tide of opinion in favour of the Entente, and more specifically of France. At the end of March 1915, for example, a group of Brazilian intellectuals—almost all of them writers—lay behind the creation of a 'Brazilian League for the Allies' whose purpose was to coordinate pro-French sympathies already expressed from the outbreak of the war. Chairman of the League José Pereira da Graca Aranha (1868–1931), a sophisticated connoisseur of Europe from his long periods there on diplomatic missions, expressed his views in his inaugural speech: "From the outbreak of the conflict we have come to France, moved by the very same instinct that in this war has showed us the renewal of the struggle between barbarity and civilisation".[8] In 1916 a message from Paraguayan intellectuals to France evoked in its turn 'the epic of the Marne' as a 'regenerative dawn of modern civilisation' and asserted that Paraguay could not help but sustain France in her struggle, and sustain:

> the French people whom we love so much, whose melodies of egalitarian harmony are the cradle language of our embryonic democracies, a land which nurtures talents in philosophy and the arts, genial explorer into the transcendence of science, always seeking to know the highest aspirations of the spirit.[9]

Still in Paraguay, the Chairman of the Centre Victor Hugo, meeting place in Asunción for intellectuals to study French culture, declared in the presence of the French Minister on 18 April 1917 that 'the student youth has always regarded with affection the nation which proclaimed the Rights of Man and which, today, defends civilisation'.[10] A few months later this solidarity with France spread out from the intellectual field and took to the streets in Montevideo, in Uruguay, where July 14 had been the national feast day from 1915: a large demonstration of solidarity with the Allies turned into a full-scale expression of Francophile feeling in which 'students [marched] at the head of the demonstration, bearing an enormous French flag'.[11]

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[8] Gaillard (1918), p. 41.
[9] Ministry for Foreign affairs—Diplomatic Archives of Nantes (MAE-ADN) Assomption A 16.
[10] MAE-ADN, Assomption A 16.
[11] MAE-ADN, Montevideo 233. See also *Le Courrier de La Plata*, 22 September 1917.

A good indicator of this generalised francophilia is also apparent in studying volunteers for the French army. Requests poured in to the French consulates, mostly from student, journalist, artistic or legal circles, etc.[12] All brought with them a personal manifesto declaring the need to defend French civilisation and the values of liberty that she represented. A young Paraguayan student, for example, addressed the following lines to Jean Loiseleur de Longchamp, French ambassador to Asunción, on 19 September 1918: "I have the great honour to address Your Excellency to express my wish to join the French front line in order to give an outsider's support as a volunteer to all those who are fighting for the triumph of civilisation and justice over militarism and Prussian barbarity".[13] Despite the Revolution of 1910 which had forced Porfirio Diaz—who was convinced that modernisation of the nation would come from France or would not come at all—to relinquish power, this passion for the defence of France was equally prevalent in Mexico, where the *chargé d'affaires* who was *en poste* at the outbreak of the war wrote to Théophile Delcassé on 8 November 1914 that:

> the marks of sympathy that I have received from Mexicans since the beginning of the war have been very numerous, and I put at around 500 the number of young men [. . .] who have come to the French legation seeking information on how to undertake an engagement in our army for the duration of the war.[14]

It is only right to balance the argument by also pointing out evidence of solidarity with the Central Powers, notably in the countries of the southern part of the sub-continent and some southern states of Brazil where immigration of Germanic origin had been substantial since the middle of the nineteenth century, and organised active propaganda that was sufficiently effective to disturb the local French representatives.[15] Pro-German opinion appears to have been strongest in Chile, for various reasons which range from the intense military

[12] See for example the list drawn up by the French embassy in Paraguay for the year 1918 (MAE-ADN, Assomption A 16).

[13] MAE-ADN, Assomption A 16. We should note in passing that the problem then faced by French representatives in Latin America was the cost of transport for volunteers to Europe. Despite the need for men, most of the requests in 1917 and 1918 finally met with a refusal.

[14] *Documents diplomatiques français*, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, vol. 1914 (3 August–31 December), 1999, p. 486.

