International organizations have never been more central to world politics than they are today. At least 238 international organizations (IOs) are currently at work on every imaginable global issue. Investigate almost any violent conflict, environmental concern, financial meltdown, or humanitarian crisis and you will find international organizations involved, probably in a leading role. These organizations do much more than simply execute international agreements between states. They make authoritative decisions that reach every corner of the globe and affect areas as public as governmental spending and as private as reproductive rights. They now work extensively in domestic governance issues, overseeing matters that once used to be the prerogatives of states. One IO, the European Central Bank, is now overseeing monetary policy for some of the most powerful states of the world. Different branches of the UN and NATO have become deeply involved in national military organizations of member states. A whole variety of IOs are busily defining human rights, refugee rights, children’s rights, and women’s rights, shaping how these rights are understood at both the international and the domestic level. The World Health Organization issues travel advisories and investigates and sanctions those countries that, in its judgment, have failed to take proper action in reporting and combating disease. When the international community engages in nation-building and postconflict transition assistance it is IOs that do much, even most, of the work. Organizations such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe are entrusted with drafting new constitutions and judicial arrangements, re-creat-
ing financial institutions, and creating civilian police—in essence remaking entire states. Our goal in writing this book is to understand better why IOs behave as they do. Most international relations theory provides surprisingly little help in this regard. For all the ubiquity of IOs, international relations (IR) scholars have not given systematic consideration to how IOs actually behave. Most of our theories are theories of states and state behavior. International organizations are treated as structures of rules, principles, norms, and decision-making procedures through which others, usually states, act. IOs have no agency and cannot act in any meaningful way under most theoretical constructs in the field. To the extent that they allow IOs to “behave” at all, most theories simply assume that IOs do what states want. They offer functional accounts in which IOs are created and continue to exist because of the (usually desirable) functions they perform. States create IOs to solve problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. This functionalism is only an assumption of these theories, though, and tends to focus scholars’ attention on why states create IOs to fulfill certain functions rather than on whether, in fact, subsequent IO behavior is as functional as assumed. The assumptions of these theories—their statism and functionalism—deserve scrutiny, and the preoccupation with creation at the expense of behavior needs correction. The notion that IOs simply do what states want quickly runs afoul of the many instances in which IOs develop their own ideas and pursue their own agendas. Similarly, the functionalist assumption runs into a sea of empirical anomalies. IOs often produce inefficient, self-defeating outcomes and turn their backs on those whom they are supposed to serve.

We want to know why.

Scholarship on organizations generally (not just IOs) has made it abundantly clear that organizations routinely behave in ways unanticipated by their creators and not formally sanctioned by their members. Organizations that start with one mission routinely acquire others. Organizations adapt to changing circumstances in unanticipated ways and adopt new routines and functions without getting approval from their “stakeholders.” Organizations are notoriously resistant to reform or redirection because change threatens entrenched organizational culture and interests. International organizations evidence all these familiar traits. They exhibit mission creep. They wander far from their original mandate and into new terrains and territories. They develop new rules and routines in response to new problems that they identify. They formulate rules that are politically safe and comfortably routine rather than efficient or effective. We want to understand these behaviors in IOs.

In this book we develop a constructivist approach to understanding IO behavior that provides a theoretical basis for treating IOs as autonomous ac-

TOCs and helps explain the propensity toward dysfunctional change over time. We need a new kind of theory to make sense of the changes that IOs undergo in their ability to change the world. IOs through the lens of constructivist analysis can be viewed as novel arrangements of social organizations, mandates, and practices. As such, IOs are not just passive enforcers of rules; they are also creators of rules through the process of persuasion and social learning. Whether they meet success or failure, international reauthorizations adapt to new experiences that have become organizational culture. They also have various responsibilities in ways not defined by their mandates.

