International organizations have never been more central to world politics than they are today. At least 238 international organizations (IOs) are currently at work on every imaginable global issue. Investigate almost any violent conflict, environmental concern, financial meltdown, or humanitarian crisis and you will find international organizations involved, probably in a leading role. These organizations do much more than simply execute international agreements between states. They make authoritative decisions that reach every corner of the globe and affect areas as public as governmental spending and as private as reproductive rights. They now work extensively in domestic governance issues, overseeing matters that once used to be the prerogatives of states. One IO, the European Central Bank, is now overseeing monetary policy for some of the most powerful states of the world. Different branches of the UN and NATO have become deeply involved in national military organizations of member states. A whole variety of IOs are busily defining human rights, refugee rights, children’s rights, and women’s rights, shaping how these rights are understood at both the international and the domestic level. The World Health Organization issues travel advisories and investigates and sanctions those countries that, in its judgment, have failed to take proper action in reporting and combating disease. When the international community engages in nation-building and postconflict transition assistance it is IOs that do much, even most, of the work. Organizations such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe are entrusted with drafting new constitutions and judicial arrangements, re-creat-
ing financial institutions, and creating civilian police—in essence remaking entire states.²

Our goal in writing this book is to understand better why IOs behave as they do. Most international relations theory provides surprisingly little help in this regard. For all the ubiquitousness and importance of IOs, international relations (IR) scholars have not given systematic consideration to how IOs actually behave. Most of our theories are theories of states and state behavior. International organizations are treated as structures of rules, principles, norms, and decision-making procedures through which others, usually states, act.³ IOs have no agency and cannot act in any meaningful way under most theoretical constructs in the field. To the extent that they allow IOs to “behave” at all, most theories simply assume that IOs do what states want. They offer functional accounts in which IOs are created and continue to exist because of the (usually desirable) functions they perform. States create IOs to solve problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. This functionalism is only an assumption of these theories, though, and tends to focus scholars’ attention on why states create IOs to fulfill certain functions rather than on whether, in fact, subsequent IO behavior is as functional as assumed. The assumptions of these theories—their statism and functionalism—deserve scrutiny, and the preoccupation with creation at the expense of behavior needs correction. The notion that IOs simply do what states want quickly runs afoul of the many instances in which IOs develop their own ideas and pursue their own agendas. Similarly, the functionalist assumption runs into a sea of empirical anomalies. IOs often produce inefficient, self-defeating outcomes and turn their backs on those whom they are supposed to serve. We want to know why.

Scholarship on organizations generally (not just IOs) has made it abundantly clear that organizations routinely behave in ways unanticipated by their creators and not formally sanctioned by their members. Organizations that start with one mission routinely acquire others. Organizations adapt to changing circumstances in unanticipated ways and adopt new routines and functions without getting approval from their “stakeholders.” Organizations are notoriously resistant to reform or redirection because change threatens entrenched organizational culture and interests. International organizations evidence all these familiar traits. They exhibit mission creep. They wander far from their original mandate and into new terrains and territories. They develop new rules and routines in response to new problems that they identify. They formulate rules that are politically safe and comfortably routine rather than efficient or effective. We want to understand these behaviors in IOs.

In this book we develop a constructivist approach to understanding IO behavior that provides a theoretical basis for treating IOs as autonomous ac-

tors and helps explain the power they exercise in world politics, their propensity toward dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior, and the way they change over time. We ground our analysis on the fact that IOs are bureaucracies. Bureaucracy is a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic and behavioral proclivities. It is because of their authority that bureaucracies have autonomy and the ability to change the work around them. Bureaucracies exercise power in the world through their ability to make impersonal rules. They then use these rules not only to regulate but also to constitute and construct the social world. IOs, through their rules create new categories of actors, form new interests for actors, define new shared international tasks, and disseminate new models of social organization around the globe. However, the same impersonal rules that define bureaucracies and make them effective in modern life can also cause problems. Bureaucracies can become obsessed with their own rules at the expense of their primary missions in ways that produce inefficient and self-defeating outcomes. Thus, while bureaucracies can be forces of progress and good, they can also fail, sometimes in spectacular ways. Whether they meet success or failure, international organizations change and evolve over time. Bureaucracies adapt to new circumstances and challenges, drawing from experience that has become encoded in rules and embedded in the organizational culture. They also expand, taking on new missions, mandates, and responsibilities in ways not imagined by their founders.

