The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women

Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstetler

Tables

The increased visibility of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements at the international level invites continuing evaluation of the extent and significance of the role they now play in world politics. Competitive and complementary actors crowd states' central position. While the presence of such new actors is easily demonstrated, international relations scholars have debated their significance. Realists and their intellectual allies argue that nation-states retain their central position; NGOs are a sideshow of international politics, if considered at all. At the other extreme, the literature on transnational relations asserts that global social interactions are dense and important enough to represent a new sector of influence upon states--a "global civil society" circumscribing states' relative autonomy.

We argue that the concept of a global civil society sets a more demanding standard for the evaluation of transnational political processes than has been applied in prior accounts of such activity. Further, most empirical studies of this activity have focused on a limited number of NGOs within a single issue area. Using three recent UN world conferences as examples of mutual encounters between state-dominated international politics and global civil politics, we develop the concept of global civil society to provide a theoretical foundation for a systematic empirical assessment of transnational relations concerning the environment, human rights, and women at the global level.¹

Global Civil Society

Theories of civil society based on domestic politics envision frequent and dense exchange among individuals, groups, and organizations in the public sphere, separate from state-dominated action.² A well-developed civil society potentially influences government in two ways. It enhances political responsiveness by aggregating and expressing the wishes of the public through a wealth of nongovernmental forms of association, and it safeguards public freedom by limiting the government's ability to impose arbitrary rule by force.³

At the international level, it is as yet unclear whether the increase in the number of NGOs with shared transnational goals can be equated with an emerging global civil society.⁴ Although NGO networks of interaction that parallel or intersect the international state system may have meaning for the participants, unless they are focused and received in particular ways, they do not necessarily affect states' positions. What should one expect to see if the growing NGO presence indeed presages global civil society? To answer this question, we first briefly
consider the meanings of *global*, *civil*, and *social*, and then explain the empirical indicators of each term. (See Table 1.)

To describe the social relations among nongovernmental actors as *global* is to assume that the "complex network of economic, social, and cultural practices" forming global civil society is widespread enough that actors from all over the world are involved in the interactions. The term *international* would only suggest increasing interactions among states, while the term *transnational* is used to characterize regular activity crossing national borders that involves at least one nonstate actor. To celebrate this form of interaction as global, thereby intimating that representation both is geographically diverse and includes nonstate actors, raises the stakes considerably.

The explosion in the number of actors is a minimal condition for the rise of global civil society, but deeper changes should be evident in the quality of nongovernmental access and proximity to global forms of governance. The *civil* component of global civil society connotes both regularized nonstate participation in global interactions and NGO access to states and other NGOs. It cannot be assumed either that a greater number of nonstate actors translates directly into more systematic participation within international governmental organizations or that states and international organizations uniformly respond to NGO "knocks" by opening the intergovernmental "doors."

Finally, the *social* component of global civil society presumes a quality of interaction among the relevant actors that goes well beyond the classic billiard-balls analogy. Actors in society are actors in relationship with each other. These relationships are grounded in the presumption that participants "may care how they are regarded by others" beyond simple interest calculations. In turn, they develop expectations of other participants and their actions. In those relationships, they work toward developing common understandings of their relationships and of substantive issues, although complete agreement is not required for social relations.

Bearing in mind those definitions, how global is the civil society we find participating in UN world conferences? A newly global UN conference constituency should be reflected in the geographical diversity and the number of nongovernmental participants in official and parallel UN proceedings.

The quality of civil participation can be determined by assessing the procedures governing NGO activity at UN world conferences. To regulate and channel increased participation and increased demands by NGOs, we would expect, at a minimum, to see new rules facilitating NGO contributions as well as greater overall interaction. These include matters such as conference accreditation, numbers of NGOs in attendance at the conferences, and the nature of contention over NGO participatory status.

In particular, we seek to trace the development of repertoires of NGO participation, the specific ways that NGOs insert themselves into the conference process. A repertoire is "not only what people do when they make a claim; it is what they know how to do and what society has come to expect them to choose to do." UN world conferences must use NGO consultative status to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as a baseline for NGO participation; in each conference process, however, the specific rules for NGO attendance and involvement, controlled in the end by states, are freshly negotiated. The evolving NGO repertoire thus reflects the changes in state expectations about the NGO role. At the same time, the NGO repertoire in all issue areas increasingly includes a "parallel repertoire" of NGO-to-NGO interactions, beyond that sanctioned by governments. To assess the impact of repertoire change on the "civility" of global relations, we trace the NGO repertoires and then investigate patterns of government responses.

We seek evidence of the quality of social interaction in current global politics by examining the substantive content of NGO participation, with the expectation that common understandings are developing both among NGOs themselves and between NGOs and states. To what extent have NGOs, through their participation at UN conferences, been able to change the agenda and understandings of governments at those conferences? Do NGO achievements at the 1990s’ UN conferences show that a common society has emerged in the form of new networks and understandings among previously separate NGO actors? We address those questions by examining the frames used by different participants in the conferences to describe and motivate their own or others' participation. A frame is a concept that refers to a pattern in participants' beliefs about the causes of and solutions
to contested issues. 9

The meanings, and thus the substance, of a particular issue are actively created and dynamically reinforced by the frames participants use. In the milieu of a UN world conference there will be varying degrees of alignment between the frames used by different participants. The development of common frames suggests more complete global integration among NGOs and between NGOs and states. If there is a development in social relations, we would see similar or related patterns of responses from the governments in the different conferences, not only among the NGOs themselves. Alternatively, differences in NGO input, participation, and reception at the conferences may suggest an incomplete shift to a coordinated society. Thus our analysis of the substance of NGO participation asks to what degree NGOs have managed to construct a shared frame among themselves and, then, to what degree their participation in UN issue conferences has helped to realign the frames of governments with their own.

To summarize our conclusions briefly, we do find evidence that the construction of a global society is under way but is far from complete. Thousands of NGOs have gathered to form a global presence at UN conferences, but significant divisions remain among them as well as among the participating governments. While NGOs are increasingly developing shared procedural repertoires, governments' inconsistent acceptance of NGOs' participation mitigates against the claim of civility. Finally, while we do find evidence of deepening common frames among NGOs, between NGOs and states we find less evidence of a sustained social relationship. States continue to dominate the procedures and the substance of interaction on key sovereignty-related issues.