We examine these through a theoretical framework of reauthorizations. We examine the IMF and the intervention in domestic countries that expanded beyond the original mandate. We examine the role of the UNHCR and the treatment of refugees. We also examine the role of human rights organizations. The concept of human rights is complex, and there are various ways in which human rights organizations can be understood. The concept of human rights is also complex, and there are various ways in which human rights organizations can be understood. The concept of human rights is also complex, and there are various ways in which human rights organizations can be understood.
First, we can address from a different angle the question. Can IOs act autonomously from states and if so, how? This connection of autonomy to authority requires some discussion. State-centric theoretical approaches provide no reason to expect, much less understand, autonomous IO behavior. Despite all their attention to international institutions, most international relations scholars treat IOs the way pluralists treat the state. For them, IOs are mechanisms or structures through which others (usually states) act; they are not purposive actors. There are, in fact, good reasons why scholars have been skeptical about IO autonomy. Large public IOs are almost always the creations of states and are almost always designed to give states, particularly powerful ones, a great deal of control. States often provide the money for these organizations, usually dominate their top decision-making bodies, and determine who becomes the chief executive. Thus, it has been difficult for many analysts to imagine IOs as anything more than tools in the controlling hands of states.

More recently, scholars have used principal-agent analysis to explore the question of IO autonomy. 34 Acting IOs as agents of states (principals), these scholars recognized that states purposefully design IOs with some autonomy since otherwise IOs would not be able to carry out their assigned tasks. In these analyses, IOs may act autonomously within a “zone of discretion” to advance state interests or to make policy where state interests are unclear or weak, and at times may even advance policies contrary to the interests of some states. 4 Missing from these analyses, however, is a clear prior specification of what IOs want in these interactions with states. Why would IOs ever want anything other than what their state principals want? These agents, after all, are created by their state principals. States write their mission statements and design their structure precisely to ensure they will be responsive tools. We need to understand how and why IO preferences diverge from state preferences, not just empirically but also theoretically.

Principal-agent dynamics are fueled by the disjunction between what agents want and what principals want. To produce any insights, those two sets of interests cannot be identical. IR theory provides us with interests only for states, and since IOs are created by states and their mission statements are written by states, it is not at all clear how an independent set of IO preferences might be derived. Analysts could proceed on the assumption that IOs want an expanded budget or mandate, but this hardly begins to exhaust the range of interests that motivate IO behavior. Just as IR theorists now recognize that there is variation in state interests and that to understand that variation requires unpacking the state, so, too, scholars of IOs need to recognize that there is variation in IO interests and that to understand that variation requires unpacking the international organization. If scholars want to understand when IOs exhibit autonomy, then they will have to be attentive not only to state interests but also to IO interests. Our approach, as we argue

Understanding IOs as bureaucracies opens up an alternative way of understanding the sources of their autonomy and what they do with that autonomy. Bureaucracies are not just servants to whom states delegate. Bureaucracies are also authorities in their own right, and that authority gives them autonomy vis-à-vis states, individuals, and other international actors. By “authority” we mean the ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference from others. Our claim that IOs possess authority puts us at odds with much of IR theory, which presumes that only states can possess authority because sovereignty is the only basis of authority. We suggest otherwise. When societies confer authority on the state, they do not do so exclusively. Domestic societies contain an array of authorities, differing in degree and kind. The state is an authority, but academics, professionals and experts, heads of nongovernmental organizations, and religious and business leaders can also be conferred authority. So, too, in international life authority is conferred in differing degrees and kinds on actors other than states. Prominent among these are IOs.