We examine these themes both theoretically and empirically. After presenting a theoretical framework in chapter 2, we provide detailed empirical examinations of three IOs working in three different areas of world politics. We examine the IMF and the way its economic expertise made ever-increasing intervention in domestic economies seem logical and even necessary to states that had explicitly barred such action in the organization’s Articles of Agreement. We then examine how the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) used its authority to expand the concept of refugee and later developed a repatriation culture that led to violations of refugee rights. Finally, we look at the UN Secretariat, the bureaucratization of peacekeeping, and the development of a peacekeeping culture that led to an institutional ideology of impartiality that made it legitimate to ignore crimes against humanity in Rwanda. In all three cases, IOs were not simply following the demands issued by states but instead acting like the bureaucracies that they are.

**UNDERSTANDING IO BEHAVIOR**

Treating IOs as bureaucracies allows us to provide insights into four aspects of IO behavior that have sparked debate among scholars of international relations: autonomy, power, dysfunction, and change.
First, we can address from a different angle the question, Can IOs act autonomously from states and if so, how? This connection of autonomy to authority requires some discussion. State-centric theoretical approaches provide no reason to expect, much less understand, autonomous IO behavior. Despite all their attention to international institutions, most international relations scholars treat IOs the way pluralists treat the state. For them, IOs are mechanisms or structures through which others (usually states) act; they are not purposive actors. There are, in fact, good reasons why scholars have been skeptical about IO autonomy. Large public IOs are almost always the creations of states and are almost always designed to give states, particularly powerful ones, a great deal of control. States often provide the money for these organizations, usually dominate their top decision-making bodies, and determine who becomes the chief executive. Thus, it has been difficult for many analysts to imagine IOs as anything more than tools in the controlling hands of states.

More recently, scholars have used principal-agent analysis to explore the question of IO autonomy. Viewing IOs as agents of states (principals), these scholars recognized that states purposefully design IOs with some autonomy since otherwise IOs would not be able to carry out their assigned tasks. In these analyses, IOs may act autonomously within a “zone of discretion” to advance state interests or to make policy where state interests are unclear or weak, and at times may even advance policies contrary to the interests of some states. Missing from these analyses, however, is a clear a priori specification of what IOs want in these interactions with states. Why would IOs ever want anything other than what their state principals want? These agents, after all, are created by their state principals. States write their mission statements and design their structure precisely to ensure they will be responsive tools. We need to understand how and why IO preferences diverge from state preferences, not just empirically but also theoretically.

Principal-agent dynamics are fueled by the disjuncture between what agents want and what principals want. To produce any insights, these two sets of interests cannot be identical. IR theory provides us with interests only for states, and since IOs are created by states and their mission statements are written by states, it is not at all clear how an independent set of IO preferences might be derived. Analysts could proceed on the assumption that IOs want an expanded budget or mandate, but this hardly begins to exhaust the range of interests that motivate IO behavior. Just as IR theorists now recognize that there is variation in state interests and that to understand that variation requires unpacking the state, so, too, scholars of IOs need to recognize that there is variation in IO interests and that to understand that variation requires unpacking the international organization. If scholars want to understand when IOs exhibit autonomy, then they will have to be attentive not only to state interests but also to IO interests. Our approach, as we argue
consider a second important topic, namely, the power of IEs and the kinds of effects they create in the world. This question—whether IOs “matter,” or have independent effects—has been at the core of the neorealist-neoliberal debate in international relations theory for almost two decades now. Our approach provides strong reasons to expect IOs to have resources at their disposal overlooked by both these approaches—such as material resources and tools of power that make them far more powerful and consequential than even neoliberalists would propose.