### The Empirical Domain

As contributors to the wealth of global activity, NGOs are some of the more curious contenders for a role at the UN world conferences. Their most important claims for inclusion rest on norms of democracy and civic participation, which historically have been weak at the international level. The early United Nations institutionalized the ideal of social representation by creating a consultative status for NGOs within ECOSOC, but only 418 NGOs held this status in 1993 as the new UN conference cycle was getting under way. 10 Today, however, tens of thousands of NGOs participate in new ways, particularly during UN world conference processes. Some avidly target intergovernmental politics as they lobby and help formulate, implement, and monitor the policies of states and intergovernmental organizations, while others supplement or eschew traditional political channels. 11 In practice, many NGOs adopt goals that straddle the division, coordinating dialogue with the grassroots sector and using lobbying tactics to target governmental and international policymakers. 12

The intense interactions between and among states and NGOs during the conference processes provide a microcosm of global state-society relations for our study. The conferences are called on a nonroutine basis and address a limited agenda within a single issue area. 13 In this article we address three recent UN "megaconferences" and their historical precedents: the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, or Earth Summit), held in Rio de Janeiro; the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna; and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing. (See Table 2). 14 Our cases are three of the largest conferences of the 1990s. Each was preceded in the last twenty-five years by at least one earlier world conference, which allows us to assess the chronological development of global civil society at such conferences. In addition, each of these conferences is substantively different from the others, but there are also areas of overlap between the issues, which participants might shape into a common frame. Although we strive for meaningful variation across cases, it should be noted that we provide only a sample of conferences as cases. 15 We have limited the present study to three cases that are most closely linked to global social movements. 16

All UN world conferences share similar goals and formats. A central focus of official business at each conference and its preparatory meetings is the creation of a final conference document to be endorsed by state participants. At regional preparatory meetings, governments develop regional positions on specific conference issues. The additional meetings of the Preparatory Committee (PrepComs) are global rather than regional and focus particularly on drafting the conference document. The wording of the final document is invariably the focus of intense politicking among states and between NGOs and states, which continues up to and through the
NGOs do not have a standing equal to states in such negotiations. But opportunities for issue influence and network building arise as soon as official preparations for the conference begin. NGOs attend both the preparatory and final conferences, some registering with the official conference and some not. A parallel NGO conference with a separate agenda, the NGO forum, has been a feature of most UN conferences and their preparatory meetings since the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment. Supplementing the business of the forum is an extracurricular festival of NGO exhibitions and activities. In all these ways, NGOs seek to influence the governmental agenda, exploit news coverage of the event, and carry on business among themselves.

Global Civility? The Changing Procedures of NGO Participation in UN Conferences

From the late 1960s to the 1990s, the forms NGOs developed to participate in UN thematic conferences reveal significant advances in both the quantity and the quality of their participation. Less than 300 NGOs attended the Stockholm Conference on the Environment. In 1992, 1,400 NGOs registered with the Rio conference, and 18,000 NGOs attended the parallel NGO forum. Only 53 NGOs in consultative status sent representatives to the 1968 Tehran International Conference on Human Rights, and four others attended at the invitation of the conference’s Preparatory Committee. For the 1993 Human Rights Conference in Vienna, a UN source lists 248 NGOs in consultative status and 593 as participants. NGO reports estimated that 1,400 to 1,500 NGOs attended. At the 1975 Mexico City Conference for International Women’s Year, 6,000 people attended the NGO forum, and 114 NGOs gained access to the official conference; at the 1985 closing conference of the UN Decade on Women in Nairobi, 13,500 people registered for--and many more attended--the NGO forum, and 163 NGOs were accredited to the official meetings. Ten years later over 300,000 people attended the Beijing NGO forum, doubling previous attendance records. But equally impressive, 3,000 accredited NGOs gained access to the Fourth World Conference on Women.

Beyond their expansion in sheer number, NGOs from all three issue areas also became increasingly involved in every stage of the conference process. The types and goals of NGOs expanded, along with the increases in the size and the extent of NGO participation. More NGOs representing local interests and NGOs from the developing world were able to take part in the processes. Partly due to this broader representation, the repertoires of NGOs expanded. While some focused on lobbying the official conference proceedings and affecting its documents, others deliberately used the UN conferences as a convenient locus for networking with other NGOs.

After an overview of NGO participation in early conferences, the remainder of this section focuses on the differences among NGOs over their ideal procedural involvement as well as on the changes that occurred in the forms of both lobbying and networking strategies in the 1990s. Finally, subsections on governmental responses to NGO strategies show that while inroads were made, governments were unwilling to allow broad NGO participation, especially when it seemed to threaten their dominant position in negotiations. Thus, the "global civility" of global civil society has yet to be firmly established through shared state and NGO expectations around procedures.

Early Conferences

At the early UN conferences NGOs had a limited role in their governmental lobbying capacity. At the 1968 International Conference on Human Rights, the few NGO representatives who attended were observers only. The then nascent international human rights community lacked lobbying experience on human rights themes at the UN. At early conferences on other themes, the repertoire of NGO participation was also markedly small when compared with current roles. At conferences on the environment, governments gave primarily scientific and technical NGOs a role to play. Certain "hybrid" NGOs that were attached to the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) helped draft and negotiate preparatory conference documents at Stockholm. At the Women’s Decade conferences, NGO participation was initially limited, and few NGOs made official interventions. NGOs were not involved in preparatory processes leading up to Mexico City and the 1980 World
Conference of the UN Decade for Women in Copenhagen; however, they were included in both national and regional preparatory conferences for Nairobi.  

In the final documents of the early conferences, governments recognized NGOs not for their contributions to the conference but for their ability to help implement conference recommendations through education and publicity. The 1972 final environmental documents referred to NGOs in their educational role or as specialty groups on single issues. The documents from the first women's conference in Mexico City mentioned the educational role of NGOs. The Proclamation of Tehran did not mention NGOs, although a conference resolution on measures to eliminate racial discrimination appealed to NGOs and the media to publicize "the evils of apartheid and racial discrimination.

Despite their limited lobbying capacity at the official conferences, NGOs had begun networking activity before the 1990s. There was no NGO forum in Tehran, but a de facto network formed in anticipation of the conference. In 1965 a human rights subcommittee of NGOs with ECOSOC consultative status began meetings to prepare for Tehran, and in 1968 an independent coalition of seventy-six NGOs and fifty independent experts drew up NGO recommendations for the official conference.

At the 1972 Stockholm environmental conference, NGOs held their first parallel forum, concurrent with the official governmental conferences. Similar to all later NGO forums, the first parallel conference gathered a wider variety of NGO participants than did the official conference. One observer characterized the Stockholm NGOs as "a colourful collection of Woodstock grads, former Merry Pranksters and other assorted acid-heads, eco-freaks, save-the-whalers, doomsday mystics, poets and hangers-on." These NGOs were quite different from the more sober and scientific NGOs contributing to the official documents. Also presaging future NGO forums, participants in the Stockholm parallel conference spent much of their time simply getting to know each other, which precluded much impact on the official conference outcomes.

The NGOs attending the forums at the three conferences of the UN Decade on Women also brought together a diverse set of participants, who engaged in a kaleidoscope of activities from performances to prayer meetings. At Mexico City and Copenhagen, vigorous political debates often overtook discussions of women's common concerns. By the time of the Nairobi conference, the increased representativeness among participants--and the shared conference history--allowed for more expanded and integrated dialogue in the hundreds of workshops and meetings held.

NGO Differences over Repertoires in the 1990s: Lobbying vs. Networking

By the 1990s, NGO participation had expanded in both the official conferences and parallel forums to the extent that NGOs were divided over the procedures that they should follow: lobbying or networking? NGO lobbyists would spend much of their time at the site of the official conferences participating in meetings or haunting the hallways around the meetings from which they were excluded. The NGOs more interested in networking, or lacking official accreditation, took advantage of the fertile ground for NGO exchange provided by the forums. The strongest, most active, and most effective lobbying organizations came from the North, while the South, often represented by Latin American groups, spearheaded the NGO networking. In the words of one NGO newspaper, writing about Rio, "the Africans were watching, the Asians listening, the Latin Americans talking while the North Americans and Europeans were doing business." In general, lobbyists' and the networkers' repertoires were mutually interdependent, although not always harmonious.