What makes IOs authorities? As we discuss in chapter 2, IOs can have authority both because of the missions they pursue and because of the ways they pursue them. IOs act to promote socially valued goals such as protecting human rights, providing development assistance, and brokering peace agreements. IOs use their credibility as promoters of “progress” toward these valued goals to command deference, that is, exercise authority, in these arenas of action. In addition, because they are bureaucracies, IOs carry out their missions by means that are mostly rational, technocratic, impartial, and nonviolent. This often makes IOs appear more legitimate to more actors than self-serving states that employ coercive tactics in pursuit of their particularistic goals. Their means, like their missions, give IOs authority to act where individual states may not. 7

What do IOs do with that authority? Often they do much more than the states that are their creators intend. IOs do not simply pursue the mandates handed to them. Indeed, they probably could not do so, even if they wanted to. The mission statements of most large public IOs are ambiguous and require interpretation. IO staff must transform these broad mandates into workable doctrines, procedures, and ways of acting in the world. Understanding how they do this is a major concern of our case studies. States may actually want autonomous action from IO staff. Indeed, they often create an IO and invest it with considerable autonomy precisely because they are neither able nor willing to perform the IO’s mission themselves. Once in place, the staff of IOs take their missions seriously and often develop their own views and organizational cultures to promote what they see as “good policy” or to protect it from states that have competing interests. And, of course, neither states nor IO staff can predict new challenges, crises, and exigencies that force IO staff to change their missions and their existing policies.
consider a second important topic, namely, the power of IOs and the kinds of effects they create in the world. This question—whether IOs “matter,” or have independent effects—has been at the core of the neorealist-neoliberal debate in international relations theory for almost two decades now. Our approach provides strong reasons to expect IOs to have resources at their disposal overlooked by both these approaches—resources that make them far more powerful and consequential than even neorealists would suppose.

In their debate, neorealists and neoliberals have focused on tools of power—material coercion (or inducements), and information. Further, they have focused only on the ability of IOs to shape state behavior, which does not begin to capture the full range of ways IOs shape the world around them. Sometimes IOs do have material resources. They often have money, even guns, and can use these to influence the behavior of others. Refugees and poor farmers often do what UNHCR and World Bank officials want because of the material resources of those organizations. States, even sizable ones, may be coerced by the IMF into adopting policies they would not otherwise adopt because of the Fund’s financial resources. But in this kind of power sweepstakes, IOs are usually dwarfed by large states. The IMF may be able to tell Zambia, Bolivia, or perhaps even Argentina what to do, but the most economically powerful states have a fair bit to say about what the IMF proposes. Because IOs can rarely coerce large states to do their bidding, IR scholars have tended to think they are not powerful.

Similarly, IOs do influence outcomes by manipulating information—creating transparency, monitoring compliance, and enforcing rules in ways that change incentives for state action. Having UN peacekeepers verify a cease-fire can cause parties to the agreement to abide by the agreement for fear of being caught if they do not. WHO reports about the HIV/AIDS pandemic and SARS can help states understand the transnational dynamics of the diseases and better devise policies to slow their spread. Clearer rules about what is (or is not) “fair” trade, coupled with an IO like the World Trade Organization (WTO) to arbitrate disputes, can provide incentives for greater liberalization worldwide. The Organization for Security and Cooperation’s Office of High Commissioner for Refugees has encouraged respect for human rights by articulating what the standards are and broadcasting how countries might be falling short of them. IOs can collect, publicize, and strategically deploy information in order to try to shape behavior. But in this kind of informational sweepstakes, IOs rarely have an advantage over states. IOs seldom have private information, unavailable to interested powerful states. States, not IOs, tend to enjoy superior access to information.

IOs are powerful not so much because they possess material and informational resources but, more fundamentally, because they use their authority to construct and create social reality. IOs do more than just manipulate information; they analyze and interpret it, investing information with meaning that orients and prompts action, thereby transforming information into knowledge. World Bank does not only collect data and produce descriptive statistics on national economies. It also takes those raw data and couples them to particular policy problems, often of the Bank’s own creation. The Bank defines development, telling us what data measure it. It tells us what constitutes poverty and what data are necessary to act on that policy problem, discussed in chapter 2, transforming information into knowledge by giving it meaning, value, and purpose one of the major activities of authorities in social life.