[15] Luebke (1987).

collaboration between the two nations to bad memories left by the law of separation between the Church and the State in 1905—Santiago was a popular destination for French religious emigration—via the black lists established in England from 1916, heavily penalising commercial activities out of the port of Valparaiso. Further, the German army also welcomed into its ranks volunteers who set up a cult of science or German philosophy against the zealots favouring eternal France.[16] That said, it was genuinely the notion that the civilisation that gave birth to human rights and to modernism must be saved which predominated in the largely Francophile attitude of Latin American élites during the first part of the war.

The War as the Death of Civilisation

The chief object of this paper is however to describe not this francophilia among the élites of Latin America but the development of behaviour and commitments observable as the war became bogged down. The concept that the war represented a struggle between barbarity and civilisation was gradually replaced by a belief that it marked the end of a world, the death of the values that had developed since the second half of the nineteenth century, the death of a culture that grew out of rationalism and materialism. This observation has nothing original about it at first sight, in that it recalled the belief that Paul Valéry—one of many—was able to propose, for example in *La Crise de l'Esprit* in 1919, an observation that even appeared to perpetuate the mimesis of Latin American intellectuals in relation to their traditional European points of reference and to reflect shared anxieties, but of which the consequences are worthy of more advanced analysis as soon as they are set against a longer time-scale. We should first of all remember some revealing examples of this change of direction, of which the first signs appeared in 1916–17, at the moment when Verdun and then the Chemin des Dames were making a strong impression on the minds of Latin America.

In 1916, in the specific context of the Mexican Revolution, the anthropologist Manuel Gamio (1883–1960) published his work *Forjando Patrio* in which he exhorted his compatriots to take the path of a

[16] Nogales Mendez (1999).

true psychological decolonisation from the dying Europe, creating a synonym for national resurgence. As a constant backdrop to his thinking, the Great War was evoked in several instances with a bitter irony, notably in its aspect of cultural confrontation: "Let us therefore beg the Foreign Cultural God to [. . .] give us his last word in Europe on the war of domination between 'Kultur' and 'culture'".[17] In a comparable attitude, in a report published in December 1919 in the *Revista do Brasil*, the Brazilian writer Monteiro Lobato (1882–1948) also stigmatised the arguments which in his country had brought into opposition the partisans of 'Civilisation' and those of 'Kultur', who ultimately plunged into the same atrocities between 1914 and 1918.[18] By committing suicide in the mud of the trenches, Europe—so determinedly hegemonic throughout the nineteenth century—thus lost all credit, whether Latin or Germanic.

The case of the Argentinian Leopoldo Lugones (1874–1938) is equally instructive. Publishing articles that he sent from Europe to the leading daily paper in Argentina, *La Nación*, from 1914, this intellectual who had gravitated towards socialist circles at the beginning of the century, before turning to a liberalism inspired by the Enlightenment, initially saw the war as a clear confrontation between German barbarity and French civilisation. Recalling on many occasions that the whole of Latin America is the inheritor of European culture, he did not restrain his criticisms of German militarism which was in the process of destroying this civilisation, and even wrote several poems in honour of eternal France. But in 1917, when he wrote the preface to the published collection of his articles dating from the first years of the war, the tone changed and the war was no longer exactly imagined as the confrontation between barbarous Germany and France the redeemer of humanity, but more radically as the collapse of the entire European civilisation: "For me, the current cataclysm represents the end of a civilisation".[19] France, as the heart of Europe, did not escape the disaster and dragged into the mud of the trenches the values that she had hitherto been expected to represent. Was it still worth fighting for her? Nothing can be less certain, concluded Lugones at the time when Argentina was facing pressure from a United States anxious to see her commit herself to

[17] Gamio (1916), p. 190.
[18] Monteiro Lobato (1965), p. 225.
[19] Lugones (1917), p. 10.

the Allied camp: Latin America, the island of purity partially spared by the cataclysm, should henceforward work towards gaining an independent identity.