Each side of this division was split on its views of the other. Some on each side viewed both roles--accepting the boundaries set by governments and pushing them--as necessary complements. Others had much more negative views. For example, although lobbyists at Rio made a concerted effort to represent a wide range of geographical positions, some of them saw new participants, who tended to focus on networking, as "lost in the process," distracting, and, above all, potentially threatening the access of all NGOs to the conference process. Some of the networkers saw the lobbyists as legitimating an illegitimate process and wasting time and resources on useless governmental proposals. Many of these individuals did participate in some of the lobbying activities, but they tended to spend more time discussing issues that had been left off the governmental
agenda. They set up various kinds of NGO-meets-NGO activities, like dialogues between Northern and Southern NGOs. Unlike the lobbyists, networkers justified these alliances as ends in themselves rather than as strategies to influence governments.

**NGO Lobbying: Expanding the Official Repertoire**

NGOs began to push for an additional set of both state-focused and parallel procedures at the early conferences, notably at the Stockholm environmental conference in 1972. But the strategic innovations came in the later conferences. NGOs in all of the issue areas expanded their procedural repertoire in the 1990s; the women's NGOs were especially creative. Many of the same NGOs, even small ones, attended multiple conferences. This suggests that cross-mobilizations and cross-references between the conferences may be an elusive source of regularity in NGO repertoires. Some of the shared lobbying strategies across conferences included: participating in preparatory processes at the national and regional level; coordinating lobbying on a daily basis at--and between --the official meetings; circulating information through conference-based newspapers; and increasing contact with official delegates and media representatives.

At Rio, environmental NGOs used several different strategies for influencing their official conferences. Many of them participated in their national and regional preparatory processes, following the UN General Assembly's directive to national governments to include NGOs. A few were even included as members of their national delegation to the official conference processes, giving them unprecedented access to and information about the conference negotiations. The vast majority of NGOs, however, followed the process from a greater distance. They were allowed to distribute proposals and even speak at conference sessions--but only where and when governmental delegates permitted it.

These lobbyists began their days at the UNCED conferences and PrepComs with a strategy session, where they coordinated lobbying, debriefed each other on the previous day's events, formulated joint interventions, and discussed substantive issues. They set up working groups on each of the agenda issues of the conference and worked at influencing language and country positions on the formal documents. Several daily NGO-edited newspapers provided information on the governmental agenda and negotiations, beginning with the second PrepCom. After the second PrepCom, the most active NGOs even coordinated their activities in between the various conferences.

A big issue for the environmental lobbyists was how to incorporate the growing stream of NGOs. Only a few dozen NGOs attended the first PrepCom, but participation gradually grew through the process until a total of fourteen hundred NGOs were registered. Many new participants knew little about the process and what had been done so far, why some compromises were necessary, and so on. The lobbyists produced periodic reference books to bring NGO representatives up-to-date. But they worried that uninformed and inexperienced NGOs hampered their own lobbying efforts.

In the Vienna conference process, many of the larger and older human rights NGOs defended the principles of universality, interdependence, and indivisibility from possible retrograde movement while pushing concrete proposals for better implementation of human rights measures. In a division of labor at the Vienna conference itself, the large international NGOs individually advocated particular proposals. For example, Amnesty International revived the idea of a high commissioner for human rights who could oversee an integrated UN response to human rights violations; the International Commission of Jurists advocated the creation of an international tribunal on human rights. 37

Human rights NGOs also coordinated working groups to discuss lobbying strategies during the official conference in Vienna, but limited access to drafting meetings forced them to seek alternative sources of information. Amnesty International "mounted a constant 'guard' outside the drafting meetings," closely following progress on issues of concern. 38 When NGOs were excluded from drafting meetings, NGO representatives serving on official delegations also began to report regularly to caucuses of their lobbying colleagues, "gaining their input and involvement in turn." 39
In preparation for the Beijing conference, women’s NGOs used all of the repertoires developed at the other conferences and also innovated an additional set of strategies in the 1990s. Because of their experience at the 1985 Nairobi and 1995 Beijing conferences on women, women's NGOs were exceptionally well prepared to engage in lobbying. They had been frustrated at conferences during the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-85) because NGOs were neither involved in the crucial drafting of the conference documents nor sufficiently organized at the conferences themselves. Women improved their lobbying in three ways between Nairobi and Beijing. First, they built coalitions through a caucus mechanism. Second, they participated early and often in preparatory meetings and in the development of new preparatory strategies. Third, they increased contact with the media and national delegations.

Women developed many of those innovations at the UN conferences on other issues. Before Rio, the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) sponsored the largest-ever NGO preparatory conference for a UN meeting, with fifteen hundred attendees. It resulted in the Women's Action Agenda 21, a gender-sensitive lobbying document based on the official conference document drafts. One of the most important mechanisms to come out of theUNCED process was the establishment of the Women's Caucus, a lobbying group (with specific task forces) to channel women's demands at UN conference processes. It applied what became the highly successful strategy of assembling precedent-setting information from previous UN documents to show how women's positions were built on accepted norms within the UN, not new rights. Whereas individual NGOs had been limited in the past to presenting single position papers and lobbying individual official delegates, the Women's Caucus presented joint concerns to the conference as a whole. [End Page 14]

Before the Vienna human rights conference, women's NGOs and human rights organizations formed the Global Campaign for Women's Human Rights. This group of ninety NGOs focused on violence against women as a global human rights issue, working to make it a special theme of the conference. The Global Campaign's efforts culminated at the NGO forum with a Tribunal on Violations of Women's Human Rights, where women presented testimony of human rights abuses to a distinguished panel of judges. The Women's Caucus coordinated lobbying on women at Vienna and was able to make six plenary presentations at the official conference.

In advance of Beijing, the women's own conference, women's NGOs used strategies developed at earlier conferences: large numbers participated in preparatory meetings, formed new caucus structures, and negotiated with national delegations. WEDO coordinated a Linkage Caucus to advance gains made by women at prior UN conferences and circulated three advocacy documents that served as the basis for NGO lobbying efforts. In Beijing up to fifty caucuses met daily on conference grounds to discuss lobbying strategies. A group called the Equipo ("Team"), which represented the major caucuses, coordinated a daily NGO briefing session. Despite their inability to make statements, NGOs were allowed to attend most of the meetings of the governmental Working Groups that debated the text remaining to be negotiated. Since NGOs were still kept out of many of the smaller, more sensitive negotiations, most lobbying was done in the halls, with more organized caucuses circulating draft language. Longtime working relationships with delegates, particularly NGO members who belonged to official delegations, facilitated communication. In addition, NGOs made fully one-third of the plenary speeches. One area where NGOs led the way was in fulfilling their promise to make Beijing a "Conference of Commitments." Although governments refused to hold themselves accountable in the official document for promises made at the conference, NGOs did so by publicizing every promise made by an official delegate. [End Page 15]

Lobbyists at the Beijing official conference, while much more involved and successful than at previous women's conferences, still faced considerable difficulties. As at Rio, veteran lobbyists quickly grew frustrated with the difficulties of absorbing the huge influx of NGOs that had not participated in the preparatory process but now wanted to join the lobbying efforts. The geographical separation between Beijing, the site of the official conference, and its distant suburb of Huairou, the site of the NGO forum, exacerbated the distance between NGOs focused on networking at the forum and those focused on lobbying at the official conference. Moreover, the lobbyists at the official conference, like those at Rio and Vienna, tended to be coordinated by Northern NGOs, who had disproportionate control over NGO resources such as paid personnel, travel funds, data, and computers, as well as the experience required to guide lobbying efforts. However, there were concerted efforts to
integrate individual representatives of Southern NGOs in lobbying strategies.