As authorities, IOs can use their knowledge to exercise power in two ways. First, they can regulate the social world, altering the behavior of states and nonstate actors by changing incentives for their decisions. Frequently they do this in order to get actors to conform with existing rules and norms of behavior. The UN Human Rights Commission publishes information about states’ torture practices, thus creating incentives for states to comply with human rights norms. IOs have a range of tools to regulate state and nonstate behavior.

Second, we can better understand the power IOs wield by viewing them as bureaucracies. IOs exercise power as they use their knowledge and authority not only to regulate what currently exists but also to constitute the world, creating new interests, actors, and social activities. This can be understood as “social construction power” because IOs use their knowledge to help create social reality. IOs are often the actors to whom we defer when it comes to defining meanings, norms of good behavior, the nature of social actors, and categories of legitimate social action in the world. IOs are often the actors empowered to decide if there is a problem at all, what kind of problem it is, and whose responsibility it is to solve it. IOs thus help determine the kind of world that is to be governed and the agenda for global governance. UNHCR helps to determine not only who is a refugee but also what a refugee is and what should be done about their plight. The IMF, World Bank, and other IOs have been involved not only in assessing good economic performance but also in defining what are “best practices” and “good governance” for national economies and in determining whose responsibility it is to create and manage economic reform. IOs have helped determine not only who is in violation of human rights but also what human rights are and what should be done to promote or protect them. In this fundamental respect, IOs shape both how the world is constituted and our agendas for acting in it.

Treating IOs as bureaucracies also gives us insights into a third set of issues, those connected with the propensity of IOs for undesirable and self-defeating behavior. Surprisingly, this has received relatively little attention. The reason for this neglect, we suspect, is that the theoretical
apparatus many scholars use provides few grounds for expecting undesirable IO behavior. State-centric utility-maximizing frameworks borrowed from economics simply assume that IOs are reasonably responsive to state interests (or, at least, more responsive than alternative policy tools); otherwise states would withdraw from them. This, however, is a logical implication of these frameworks; it is rarely treated as a hypothesis subject to empirical investigation. With little theoretical reason to expect counter-productive or self-defeating behavior in IOs, these scholars do not look for it and have had little to say about it.

Sometimes the reasons why IOs fail are obvious. IO staff are often the first to point out that they are frequently given mandates without funding and assigned tasks that others cannot or will not do. Further, large public bureaucracies are often designed to satisfy political rather than performance criteria and are, in this sense, designed to fail. Staff are frequently selected according to national background and not merit, and the redundancy and inefficiency in staff structure can derive from the need to satisfy political requirements of regional or ideological representation.

Yet not all undesirable IO behavior can be blamed on states. IOs often generate their own mistakes, perversities, even disasters. In fact, it is often the very features that make bureaucracies authoritative and effective that can encourage bureaucratic dysfunction. Bureaucracies divide labor, create standardized rules of action, and deploy relevant social knowledge to solve problems in an orderly, rational way. These are virtues. It is precisely because bureaucracies act this way that they can effectively carry out the complex social tasks we give them. However, each of these capabilities also comes with liabilities. Division of labor and specialization can create tunnel vision among staff. Standardized rules of action can make it difficult to respond to unique situations. Expert knowledge may solve some problems but inevitably carries biases and limitations that can create new problems. Bureaucracies can thus become obsessed with their own rules and captives of parochial outlooks and internal culture. We call “pathologies” those dysfunctions that are attributable to bureaucratic culture and internal bureaucratic processes and that lead the IO to act in a manner that subverts its self-professed goals. There are many ways in which a bureaucratic culture can create pathologies. One of our aims is to identify several possibilities and then explore in detail a few of those.

Finally, our approach provides insight into change in international organizations. Conventional IR approaches assume that change in IOs must be the result of changing demands of strong states, but as policymakers are well aware, getting any large bureaucracy, including international bureaucracies, to reform or respond to demands for change is an exercise in frustration. U.S. efforts to reform the World Bank and the UN did eventually spur some change, but change was slow and very incomplete. These efforts ended up being successful at showing the
stuff” of which bureaucracy question about what makes up, sets it. “How are things in the... makes things behave and what causes are constituted socially. IOs and the effects this is of constitutive explanation, such as “if X happens, then... understandable of how certain kinds probable, and why.