In their debate, neorealists and neoliberalists have focused on or tools of power—material coercion (or inducements), and information. Further, they have focused only on the ability of IOs to shape state behavior, which does not begin to capture the full range of ways IOs shape the world around them. Sometimes IOs do have material resources. They often have money, even guns, and can use these to influence the behavior of others. Refugees and poor farmers often do what UNHCR and World Bank officials want because of the material resources of those organizations. States, even sizable ones, may be coerced by the IMF into adopting policies they would not otherwise adopt because of the Fund’s financial resources. But in this kind of power sweepstakes, IOs are usually dwarfed by large states. The IMF may be able to tell Zambia, Bolivia, or even Argentina what to do, but the most economically powerful states have a fair bit to say about what the IMF proposes. Because IOs can rarely coerce large states to do their bidding, IR scholars have tended to think they are not powerful.

Similarly, IOs do influence outcomes by manipulating information—creating transparency, monitoring compliance, and enforcing rules in ways that change incentives for state action. Having UN peacekeepers verify a cease-fire can cause parties to the agreement to abide by the agreement for fear of being caught if they do not. WHO reports about the HIV/AIDS pandemic and SARS can help states understand the transnational dynamics of the diseases and better devise policies to slow their spread. Clearer rules about what is (or is not) “fair” trade, coupled with an IO like the World Trade Organization (WTO) to arbitrate disputes, can provide incentives for greater liberalization worldwide. The Organization for Security and Cooperation’s Office of High Commissioner for Refugees has encouraged respect for human rights by articulating what the standards are and broadcasting how countries might be falling short of them. IOs can collect, publicize, and strategically deploy information in order to try to shape behavior. But in this kind of informational sweepstakes, IOs rarely have an advantage over states. IOs seldom have private information, unavailable to interested powerful states. States, not IOs, tend to enjoy superior access to information.

IOs are powerful not so much because they possess material and informational resources but, more fundamentally, because they use their authority to construct and create social reality. IOs do more than just manipulate information; they analyze and interpret it, investing information with meaning that creates social reality. IOs do more than just manipulate information; they analyze and interpret it, investing information with meaning that orient and prompt action, thereby transforming information into knowledge. World Bank does not only collect data and produce descriptive statistics on national economies. It also takes that raw data and couples them to particular policy problems, often of the Bank’s own creation. The Bank defines development, telling us what data measure it. It tells us what constitutes poverty and what data are necessary to act on that policy problem. discussed in chapter 2, transforming information into knowledge by giving it meaning, value, and purpose is one of the major activities of authorities in social life.

As authorities, IOs can use their knowledge to exercise power in two ways. First, they can regulate the social world, altering the behavior of states and nonstate actors by changing incentives for their decisions. Frequently they do this in order to get actors to conform with existing rules and norms of behavior. The UN Human Rights Commission publishes information about states’ torture practices, thus creating incentives for states to comply with human rights norms. IOs have a range of tools to regulate state and nonstate behavior.

Second, we can better understand the power IOs wield by viewing them as bureaucracies. IOs exercise power as they use their knowledge and authority not only to regulate what currently exists but also to constitute the world, creating new interests, actors, and social activities. This can be understood as “social construction power” because IOs use their knowledge to help create social reality. IOs are often the actors to whom we defer when it comes to defining meanings, norms of good behavior, the nature of social actors, and categories of legitimate social action in the world. IOs are often the actors empowered to decide if there is a problem at all, what kind of problem it is, and whose responsibility it is to solve it. IOs thus help determine the kind of world that is to be governed and set the agenda for global governance. UNHCR helps to determine not only who is a refugee but also what a refugee is and what should be done about their plight. The IMF, World Bank, and other IOs have been involved not only in assessing good economic performance but also in defining what are “best practices” and “good governance” for national economies and in determining whose responsibilities it is to create and manage economic reform. IOs have helped determine not only who is in violation of human rights but also what human rights are and what should be done to promote or protect them. In this fundamental respect, IOs shape both the world is constituted and our agendas for acting in it.