Government Responses to Lobbying

If established lobbying NGOs had trouble incorporating the rising flood of NGO participants, governments were even less prepared for it. From Rio on, NGOs without ECOSOC consultative status could be authorized for accredited participation in the PrepComs. As a result of this potentially greatly increased access, the PrepComs turned out to be a major arena of contention over NGO participation. During the preparations for all three conferences, there was a Fourth PrepCom phenomenon: at this point in the process, the grudging government inclusion of NGOs changed to exclusion. In each case, the limitations placed on NGOs at the final and arguably most important Fourth PrepCom indicated the degree to which governments were still unwilling to legitimate global civil interactions when they most mattered: during the crucial final stages of drafting the conference documents.

For Rio, the level of NGO admission to the official environmental conference process diminished over the course of preparations. At the early PrepComs, where the discussions focused on procedures, the meetings were formal and NGOs had access. As the actual summit approached, meetings became substantive and informal, with less NGO access. NGOs' access to task-oriented working groups at the PrepComs varied. At the Third Prepcom for Rio, even the working groups that had been most liberal in terms of NGO access decided in the last week to close out NGOs at the Fourth Prepcom, ostensibly to speed negotiations. The narrowing of participatory opportunities coincided with an increase in the number of NGOs seeking to participate as the conference drew nearer, leaving many frustrated.

NGOs were also marginalized at the Fourth PrepCom for the World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna. Their initial participatory rights included the opportunity to observe, submit written statements, and make oral statements at the discretion of committee chairs. But at the Fourth PrepCom in April 1993, where governments were unable to complete the task of drafting a final statement in preparation for the conference, Asian governments led an unabashed effort to limit the NGO participation in drafting sessions at the upcoming conference itself. In a compromise, NGOs were permitted to observe plenary sessions and make presentations to the drafting committee but were excluded from even observing actual drafting. Access to the drafting committee would have permitted NGOs to observe the different positions of the various governments but now they were effectively excluded from meetings where the real work occurred.

Exclusion also characterized the later stages of the Beijing preparatory process and threatened to mar the World Conference on Women itself. In the General Assembly resolution on NGO accreditation for the preparatory process, the degree of governmental ambivalence was indicated by the fact that NGO participation in the official conference was not mentioned. At the Fourth PrepCom in New York in March 1995, NGOs were again effectively excluded from many closed discussions of the conference document. The conference secretary-general, Gertrude Mongella, was said to have described the arrangements as a situation in which "the delegates, as hosts, invited the NGOs into their sitting room, but then disappeared into the kitchen to cook, keeping their guests waiting and hungry." NGOs then lobbied their own governmental delegations to the concurrent ECOSOC meetings. In an unprecedented use of its assembly procedures, ECOSOC challenged the conference delegations' exclusion of NGOs. Meeting in New York, it adopted a declaration on the matter halfway through the Fourth PrepCom that extended the NGO application period for accreditation, gave NGOs the chance to appeal denials, and held that the rules for NGO participation at the Beijing conference should match those of the PrepComs.

To varying degrees, the governmental obstacles to NGO participation at drafting sessions continued throughout the official conferences themselves. Accredited NGO representatives did have access to some of the larger working group sessions set up to hammer out the remaining differences over issues in the final documents left unresolved in the preparatory process. But as with the PrepComs, the more delicate the negotiations, the more exclusionary the meetings. NGOs rarely were able to attend the so-called "informal" sessions at which the most contentious language was argued over by those countries with the most at stake.

NGO Networking: Expanding the Parallel Repertoire
Beyond efforts to influence official positions, a separate and often complementary NGO strategy is networking, which takes place at parallel NGO forums accompanying official government proceedings. Like other accredited forms of NGO conference participation, NGO forums grew in organization and scope in the 1990s.

The parallel repertoire of NGOs could be summarized as NGO-to-NGO policy discussion supplemented by informal networking. Each NGO forum produced its own formal statement, had its own program and newspaper (or newspapers), and offered a multitude of activities for daily visitors. Workshops and other participatory activities and educational displays formed part of the common repertoire of NGOs. At Rio, computer records tallied 450,000 daily visitors over the fourteen-day celebration. Participants selected from a program that included 350 scheduled meetings and even more informal gatherings. Visitors could also watch the official daily conference proceedings on closed-circuit television. In Vienna, groups crowded the halls of the ground floor of the Austria Centre with their displays and overflowed into an adjoining outdoor pavilion. According to one estimate, approximately 255 NGOs held about 400 parallel events at Vienna, in which nearly 3,000 people participated. NGO workshops vied with one another for inadequate meeting space, with double booking of rooms and a lack of chairs a frequent problem. Beijing showed a dramatic proliferation in the number of forum activities over previous women's conferences. Every forum associated with the women's conferences held workshops whose numbers (and issues) increased astonishingly at Beijing. At Mexico City (1975) there were 192 sessions in all; at Copenhagen (1980), 900; at Nairobi (1985), 1,200; and at Beijing, 3,340, an average of 371 sessions per day.

**Government Responses to Networking**

The arrangements for the parallel conferences depended as much on the politics of the host country and UN politics as on the efficacy of the NGO planning committees. As a result, even NGO networking could not proceed free from state interference. The human rights NGO forum was conveniently held at the Austria Centre, where the official conference also met. However, four days before the start of the NGO forum on human rights, the UN decided that the forum program could not be used as printed because it contained country-specific events at which individual countries would be subject to criticism. This would have violated the UN taboo against overt criticisms of member governments at UN-sponsored events. In contrast, it was the Chinese government itself that threatened to throw planning for the women's forum off course. In moves that observers attributed to a fear of radical activism and criticism of its human rights record, the government not only delayed visas for many participants in the women's NGO forum until the last minute (or later) but also switched the site of the forum from Beijing to Huairou a mere four months before the conference. The switch was justified by the dubious claim that the Beijing site could not support the expected number of participants. The new site, an hour's drive from the capital, was never finished, did not provide meeting spaces that could accommodate more than 1,500 people at a time, and located meeting rooms far from each other or in flimsy tents that collapsed under the constant rain. Many participants complained that the NGO coordinating committee had not been sufficiently proactive to prevent the move.

The Rio forum experienced less geographical trouble. Although its parallel conference site was also an hour's trip from the official conference, its setting was the much more congenial and centrally located Atlantic beaches of Rio de Janeiro. Nonetheless, this forum was dogged by financial problems. A budget deficit of $2 million almost stopped the forum as suppliers demanded payment, and one organizer was accused of diverting $1.7 million to his own organization.

In sum, NGOs broadened their repertoires for participating in the UN conference processes, establishing a relatively shared notion of “civil” procedure. But the new civil openness was arbitrary and unstable. NGO privileges and substantive access were trimmed at the whims of governments. For Rio, the trimming went on as preparations progressed, while the Vienna preparations exhibited a fairly stable openness until the last PrepCom considered upcoming conference privileges. At Beijing, ECOSOC resolution procedures external to, yet binding upon, the conference proceedings were used to protect the gains that had been made. Thus states excluded NGOs from negotiation over the most important formal outcomes of the conferences—such as the final statements—and hindered NGO-to-NGO interaction. The changes from the 1970s to the 1990s notwithstanding,
governments still treated NGOs with a significant degree of incivility.