CASE DESIGN

Chapter 2 explores what IOs about the nature of bureaucracy form for IO behavior, providing our case studies. Each approach and our framework claim that IO behavior follows little autonomy of any constraining the kinds of pressures respond. Tracing these issues extremely important, state and IO behavior.16

This suggests that IOs requires that we be specific as states only when IOs are able contrary to their expressed statist that there are, indeed, seems unnecessarily restricts IO activity that might be in the powerful. If, by contrast, able to act in ways not does not well explained by state. We look in our cases for patterns in these cases, we look for constitutive patterns of IO action.

Tainly these IOs paid close attention to what states, especially strong states, wanted, but in all three cases we found these organizations pursuing important, often defining, policies that were not demanded by state members. Even where the IO did adopt policies favored by states, however, we must remember that correlation is not causation. IOs and states can arrive at similar policies but for very different reasons, as we see in the Rwanda case. In other cases, for example that of UNHCR, IOs can be the policy leaders, setting the agenda in their domain of action and co-opting states to adopt it. At times, IOs may actually shape the policy preferences of states by changing what states want. It matters who initiates policy and why. By investigating IO interests and determining both where they came from and whether they differ from those of states, we are better able to identify potentially autonomous actions.

Autonomy is not simply present or absent in IO behavior, however. It varies in both degree and kind, and in each case we assess the degree and kind of autonomy we see. In chapter 2 we identify five different kinds of autonomous behavior that IOs might exhibit with respect to states. IOs might act independently from, but consistently with, state interests, interpreting mandates and implementing policy in ways that are perhaps unanticipated but are agreeable to states. They also might operate in areas to which states are indifferent. They might fail to carry out state interests, oppose state interests, or change state interests. IOs thus have complicated relationships of both autonomy and dependence with a variety of other actors, including states. While state demands matter, they leave much unexplained.

We then attempt to explain the autonomous IO behavior we see. Here, too, our framework provides guidance. We deduce from general principles of bureaucracy a set of expectations about how IOs might behave and the kinds of effects they might have in the world. Using these insights, elaborated in chapter 2, we look inside the IOs at the way they are put together socially and culturally, at their authority, and at their rules and show how these organizational characteristics can explain the behavior we see.17 The framework suggests that IOs will formulate goals for action that reflect the sources of their authority—their rational-legal character, their mandate from states, and the expertise and moral claims that legitimate them in the, broader political scene. It suggests that as bureaucracies and rational-legal entities, IOs will exercise power and further their goals through impersonal rules. In each case we examine the use of rules and their effects, both intended and otherwise, on those inside as well as on those on whom the organization acts. In addition, the framework suggests that the specific sources of authority for an organization will shape its work, and we examine these connections.

Understanding how IOs work demands both historical and interpretive analysis. Understanding the historical experience encoded in these organi-
zations is crucial. It is not enough to open up the black box and take a shot of the organizational culture at one moment in time. Instead, to follow the sequence of events as they unfolded in an organizational and historical context and were subsequently made in the organizational culture. Our historical analysis, therefore, involves detailed research. Just as an investigator analyzing an airplane crash must pay attention to a sequence of contributing factors, not just the final outcome, we insist that any examination of IO interactions and especially cooperation and decision making in the context of these rules be done. The rules that IO staff use to see the world and make decisions are always a product of the organization and impose a set of constraints on what the rules are. Instead, it is absolutely critical that we ask the IO staff to interpret the rules the way they do. In this, we can analyze and contextualize what the key events in the events we analyze.