Finally, the Brazilian author Alceu Amoroso Lima (1893–1983) offers an evocative echo of the writings of Lugones. Nurtured on European references in his childhood, with perfect mastery of the French language, with several periods spent in Paris and in Italy in his adolescence, this multi-skilled writer—literary critic, lawyer, sociologist and philosopher—grew up in an atmosphere of militant secularism that came straight from France, and of the positivism which then ruled over the world of ideas in Brazil. Retrospectively, Lima was to describe itself as being particularly representative, on the eve of the First World War, of those despiritualised Brazilian élites who were profoundly influenced by the works of Cousin, Renan and above all Auguste Comte, whose extraordinary diffusion in Brazil in the second half of the nineteenth century is well known. Evoking the impact of the Great War on his intellectual travels, Lima set down a valuable work of witness on the cruel revisions required of this generation as it confronted the lost paradise of modernity:

> In Paris, the centre of Europe, I saw that a world was coming to its end. It was the end of euphoria [. . .] No more dilettante life, no more idle hours. Now for a difficult life, the need to choose between two extremes, sin and dogma . . . Out of this decade from 1920 to 1930 came an inversion of alliances, a reversal over Anatole France, Machado de Assis and Silvio Romero. The trouble was that they had inculcated in our minds a scepticism and a dilettanteism which was leading us towards a clash in the face of the catastrophe that was the war. We had all been inclined, particularly after 1918, to revise our ideas and everything which for us represented the Belle Epoque.[20]

On many points, this disenchantment resulting from the war relates to what French historiography has recently named as 'the spirit of the 1920s': combined with the Bolshevik revolution, the effects of the world war open up the possibility that pre-1914 styles of thinking are no longer capable of meeting the problems of the highly contemporary.[21] With the small difference that the majority of the Latin American élites are not going to turn their gaze towards Moscow to find a new world coming to take the place of that pre-war world,

[20] Lima (1973).
[21] Trebitsch (1997).

but towards their Hispanic past, hidden since the beginning of the nineteenth century—we should note that Brazil forms the exception here—and the indigenous elements of the nation who should no longer be thought of as simply peripheral to the European centre.

Between Iberian Past and Indigenism: Latin-American Identity put to the Test of the Great War

Rupture is fundamental in the imagination of these élites in that it distanced them from the mimetic reflexes that were hitherto current, forcing them to fresh reflection on identity in relation to late nineteenth-century views: the main consequence of the Great War is that the suicide of Europe led Latin America to break away from the specific importational patterns of thinking that had characterised it since the end of the eighteenth century. Yet this supposition should undoubtedly be adjusted if we consider that this identificatory reflection first appeared by the end of the nineteenth century. Apart from the anti-materialist—and indirectly anti-European—reaction reflected in the works of José E. Rodo in Uruguay, Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos in Mexico, of Francisco Garcia Calderón in Peru and Farias Brito in Brazil, we know for example that the celebration of the centenary of Argentinian independence, in May 1910, took place in an atmosphere of long-established intellectual unease over the future of the Nation: was not the non-integration of certain sectors of society the product of the blind transfer of a European-style liberalism which would deprive the country of essential resources? Can one really see an Argentinian identity being born at the very same time as efforts are being made to create a servile reproduction of the few European countries that were the source of the vast majority of the population?[22] Is the opposition between Civilisation (European) and Barbarity (indigenous), inherited from the *Facundo* of Domingo F. Sarmiento published in 1845 and thenceforward a structural creator of the national image, the best way to achieve modernity? Or, in order that Latin America should not reduce itself further to a 'Far East', should one not henceforward concentrate on approaches such as that of José Martí, herald of the values described as bar-

[22] Quattrochi-Woisson (1992), pp. 26–27.

barian in his quest for a specifically Latin-American identity? The premises of a nationalist step sideways are also visible in early twentieth-century Chile, with the publication of many works denouncing the submission of the country to foreign interests and culture, including *La conquista del Chile en el siglo XX* by Tancredo Pinochet Le Brun in 1909.[23] And it was also at the turning point of the two centuries that questions were raised again in Andean nations such as Bolivia, over the pertinence of this positivism born out of social Darwinism which pushed out the Indian—degenerate and seen as responsible for the country's backwardness—to the margins of the Nation in order to favour Europeanisation and the whitening of population and culture.[24] The Great War cannot therefore be considered as the factor that unleashed the reflections on the future of Latin America which flourished in the 1920s and 1930s, but it had a full part in the brutal reactivation of the problem of identity, particularly because published reflections on the fate of Europe, such as those of Spengler, were very widely available.[25]

Although it was accepted that Old Europe died in the trenches, some still expected to revive it on the American continent. One such was Romulo S. Naón (1875–1941), ambassador of the Argentinian Republic to Washington and, from 1917, in favour of Buenos Aires joining the United States in the Allied camp. In the final months of the war he declared:

> The consequences of this war will affect every nation in the world for a long period of time. Our continent has assembled the foundations of its own civilisation from nations which are exhausting themselves in this war [. . .] It will be said that all the material and moral energies of these peoples have come together to create this wonderful social transformation which is known as the American civilisation [. . .] It is up to us to reincarnate the European civilisation.[26]

But the stringency which commanded the attention of most activists in the post-war world is rather that of a radical cut-off from the pre-war world and the redefinition of a specifically Latin American identity. This, for example, is the opinion of a Bolivian intellectual,

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[23] Gazmuri (1980).
[24] Parrenin et Lavaud (1980).
[25] Romero (1995).
[26] Gaillard (1918), p. 223.

Daniel Sánchez Bustamente (1871–1933), who at the end of the war wrote in *El Tiempo*, La Paz:

> We have lived dependent on the fashions, problems, methods and ideas of Europe, ignorant or pretending to be ignorant that there must also be South American [. . .] problems. Fascinated by the dazzle of the Old World, we have allowed a heavy shadow to extend across our own virtues.[27]

Objective signs bear witness to the reality of the changed representation of Europe, like the sociological mutations that affected Latin American travel. While the élites as a whole—intellectual, political, economic—had made the initiatory stay in Paris a veritable ritual before 1914, the Paris visit tended to become an élite artistic monopoly in the 1920s.[28] For if the French capital had lost none of its essential attraction, it now had to compete with two new poles of attraction that appeared to offer better assurance of a successful initiation: New York and the United States, of course, but also Madrid, Barcelona or Seville. For beyond the detailed factual accounts, the rediscovery of the 'special virtues' of Latin America was presented from the 1920s onwards as part of a rehabilitation of its Iberian past, which had been disregarded since the Independences, and favoured by the fact that Spain had remained neutral during the First World War. The time had come to rediscover the old Spanish mother-country to the detriment of the French civilisation which had inspired so many intellectuals since the nineteenth century, the civilising role of the Catholic Kings to the detriment of the 'supposed Enlightenment', the virtues of Catholicism after a barbarous war which had proved that it was impossible to do without God.

The development of a nationalism that places the notion of race at the heart of its concerns was the first element of this rediscovered Hispanicism. In most of the countries formerly subject to Madrid, Spain and her glorious past tended to take the place of the French model which was no longer the precise symbol of modernity and progress. By 1917, when public debate was fully engaged with the hypothesis of joining the war on the same side as the United States, the Argentinian president Hipólito Yrigoyen chose to make 12 October—the date of Christopher Columbus' discovery of America—a

[27] Gaillard (1918), p. 277.
[28] Rolland (2000), p. 140.

public holiday, with the Chilean government following its example early in the 1920s. In line with works by Manuel Gálvez, author in 1916 of *El solar de la raza*, the 1920s witnessed the development of a vast undertaking of historical revisionism that aimed to reconstruct the broken affiliation between Spain and Argentina.[29] The focal points of this neo-nationalism multiplied throughout the inter-war years, particularly in the form of reviews such as *La Nueva República*, founded in 1927 by young intellectuals fascinated by General Primo de Rivera and keen to bring this model of authoritarian government to the banks of the River Plate. And although the doctrinal body of such publications retained French references, it must be acknowledged that Maurras and Action Française took the place of the secular and republican model.[30] Around a decade later it was entirely logical that the Popular Front should be held up to public obloquy and that Franco should be venerated, seen as the continuing assurance of Spain the eternal threatened by subversion.[31]

The second symptom of this return to Hispanicism lies in the great wave of conversions to Catholicism recorded between the two world wars, seen by some to be more in line with America's colonial past that the militant secularism of Combes that was celebrated before 1914. The absence of syncretic works on this topic should not conceal the extent of a phenomenon that was identifiable across the whole of Spanish-speaking America; but it also affected Brazil, as can be seen, for example, in the well-documented examples of Alceu Amoroso Lima and Gustavo Corção (1896–1978). As noted above, Lima was brought up in the cult of European materialism but was profoundly affected by the disaster of the Great War. In 1918 he embarked on a process of thought which led to his conversion ten years later;[32] Corção, an astronomer and chemist trained in European science, converted on the eve of the Second World War after a period of reflection on his epoch which led him to reject 'the vast dustbin of the rationalist century'.[33] Apart from these individual cases, the intellectuals returning to the bosom of the Church in the inter-war years could be counted in their hundreds, in contrast