Global Society? The Substance of NGO Participation

Despite the undeniable profusion of nongovernmental actors and activities at UN conferences, there is little consensus on the long-term consequences of these global interactions on the substance of international politics. Observers disagree on the merits, significance, and desirability of NGO activities. In this section, we evaluate the ways the participants frame or interpret NGO participation and the substantive content of their participation. First, we assess the extent to which NGOs themselves have constructed shared frames—or find themselves acting "socially"—with regard to the nature of their role and the substance of their issues. That framing is based on considerable agreement, though "unaligned" frames remain to some degree based on geographical (and geostrategic) differences. Second, we analyze the governmental framing of the NGO role and state-society relations, as shown in the official conference documents and in governments' treatment of NGOs. This framing continues to manifest state dominance over key sovereignty-related issues, casting doubt on whether states and NGOs find themselves in the same global society.

NGO Frames on Global State-Society Relations: Government Monitoring

In over three decades of participation in UN issue conferences, NGOs have fashioned one clear shared presumption about their participation: they have come to see themselves as an irreplaceable part of the conference process. Their importance resides in their role as monitors of governments perceived as unlikely or unable to resolve global problems. In the issue areas of the environment, human rights, and women, NGOs view governments as among the causes of current problems, but themselves as part of the solution. As the Vienna NGO forum report concluded, "In the face of government action or duplicity . . . it was up to NGOs to take a stronger stand." [End Page 21]

For most NGOs, this conclusion led to the corollary that governments need to be monitored by NGOs. The frame has long been shared by human rights NGOs, which was evident in the preparations for Vienna. Amnesty International, for example, adopted the assertive theme "Our World: Our Rights" for its publicity materials, and prior to the fourth PrepCom, circulated a strongly worded yet sophisticated proposal for reform of the existing system of human rights protection. At other conferences as well, the monitoring frame motivated both NGO-to-government activity and NGO-to-NGO exchange, with lobbyists seeing their presence as necessary to prod governments to take positions they would not otherwise take and with networkers offering their parallel conferences as alternatives to governmental conferences that glossed over key issues. Both kinds of participants also saw their continued activism as critical for holding governments accountable at home for the promises they made at the conferences.

The rise in the sheer number of NGO participants attests to the emergence of the government-monitoring frame among NGOs in all issue areas. Tens of thousands of participants spent time and money that showed commitment to action at the level of global processes. Further evidence is provided by the fact that since the conferences in the 1990s, NGOs have shown a commitment to following up on the promises they and governments made at their conferences. Human rights NGOs were quick to criticize governments for the modest achievements of the Vienna conference. WEDO issued its first report on government commitments a year after Beijing. Environmental NGO were a critical audience for the five-year review in 1997 of the Rio conference's Agenda 21 achievements.

An issue of some importance that arises when considering the government monitoring capacity of NGOs is, nor surprisingly, how autonomous NGOs are from their governments. Many governments offered some form of support for NGOs, from allowing NGO participation on governmental delegations to providing funding for national NGO conferences and NGO travel to particular international conferences. Such support brings with it the possibility of compromising NGOs' independence and is often debated among NGO participants. It also indicates, however, that governments may be accepting certain roles for NGOs.

The more serious threat of wholly government-sponsored NGOs has also become a subject of debate. Rules governing ECOSOC consultative status prohibit such groups, but some states have taken advantage of the
relaxed rules for affiliation with UN conferences. Countries such as China have either declared party organs (such as the All China Women's Federation) to be NGOs or established new organizations (such as the Human Rights Society of China) in order to participate in the NGO forums at international UN conferences. These GONGOs (government-organized NGOs) are regarded with suspicion by NGOs that fear government encroachment on their relatively autonomous arenas of debate. But even this move can be seen as reflecting the increasing strength of NGO activity, to the point where governments feel a need to monitor it from within.

NGO Frames on Substantive Issues

A common NGO agenda may also be formed if the substantive concerns and frames developed by NGOs within an issue area are incorporated by NGOs into other issue areas. We find two levels of frame alignment. On the one hand, there are close two-way connections between women's issues and each of the other two issues. On the other hand, environmentalists and human rights activists, while not antagonistic, have done less to incorporate each other's concerns into their own more specific agendas at global conferences.

One result of framing NGO activity in terms of global civil society is to note that steps toward mutual agenda formation taken by nonstate actors have their own rewards, whether or not they have an impact on state actors. Yet we also find that there are important differences in experience and goals among NGOs that fall roughly along geographical lines. North-South differences and concomitant differences of philosophy remain a significant source of "unaligned" NGO frames, or social division. These differences suggest that the globality of global civil society is still somewhat tentative, even when states are left out of the equation.

The earliest documented conference link between environmentalists and women's activists was in 1982, when the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) held a special meeting in Nairobi to evaluate the achievements of Stockholm, ten years after that conference. Although the meeting was not a global conference on the scale of Stockholm or Rio, about one hundred NGOs took part. A women's caucus met twice and established a network "to increase the involvement of women's organizations in environmental issues." The ongoing caucus raised women's issues for environmentalists at the 1982 meeting and then immediately followed up by raising environmental issues at the women's conference in Nairobi three years later. The caucus was aided by environmentalists from the Environment Liaison Centre International (ELCI), an international organization of environmental NGOs permanently located in Nairobi.

After a decade of such cross-mobilizations, the 1990s conferences show quite a bit of mutual influence. In their final documents at the 1992 meeting, environmental NGOs stressed the specific needs and resources of women, while women made environmental justice one of the rallying cries of the Beijing forum. The women's tent at Rio, Planeta Femea, was always among the most crowded, and environmentalists and indigenous activists organized busy workshops at Beijing. Many participating NGOs, such as WEDO, blurred the distinction between environmental and women's NGOs by supporting both issue areas.

Similar kinds of ties have also developed between human rights activists and women's rights activists. Ongoing relationships between key players within large human rights groups and women's rights activists in different countries had solidified in the late 1980s. This fostered the "mainstreaming" of women's rights within human rights discourse and action, leading to the emergence of the movement for women's human rights.

Women's organizing at Vienna was mirrored in the preparations of human rights organizations for the Beijing Conference on Women. To coincide with the Beijing conference, two major international human rights organizations staged campaigns and issued publications on women's human rights. By this time, "women's rights as human rights" had become a dominant frame for NGOs in both issue networks. The NGO documents from both conferences show substantial cross-fertilization.

The connections are much looser between environmentalists and human rights activists. At environmental conferences, indigenous activists have been the most frequent users of rights language. "Human Rights and International Law," for example, was the first section of the final document of the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples on Territory, Environment, and Development, held in Rio immediately before the UN conference. Other
NGO declarations written during various parts of the environmental NGO forum included few references to human rights. In less formal activities, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund sponsored an all-day seminar on human rights and the environment at Rio.

Conversely, the atmosphere of attack on basic human rights assumptions at Vienna was not conducive to an ambitious expansion of the concept of human rights. Human rights NGOs on the lobbying front anticipated the difficulties and steeled themselves to defend existing rights. Some environmental issues pertaining to the right to development were considered at Vienna, but no working group at Vienna's NGO forum focused solely on environmental issues.