Treating IOs as bureaucracies also gives us insights into a third set of issues, those connected with the propensity of IOs for undesirable and self-defeating behavior. Surprisingly, this has received relatively little attention. The reason for this neglect, we suspect, is that the theoretical
apparatus many scholars use provides few grounds for expecting undesirable IO behavior. State-centric utility-maximizing frameworks borrowed from economics simply assume that IOs are reasonably responsive to state interests (or, at least, more responsive than alternative policy tools); otherwise states would withdraw from them. This, however, is a logical implication of these frameworks; it is rarely treated as a hypothesis subject to empirical investigation. With little theoretical reason to expect counterproductive or self-defeating behavior in IOs, these scholars do not look for it and have had little to say about it.

Sometimes the reasons why IOs fail are obvious. IO staff are often the first to point out that they are frequently given mandates without funding and assigned tasks that others cannot or will not do. Further, large public bureaucracies are often designed to satisfy political rather than performance criteria and are, in this sense, designed to fail. Staff are frequently selected according to national background and not merit, and the redundancy and inefficiency in staff structure can derive from the need to satisfy political requirements of regional or ideological representation.

Yet not all undesirable IO behavior can be blamed on states. IOs often generate their own mistakes, perversities, even disasters. In fact, it is often the very features that make bureaucracies authoritative and effective that can encourage bureaucratic dysfunction. Bureaucracies divide labor, create standardized rules of action, and deploy relevant social knowledge to solve problems in an orderly, rational way. These are virtues. It is precisely because bureaucracies act this way that they can effectively carry out the complex social tasks we give them. However, each of these capabilities also comes with liabilities. Division of labor and specialization can create tunnel vision among staff. Standardized rules of action can make it difficult to respond to unique situations. Expert knowledge may solve some problems but inevitably carries biases and limitations that can create new problems. Bureaucracies can thus become obsessed with their own rules and captives of parochial outlooks and internal culture. We call “pathologies” those dysfunctions that are attributable to bureaucratic culture and internal bureaucratic processes and that lead the IO to act in a manner that subverts its self-professed goals. There are many ways in which a bureaucratic culture can create pathologies. One of our aims is to identify several possibilities and then explore in detail a few of those.

Finally, our approach provides insight into change in international organizations. Conventional IR approaches assume that change in IOs must be the result of changing demands of strong states, but as policymakers are well aware, getting a large bureaucracy, including international bureaucracies, to reform or respond to demands for change can be an exercise in frustration. U.S. efforts to reform the World Bank and the UN did eventually spur some change, but change was slow and very incomplete. These efforts eventually failed at changing the formal structures than at changing everyday practices and routines. Conversely, these organizations often change in ways that states do not ask for or anticipate. IOs continually formulate new tasks and new procedures for doing their work in response to changing world situations, changing expertise, and other factors. States can usually step these changes if they want to (although often only after tremendous exhortion), but they do not generally initiate them. We need to better understand both what prompts unsolicited change and what sparks resistance to demands for change, as well as what types of change are likely to succeed (or fail).

There are many possible causes of change in IOs, and we discuss a variety of these in chapter 2. However, the constitutive arguments we develop about IOs suggest several important observations about IO dynamics. One is that IOs are not black boxes that respond to external stimuli (state demands for change, policy shocks) in an obvious or unproblematic way. Over time these organizations develop strong bureaucratic cultures that profoundly shape the way external demands or shocks are interpreted and the kinds of responses the organization will entertain and, eventually, implement. Second, because of these cultures, change in IOs is almost always highly path dependent. Bureaucracies encode experience into their governing rules and standard operating procedures, which strongly discourage some types of change and make others more likely. Any attempts at change must be filtered through that accretion. Finally, our constitutive argument provides insights into the often remarked, often derided, and generally pervasive phenomenon of mission creep in bureaucracies, including IOs. IO missions may expand simply because states give them more tasks, but, as the term “mission creep” suggests, there is an unintended internal logic at work here as well. As IOs go about their business of defining tasks and implementing mandates, they tend to do so in ways that permit, or even require, more intervention by more IOs. This is not bureaucratic imperialism so much as it is a logical outgrowth of the nature of their authority. As rational-legal authorities, bureaucracies tend to value the technocratic impartiality that legitimates them and so tend to construct problems and solutions in ways that reflect those preferences. They define problems and appropriate solutions in ways that favor more technocratic impartial action, which, of course, they are uniquely able to supply.