Proceeding in this manner allows us to determine how, when, and why IOs are able to act in ways that are not always straightforward or exhibit different kinds of autonomy. It also allows us to arrive at a more complete understanding of IO-state interactions. To be clear, the approach we develop in this book makes a difference. We are not simply interested in the rules that states impose on the IOs. State support is a crucial component of IO authority. The case studies illustrate that states do not simply act in a vacuum. They respond to the demands as they formulate policy. We do not want to create a myth of IO omnipotence to replace a myth of state omniscience. The demands are only one component of the behavior. IOs are also passive servants of states. They are political representatives of their states and face the same political pressures as states do. The advantage of this approach is that it puts the interactive relationship between state and IO at the center of our analysis. This allows us to see how the rules and norms are adopted by states without making it seem like a rigid, linear process. It is not a way street in which states simply dictate.

We apply our approach in three case studies. Chapter 3 examines the International Monetary Fund and highlights the authority and autonomy come from professional expertise. Developing specialized knowledge carry out tasks is a hallmark of bureaucratic environments. The behavior that legitimates it—yet it is not what we understand as autonomy. Political scientists have tended to focus on expertise as independent, existing independently of organizations and states and in the routine of organizations. By our examination of the IMF staff and technologies and economic models that made balance-of-payments problems tractable for policymakers. These models were influential, however, not because the IMF kept this knowledge inside the organization but because the Fund disseminated it widely, reducing rather than exploiting information asymmetries. Only by understanding the economic models could states and others be persuaded to follow their prescriptions.

We then consider the relationship between the IMF's expertise, its power, and its growing role in Third World states. The models used by the Fund led to a demand for methods that were designed not only to regulate member states' domestic economies but also, ultimately, to reconstitute them. The IMF faced the challenge of getting deficit governments to accept its recommendations. Toward that end it began to set conditions on the use of its resources. Conditionality, however, often did not produce the desired results. When programs failed to solve members' payments problems, the Fund's assessment usually concluded that the original models were too narrow and that new variables had to be included. Policy failure justified expansion, not retrenchment. Over time, the Fund moved from a limited focus on balance-of-payments lending to more sweeping structural interventions in member states' economies and societies in an attempt to control activities that might contribute to stabilization. Alongside conditionality, the IMF established technical assistance programs that were designed to help develop new economic institutions and enable the country to absorb the knowledge and recommendations imparted by the agency. The IMF thus uses its expert authority both to regulate the economy of Third World societies and to help reconstitute those societies in the process.

Chapter 4 examines the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the way it used its moral authority to expand the category of refugee and its scope of action. It then explores the emergence of a repatriation culture and the rules governing repatriation that led to the violation of refugee rights, that is, pathological behavior. When states created UNHCR in 1951, they gave it a three-year life span, almost no autonomy, and a very circumscribed mandate. UNHCR was to provide legal, not material, assistance only to people who had been displaced by events in Europe prior to 1951. Yet the agency was able to capitalize on refugee-producing events and use its institutional position and moral authority to expand the concept of refugee, to widen its assistance and protection activities, and to significantly extend its sphere of operations. By the late 1970s it was no longer a small European refugee agency but a global humanitarian organization. UNHCR was established to help find "permanent solutions" to refugee circumstances and to do so in accord with the regime's foundational principle of nonrefoulement: refugees cannot be returned against their will to a situation that continues to represent a threat to their existence. In the
early decades of its life, the organization’s favored solution involved resettling refugees in some new country. Over time, however, the organization has increasingly favored “voluntary repatriation” as a solution for refugees that satisfies political dilemmas and still respects refugee law principles. In fact, voluntary repatriation has become so ingrained in the organization’s culture that beginning in the late 1980s there was growing evidence that the organization was sponsoring repatriation exercises that were hardly voluntary and clearly violated refugee rights. To illustrate this repatriation culture at work, we detail UNHCR’s handling of the Rohingyan refugee flight in 1994, one of the largest refugee flights of this or any period. In response, UNHCR authorized the repatriation of the Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Burma in ways that violated the principle of voluntary repatriation.