Unaligned NGO Frames

Using the language of "frames" draws attention to the fact that the substantive content of particular issues in world politics is not simply inherent in the issue but is constructed by the participants involved. Understandings of the philosophical and procedural content of human rights claims changed considerably between 1968 and 1993, and the same can be said of environmental protection and women's rights. Although NGOs share many frames and definitions, they have also actively disputed meanings with each other. One of the ironies of the global conference phenomenon is that by bringing together so many divergent NGOs, conferences also provide a forum for NGOs to discover their disagreements. Perhaps the sharpest divisions among NGOs are along geographical lines, with Northern and Southern NGOs prioritizing different aspects of these issues. However, airing differences within a particular conference, or across several conferences, can result in further understanding [End Page 25] and collaboration among NGOs, even those from very different national contexts.

The experiences of NGOs at the Rio conference illustrate the types of struggles over frame alignment that may occur during the conference process. Northern NGOs were disproportionately involved in the early preparations for the Rio conference, lobbying official delegates on the conference agenda. This agenda reflected many of the traditional environmental concerns of the North, stressing specific sources of pollution or resources in need of preservation. When Southern NGOs showed up in larger numbers at the third PrepCom, they disrupted this lobbying by focusing on issues on the periphery of the official agenda, such as the ways in which international debt and multinational corporations contributed to environmental degradation. One Northern NGO reported after the Rio conference that issues dividing Northern and Southern NGOs included Southern assertions of national sovereignty over decision making and resources versus Northern support for a global decision-making body and the concept of a global "common heritage of resources." On these issues, some NGOs had more in common with their home governments than with each other.

At the same time, the final conclusion of this report stresses the ways in which NGOs gradually aligned their environmental frames through the remaining PrepComs and the actual Rio conference. The experiences of trying to work together across traditional divides, and the raised awareness among Northern environmental NGOs of issues of concern to Southern NGOs and of development issues generally, may change the way NGOs work in the future. Some Northern NGOs simply picked up the rhetoric of the development debate, but others began changing their policies in response to what they learned through the UNCED. While differences on many of these issues remain among NGOs, the North/South divide was less neatly defined after Rio than before.

North/South divisions characterized the women's conferences in the beginning as well. The repeated encounters and growing experience in negotiation made possible by the four women's conferences resulted, however, in the blurring of what had been a sharp dividing line. The timing of the conferences was also a factor: as the tensions among nations fostered during the cold war receded from the mid-seventies to the mid-nineties, so too did the tensions between Northern and Southern women. [End Page 26]

At Mexico City, women from the South were more concerned about development and imperialism, whereas women from the North focused on sexism to the exclusion of other political considerations. At Copenhagen the conference-wide debate over whether to declare Zionism as a form of apartheid was reflected in the near-pitched battles fought among NGO representatives. But the ever-growing web of women's connections that were developed over the course of the Decade on Women resulted in more agreement on issues of common concern.
In the area of development in particular, interaction between Northern and Southern feminists became increasingly fruitful. By Beijing, women from all regions had found international economic policies increasing their daily responsibilities—although Southern women connected economic issues to problems such as gender-based violence, while Northern women tended to consider such issues separately. 73

In contrast, at Vienna the North/South divide was not a central issue among NGOs. One commentator remarked on the "depth of common understanding" of values, goals, and policies "expressed by human rights activists from both the South and the North of the world." 74 The evidence suggests that NGOs developed this common understanding before the preparations began for the Vienna conference. By 1993 Latin American NGOs in particular were strong advocates of civil and political rights, with experience advocating such rights in international forums. Although one might expect Southern NGOs to be stronger proponents of economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as the right to development, the importance of such claims is widely recognized even by the larger Northern-based NGOs that tend to have the most experience at the UN. For example, the International Commission of Jurists, based in Geneva and dedicated to promoting human rights as a manifestation of the rule of law, determined in 1959 that the rule of law included economic justice; in 1986 the organization helped to promote UN recognition of the right to development. Amnesty International also recognizes the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights. 75 [End Page 27]

With the universality of human rights under attack at the Vienna conference, NGOs set aside any remaining differences over extending the human rights agenda. Efforts to defend the universality of rights and to create stronger monitoring powers were "strongly supported by delegates from over 1,000 nongovernmental organizations, many from Asia, who dismiss the third world's 'relativist' arguments as nothing more than excuses for authoritarian regimes." 76 Contrary to participants' forecasts, there was little evidence of a North/South split at Vienna over the right to development. 77 The unity of Southern and Northern NGOs at Vienna in favor of limits to national sovereignty contrasted with the Southern NGOs' defense of sovereignty at the Rio conference.

This evidence suggests that although NGOs disagree among themselves on many issues, the North/South divide may not always be the most important source of conflict. In all conferences, this divide partially overlaps more persistent divisions between the newer generation of small grassroots organizations focused on local action and the more professional, often larger and older, organizations with long-standing activities at the United Nations. 78 These divisions lead to the differences in repertoire already noted but are also reflected in different substantive orientations. Much as they tend to work within the established mechanisms for NGO participation, 79 older NGOs tend to follow the substantive agenda of the United Nations more closely than do the newer ones.

Governmental Frames on Global State-Society Relations

Governments retain the ability to respond selectively to the new NGO frames, adopting some and firmly rejecting others. After half a decade of global conferencing with active NGO participation, we identify lingering differences between governmental and NGO frames on their relations. [End Page 28] While governments have agreed to a certain level of NGO involvement at the international level, they still bar NGO participation in procedures or issues that in some way restrict state sovereignty. States do not yet agree with NGOs over the substance of global society.

How did governments respond to NGOs' central claim of importance as global actors? On its face, the evidence supports the argument that governments have recognized that NGOs form a new part of global society. The contrasts between the documents of the earliest and latest conferences are especially telling. In all three issue areas, NGOs were virtually ignored at the earlier conferences, meriting only a passing comment in conference documents. In the 1990s, all three sets of final governmental documents found extensive roles for NGOs, who are expected to implement, educate, and even help formulate new approaches to all the issues. The UNCED final document dedicates an entire chapter to the role of NGOs, while NGO references are integrated throughout the Vienna Declaration and the final Beijing document. The new Commission on Sustainable Development, created at Rio, also finds a place for NGO participation. 80

Despite this language, governments were in fact seriously divided over the issue of NGOs' role at both the
conferences themselves and in global politics more generally. The clash came in the "promising but difficult marriage of an essentially American model of democratic lobbying and a forum [the UN] with a built-in democratic deficit," wrote an observer of the women's Fourth PrepCom. Even governments accustomed to American-style lobbying at home drew limits to the roles of NGOs abroad, although developing countries took the lead in excluding NGOs.

Governments did not entirely accept the new NGO frame on the global significance of NGO importance, maintaining their own dominant role, especially at home. The most common kind of reference to NGOs in the Rio conference's Agenda 21 depicts NGOs as secondary collaborators with states, as in this example: "The United Nations . . . in cooperation with Member States and with appropriate international and non-governmental organizations, should make poverty alleviation a major priority." Other language in the documents also reasserts the central role of nation-states. Mark Imber notes that "whereas the Stockholm Declaration postponed the party-pooping affirmation of states-rights until paragraph 21, the Rio Declaration affirms national rights over resources in paragraph 2." This affirmation is backed up with a shift in the language from that of "man's" to "states" responsibility for the environment. In Beijing, religious fundamentalist governments attempted to assert their religious and cultural sovereignty over both NGOs and international organizations, succeeding to a limited extent in enshrining such sovereignty in the final document. At Vienna, while the principle of the universality of human rights was upheld, governments waffled on protections for human rights NGOs at the national level. The final document from the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights cites national law as the relevant standard for the protection of NGO activities, a move that was seen by NGOs as a setback for the impartial application of international standards of human rights. In summary, many governments acknowledge that NGOs have a new role to play in global politics but most resist the full implications of NGO membership in global civil society.