29 Quattrochi-Woisson (1992).
30 Lafage (1991), pp. 19–24.
31 Quijada (1991).
32 Lima (1973).
33 Corção (1987), p. 118.

with the end of the previous century when the 'despiritualisation' of the élites had been very considerable. If this wave of conversions continued under the influence of spiritual guides such as Jacques Maritain (French) or G.K. Chesterton (English), it also shows evidence of a break in the intellectual history of contemporary Latin America. More generally, it was in fact part of a general revival in Catholicism immediately after the First World War, which can also be identified at an institutional level through the length of the subcontinent (the establishment of *Cursos de Cultura Católica* in Buenos Aires and of *Centro Dom Vital* in Rio in 1922, the *Centro fides* in Lima in 1930, movements of Catholic action in almost all the countries at the turn of the 1920s–30s, etc). Allied to the construction of a form of nationalism hostile to the modern pattern that arose out of 1789, this rediscovery of Catholicism permanently changed the thinking of a section of the élites.

With the rediscovery of the Iberian past, the affirmation of the indigenous element constitutes the second panel of this re-evaluation of identity. Presented in the form of an ideological reflection before 1914, the question of the native population became a genuine political and social stake in the inter-war years. As quoted above, the example of Manuel Gamio shows that the will to bring the Indians into the Nation and the social body is derived directly from the questioning of models of thought acquired from Europe, and is thus derived indirectly from the Great War. Beyond the rejection of intellectual colonisation by Europe, which has no further reason for existence after the great massacre of the war, the Mexican anthropologist makes the Indian one of the central subjects of *Forjando patria*.[34] Referring to the education dispensed in the schools, he observes for example that:

> preferential consideration is given to the past history of social classes of civilisation derived from the European civilisation, as if that of the indigenous class, which is the basis of the population, was not of capital importance.[35]

Gamio, inspired by the specific context of the revolution that began in 1910, was not alone in bringing indigenism into his patterns of thinking inspired by the collapse of European civilisation; Bolivia is

[34] Guidicelli (1996).
[35] Gamio (1916), p. 113.

another example of this rupture—pre-1914 reflections on the integration of Indianness were visible, for example, in an active education policy in favour of Indians which culminated in a statute on native education published on 21 February 1919.[36] The gradual integration of Indians through education naturally continued to be implemented according to the yardstick of European criteria,[37] for in the aftermath of the Great War multiculturalism was still not in fashion—the movement for the emancipation of the natives by natives was not to get under way seriously until the 1960s; but the period of exclusion in favour of Europeanisation of the race seems to have genuinely come to an end at the end of the war. In Brazil, finally, the Modernist movement launched at Sao Paulo in 1922 also rested on extolling non-western or anti-western traits in Brazilian culture: for example, the poet Mário de Andrade or the musician Heitor Villa Lobos plunging into the interior of the vast Brazilian landscape and bringing out elements of folkore to be included in their sophisticated works, while they burned Anatole France.

As always when it is a matter of cultural and intellectual history, it could not finally be a question of identifying a sharp and open break. The questioning of European references in their prevailing form throughout the nineteenth century began before the First World War, and the war did not mark their definitive abandonment. Witness for example the fact that in a domain as symbolic as higher education, nations such as Brazil or Argentina very largely turned to European university teachers to whom they consistently allocated prestigious posts throughout the 1920s and 1930s. None the less, the emergence of a nationalism founded on the Iberian past, the return of some élites to Catholicism, the discovery of Indianness and its gradual integration into the Nation, were all changes which, bore the mark of the shadows of the First World War and had a profound influence on the contemporary history of Latin America. In the thinking of the Latin-American élites, the years 1914–1918 accelerated a shift of balance from which it is easier to understand the perception of a certain number of later episodes: for example the Spanish Civil War, experienced as a trauma of identity in the whole of Spanish-speaking America from the very fact of the overturning of representations which accompanied the First World War.

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[36] Perrenin and Lavaud (1980)

[37] Bonilla, Martinez, Sinardet (1999).

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