Chapter 5 considers the case of UN peacekeeping and the theme of pathology in the UN Secretariat’s policy toward Rwanda through late April 1994. Before 1989 the UN operated with clear peacekeeping rules involving consent of parties, impartiality, and neutrality in any mission. The spate of missions authorized in the early 1990s involving humanitarian emergencies, domestic conflict, and nation-building suddenly made those rules unworkable and led the organization to use much more assertive rules to carry out these new, more ambitious missions. Failure of these missions, particularly the one in Somalia that departed from consent-based rules and used force, made UN officials fear that these new missions and the departure from the rules of classical peacekeeping threatened the survival of peacekeeping as an enterprise. As a consequence, they reasserted old rules emphasizing neutrality and impartiality in autumn 1993 and directed that peacekeeping be used under very restrictive conditions. These rules, in force by the time of the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide on April 6, 1994, guided UN officials to see the genocide as a civil war and to conclude that there was no basis for intervention to stop the killing of eight hundred thousand people.

This array of cases has several advantages for our purposes. First, choosing IOs working in security (UN Security Council), finance (IMF), and humanitarian affairs (UNHCR) helps us demonstrate the utility of this approach across many issue areas. Second, selecting cases where there are obvious and often widely accepted statist explanations of the behavior of IOs makes these good test cases for our argument. The Secretariat did not push the Security Council to authorize intervention to stop killings in Rwanda because powerful states who opposed intervention (particularly the United States) pressured it into silence. IMF staff advocate particular economic models and intrusively apply them around the world because those are the models of powerful states, home to powerful capitalists. UNHCR made repatriation the durable solution to refugee plights and engaged in acts of involuntary repatriation because states wanted to repatriate refugees.

staff in places like Burma. The existence of robust counterexplanations rooted in state demands makes these cases hard ones for our autonomy hypothesis. Third, these cases offer some variation in the sorts of controls that states place on IOs and the ways in which IOs are dependent on states. Financial dependence varies. The IMF is largely self-financed, paying for its operating budget with money returned on the funds it manages. The UN levies annual dues but has no sure way to collect them should states decide to withhold payment. UNHCR, by contrast, must pass the hat for voluntary contributions. Similarly, voting structure and governance arrangements vary. The IMF and the Secretariat are both under very immediate direction by state representatives who are constantly present in the building when business is conducted. Although UNHCR’s Executive Committee helps to set broad policy directions, it is much less involved in daily operations. Finally, we selected cases that provide variation in one of the key elements of bureaucracy identified in chapter 2—authority. Each of these IOs traffics in a different mix of authority claims. The IMF relies heavily on expert authority, the Secretariat on moral authority, and UNHCR on a mix of moral and expert authority. While such a limited number of cases permits only provisional generalizations, variation in authority types helps us to begin to understand how different types of authority have different consequences for organizational behavior.

In the concluding chapter we explore both empirical and normative implications of our argument. Empirically, one consistent finding is that IOs tend to expand. Our framework provides reasons why this should be true, and our case studies illustrate how these theoretical mechanisms play out on the ground. Consistent expansion of IOs raises questions about the future shape of politics, however. It raises the prospect of an ever more bureaucratized world, with international organizations becoming steadily more involved in more aspects of our daily lives. This, in turn, raises questions about whether such increasing bureaucratization, which we suspect is inevitable, is a good thing. On the one hand, a strong thread running through the ever-expanding world of IOs is their substantively liberal character. Most IOs were founded by Western liberal states and are designed to promote liberal values. To the extent that one likes political liberalism, IO expansion is, indeed, good. However, the liberal norms embodied and promoted by these organizations are generally not matched with the accountability or participation procedures that liberalism favors. These are emphatically not democratic organizations. This raises the possibility that at the global level we face an undemocratic liberalism, and we explore this possibility at the end of the book.