The conference-based struggles to define the limits of global civil society have had an impact beyond the conference arena. The 1996 revision of the terms of NGO consultative status within ECOSOC reflects the progress of, as well as the remaining obstacles to, NGO access to official UN business. The new rules continue to confine NGO consultative status to ECOSOC rather than to the entire General Assembly, and NGOs may not circulate written statements as official documents or play "a negotiating role" at conferences.

However, several changes reflecting the growth of NGO participation in conference processes indicate government acceptance of NGO importance and strength. First, more NGOs are allowed to participate in the consultative and conference processes. In contrast to earlier stipulations, regional and national NGOs' participation is now actively solicited, particularly from countries with developing economies. The new rules continue to confine NGO consultative status to ECOSOC rather than to the entire General Assembly, and NGOs may not circulate written statements as official documents or play "a negotiating role" at conferences.

One way to assess the diffusion of shared-issue definitions among NGOs and governments and thus the creation of a global society is to look for documentary evidence of the impact of NGOs that mobilized for the first time at conferences outside their own issue areas, for example, women participating at human rights or environment conferences. We refer to such impact as "cross-fertilization." If evidence of cross-fertilization shows up at conferences where NGOs rather than governments have linked concerns across issue areas, we contend that it can plausibly be attributed to the growth of global civil society.

Indeed, impressive evidence of women's cross-fertilization appears in the documents of Rio and Vienna. Women and women's concerns are thoroughly absent from the various documents of Stockholm. The words women or woman never appear, and the generic man is the main actor. Population issues receive ample attention, but even so there is no suggestion that women bear children. Women do not appear in the first agenda for Rio but were added to the final agenda only at the Third PrepCom, after a large women's lobbying group showed up at the Second PrepCom. Women lobbied for the Women's Agenda 21, which detailed the language about women to be used, and they largely succeeded. Observers also counted women as the most successful NGO coalition at Vienna, remarking that they were able to get whole paragraphs on women's rights and violence against women into the final document. In contrast, a single resolution had referred to women in the Tehran Final Act. Women
were also successful at their own conference, with some 67 percent of NGO recommendations on controversial text eventually incorporated into the final document. 93

Environmentalists and human rights activists did not form the same kind of united front at any of the conferences, and there is less evidence [End Page 31] of cross-fertilization on their issues. There is some coincidence between the presence of environmental NGOs at the women's conference in Nairobi and the fact that it was the first women's conference that produced a document with an entire special section on the environment. The Vienna document adopted the language of sustainability when discussing the right to development for the first time. 94 Based on these conferences, the evidence suggests that NGOs making a concerted effort to lobby across conferences may achieve more than if they lobby exclusively at their own conferences. The experiences of women indicate that influencing governments may even be easier at conferences on other issues. One reason may be that at a conference on a specific issue, both proponents and opponents are mobilized, while only one side may mobilize for a conference on a seemingly unrelated issue. For example, religious fundamentalists mobilized for the population and women's conferences but largely ignored the environmental conference, and so women faced less opposition there.

Strikingly, NGOs were systematically unable to influence governments on a set of issues that remained remarkably consistent among all of the conferences from 1968 to 1995. Governments rejected NGO challenges to two key nation-state prerogatives: the choice of economic development models and any reference to national militaries. While developing states had objected most strongly to any expansion of the NGO role, developed states also exercised their vetoes on economic and military issues. The United States, the European Union (EU), Canada, and Australia, all defenders of NGOs, were the key negotiators who objected to a paragraph on the "responsibility of states for environmental damage caused by weapons of mass destruction" in Rio's Agenda 21. 95 The United States and the EU played key roles at both Rio and Beijing in opposing language that questioned dominant economic models. 96 At Vienna, strong NGO statements about the "compatibility" of structural adjustment programs and human rights precepts were not reflected in the final governmental documents. 97 In addition, with the growth of attention focused on issues of gender equality through the women's conferences, this arena also has become [End Page 32] one in which certain states assert claims to national (often cultural or religious) sovereignty. At Beijing, representatives of the Holy See, Guatemala, Honduras, Argentina, Malta, Sudan, and Iran frequently used the language of sovereignty to object to certain formulations of women's and girls' rights that they saw as somehow undermining family or national cohesion and morality. When unsuccessful at blocking the inclusion of such rights, they then placed limitations on them when signing the final conference document.

Conclusion

There is no denying that NGOs are on the world stage to stay. Their presence and issues form an integral part of UN thematic conferences. They have advanced shared agendas through NGO-to-NGO networking at UN forums. Moreover, governmental frames have clearly been realigned in the 1990s to recognize a broader role for NGOs and some of their substantive innovations at global conferences. To varying degrees, governments and the UN as an organization permit or facilitate NGO participation in the conferences and rely on their assistance with implementing conference agreements. New rules for NGOs' UN consultative status institutionalize some of the gains made in the 1990s conferences. It is too soon, however, to declare that a global civil society has definitively emerged. Table 3 summarizes the uneven achievement of global civil society as compared with the expectations generated from our initial theorizing of the concept. Thousands of new NGOs have come together in a truly global groundswell of activity to lobby and network at UN conferences. Taken as a whole, however, our empirical findings lead us to conclude that for nongovernmental organizations, as well as for states, the differences between North and South, rich and poor, developed and less developed, still mark contentious political territory.

NGOs' shared procedural repertoires attest to the civil nature of their activities. New rules facilitate their expanded participation. Greater overall interaction is in evidence, much of it in the form of greater NGO-to-NGO contacts. Governments, however, do not perceive such interaction as highly significant. While new rules have been
developed, they have not had the nonarbitrary quality characteristic of theories of domestic civil society. NGOs have been shut out of the most crucial stage of conference planning (the Fourth PrepCom phenomenon) and are given subordinate roles in conference documents. Some governments have placed obstacles to NGO networking during conferences. [End Page 33]

We do find evidence of a deepening society of global NGOs. While NGOs continue to disagree on some specific substantive issues, they do so in a context of intense interaction and debates that places value on their interrelationship. Ongoing interactions between NGOs have also helped to narrow the distance between them on substantive issues. But NGOs’ interactions alone are not enough to establish the existence of a global society, and states only provisionally accept NGOs’ contributions to UN conference processes. Governments are standing firm in their claims to ultimate sovereignty over the issues that seem to most affect their ability to control the distribution of power and resources, whether at home or abroad. Military defense and models of economic development are not negotiable. Moreover, certain countries see gender relations as yet another arena to block challenges to nation-state prerogatives. The substantive content of the three topics do potentially impose different limitations on these prerogatives. In further research we hope to generalize further about the comparative relationship between issue characteristics and states' responses to NGOs.

Government responses do correspond in some ways to the patterns of NGO mobilizations, with more responsiveness where NGOs are more [End Page 34] visible. Responsiveness, however, does not necessarily mean acceptance of NGO perspectives. When NGOs do seek to engage states, most states seem to respond by calculating their interests rather than by cultivating a relationship with NGOs. On the one hand, states have an incentive to respond positively to NGO efforts to participate in intergovernmental forums: they can act as representatives of popular opinion or as informed observers on governance issues at the international level, as well as help governments in the implementation of international agreements. On the other hand, NGOs demand of governments resources and principled action that governments may not willingly provide or undertake. On issues that centrally address state sovereignty, more NGO visibility only means a more forceful negative response. In the final analysis, even new kinds of global conferences on new global issues with new global participants remain partially imprisoned by traditional roles and priorities of international politics. State sovereignty sets the limits of global civil society.

Ann Marie Clark is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. She is working on a book about Amnesty International and the development of contemporary international human rights norms.

Elisabeth J. Friedman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University. She has published on transnational women's organizing and gender and democratization in Latin America. Her book on women's experience of democratization in Venezuela is forthcoming.

Kathryn Hochstetler is Assistant Professor of Comparative Environmental Politics at Colorado State University. She has published several articles and book chapters on environmental movements and democratization in Latin America and is currently completing a book manuscript on the subject.

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Notes

1. Others have observed that further investigation is necessary. Martin Shaw observes that "too little attention has been paid" to the "empirical analysis of [social movements in civil society] and their relevance to the global/interstate contexts." Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate note that "the differences, conflicts, and tensions in the interstate order are relatively well documented and discussed; this is not true for the nonstate order." Shaw, "Civil Society and Global Politics," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23 (Fall


11. Organizations falling into the latter category sometimes call themselves social movements, but we have chosen to use the term *nongovernmental organization* to refer to groups with both types of aims. This term is the most appropriate choice for this article since it is also the UN designation for such groups.


Elisabeth J. Friedman observed the Vienna NGO forum; the NGO forum of the Latin American and Caribbean Regional PrepCom for Beijing at Mar de Plata, Argentina; and the Beijing conference, both the NGO forum and the official conference, as an accredited NGO representative. Kathryn Hochstetler observed four preparatory meetings of the Brazilian NGO forum for the UNCED in 1990 and 1991; a Latin American NGO preparatory forum sponsored by Friends of the Earth in São Paulo, Brazil; and the official and parallel meetings of the UNCED Fourth PrepCom. Throughout this article, we refer to the conferences either by their title or by the city in which they were held.

The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo, Egypt, and some later conferences might also fit into our conceptual framework.

The largest difference between the 1994 Cairo conference and the conferences analyzed in this article may be that the first population conferences (Rome, 1954, and Belgrade, 1964) were specialist conferences characterized by specialized, knowledge-based, consultative interactions between NGOs and governments. These conferences were cosponsored by a transnational scientific organization, the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSPP). Planners for the 1974 population conference in Bucharest, although themselves a group of academics and government specialists, decided that it should not be another specialist conference. Thus, the Bucharest and later Mexico City (1984) and Cairo (1994) conferences were more broadly based, but still had a significant knowledge-based component. Paul Taylor, "Population: Coming to Terms with People," in Taylor and Groom (fn. 13), 151.

Applying our analytical categories to Cairo, our initial research suggests that the procedures governing NGO participation were not particularly contentious because alliances were built based on the shared knowledge component. With some possible exceptions, cleavages were characterized by NGO-to-government agreement on various sides of substantive issues rather than by disagreements between governments and NGOs.

We use official conference and PrepCom (Preparatory Committee Session) to distinguish governmental proceedings from NGO forums.


Weiss et al. (fn. 1), 239.


The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the International Conference of Scientific Unions were the early "hybrids." Morphet (fn. 17).

For example, only two representatives per accredited NGO were permitted to participate on a limited basis in
the governmental conference at Mexico City.


31. Rowland (fn. 26), 1.

32. We discuss North-South tensions between NGOs later in the paper in "Unaligned NGO Frames."


35. For one version of this argument, see Matthias Finger, "Environmental NGOs in the UNCED Process," in T. Princen and M. Finger, eds., *Environmental NGO in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

36. UN Resolution 44/228, December 22, 1989.

37. "Some Proposals from NGOs for the World Conference," *NGO-Newsletter* (February 1993), in Manfred Nowak, ed., *The World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna, June 1993: The Contribution of NGOs: Reports and Documents* (Vienna: Manz, 1994), 217. The position of high commissioner was not established by the conference but was approved in the following General Assembly session. A tribunal has not been established.


40. Martha Alter Chen, "Engendering World Conferences: The International Women's Movement and the UN," in
Weiss and Gordenker (fn. 39).


43. In the preparatory process for the Rio conference and others, the official meetings received one of three designations, which provided for different levels of NGO participation. "Formal" meetings, with governmental statements for the record, allowed NGOs to be present, to give presentations if asked or allowed by the chair of the meeting, and to lobby. "Formal informal" meetings allowed the presence of NGOs at the discretion of the chair. "Informal" meetings involved many kinds of gatherings. Most of the actual governmental negotiating sessions were scheduled as officially informal meetings, meaning that NGOs had no systematic access to them.


46. Cook (fn. 38), 192.


52. Fraser (fn. 22), 60, 147, 199; Esther Ngan-ling Chow, "Making Waves, Moving Mountains: Reflections on Beijing '95 and Beyond," *Signs* 22, no. 1 (1996), 187.


(December 1992), the 39-page document issued the same month by Amnesty International.

59. A contrast between many governments' sense of relief after the Vienna conference and NGOs' strident criticisms appears in Markus Schmidt, "What Happened to the 'Spirit of Vienna'? The Follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the Mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights," Nordic Journal of International Law 64 (1995), 599.

60. WEDO, Beyond Promises: Governments in Motion One Year after the Beijing Women's Conference (New York: WEDO, 1996).


63. This finding contradicts Wapner's expectation that his analysis of the parallel activities of Northern NGOs on the environmental front could be extended to all NGOs. Wapner (fn. 5), 316.


70. Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations Issues and Non-Governmental Organizations Programme (fn. 34), 16.

71. Ibid., 11.

72. Stephenson (fn. 25), 143.


78. Nowak and Schwartz estimate that over 70 percent of NGOs at Vienna were small Southern NGOs participating at the global level for the first time. Nowak and Schwartz (fn. 51), 8. According to a survey of five hundred NGOs that "go to, or wish to go to UN conferences in the 1990s," 76 percent felt "restricted" by larger NGOs; 75 percent by English-language NGOs; and 71 percent by Northern NGOs. Benchmark Environmental Consulting, Democratic Global Governance: Report of the 1995 Benchmark Survey of NGOs (Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996) 26-28. See also Gaer (fn. 39), 58.

79. Peter Uvin makes the point that Southern NGOs have a good deal to gain from cooperating with larger Northern NGOs. "Third World NGOs increasingly attempt to link up with Northern ingos [international NGOs] in order to influence rich country governments. . . . Northern ingos increasingly serve as lobbyists for their Southern partners, working with them to promote policy change at the summit." Uvin, "Scaling Up the Grassroots and Scaling Down the Summit: The Relations between Third World NGOs and the un," in Weiss and Gordenker (fn. 39), 167.


83. Imber (fn. 80).


86. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 (July 25, 1996) replaces ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (1968), which formerly governed NGO consultative status.

87. Willetts points to a document (Decision 1/1) that indicated such restrictions during the Rio preparatory process and seems to have been incorporated into Resolution 1996/31. Willetts (fn. 30), 74-75.


89. Ibid., section IX, paragraphs 68-70.


92. UN Document A/Conf.32/41 (fn. 19), part 3, res. 9.

93. WEDO (fn. 42), cover letter.