In sum, we can better understand what IOs do if we better understand what IOs are. International organizations are bureaucracies, and bureaucracies are a distinctive social form that exercises authority in particular ways. Perhaps most influential and least noticed are the ways in which IOs use their authority to both regulate and constitute the world. By opening up the black box of international organizations and examining how they are constituted and use their authority, we can begin to understand their power, their capacity for pathological behavior, and the way they evolve.

The claims we make in this book thus flow from an analysis of the "social
stuff” of which bureaucracy is made. We are asking a standard constructivist question about what makes the world hang together. As Alexander Wendt puts it, “How are things in the world put together so that they have the properties they do?” In this sense, our explanation of IO behavior is constitutive and differs from most other international relations approaches. This approach does not make our explanation mere description, since understanding the constitution of things is essential to explaining how those things behave and what causes outcomes. Understanding how bureaucracies are constituted socially allows us to hypothesize about the behavior of IOs and the effects this social form might have in world politics. This type of constitutive explanation does not allow us to offer law-like statements such as “if X happens, then Y must follow.” Rather, by providing a more complete understanding of what bureaucracy is, we can provide explanations of how certain kinds of bureaucratic behavior are possible, or even probable, and why.

CASE DESIGN

Chapter 2 explores what IOs are. In it we develop a constitutive argument about the nature of bureaucracy and theorize about the implications of that social form for IO behavior. This framework provides guidance for structuring our case studies. Each case study begins by treating the statist approach and our framework as competing arguments. Statist arguments claim that IO behavior follows directly from state demands, ergo IOs exhibit little autonomy of any consequence. We assess the statist hypothesis by examining the kinds of pressures states put on organizations and the way IOs respond. Tracing these interactions, we show that, while state demands are extremely important, state action by no means determines all, or even most, IO behavior.

This suggests that IOs can act autonomously, but clear demonstration requires that we be specific about what counts as autonomy. If autonomy exists only when IOs are able to coerce powerful states, forcing them to act contrary to their expressed interests, then we would have to agree with the statist that there are, indeed, few instances of IO autonomy. This criterion seems unnecessarily restrictive, however, since it excludes a wide variety of IO activity that might be independent of states but not actively opposed by the powerful. If, by contrast, we understand autonomy to exist when IOs are able to act in ways not dictated by states, we capture the range of activity not well explained by statist arguments and can provide a fuller argument. We look in our cases for precisely such instances.

To identify this autonomy empirically in the three cases, we look for consistent patterns of IO action that cannot be traced to state pressures. Certainly these IOs paid close attention to what states, especially strong states, wanted, but in all three cases we found these organizations pursuing important, often defining, policies that were not demanded by state members. Even where the IO did adopt policies favored by states, however, we must remember that correlation is not causation. IOs and states can arrive at similar policies but for very different reasons, as we see in the Rwanda case. In other cases, for example that of UNHCR, IOs can be the policy leaders, setting the agenda in their domain of action and cajoling states to adopt it. At times, IOs may actually shape the policy preferences of states by changing what states want. It matters who initiates policy and why. By investigating IO interests and determining both where they came from and whether they differ from those of states, we are better able to identify potentially autonomous actions.}

Autonomy is not simply present or absent in IO behavior, however. It varies in both degree and kind, and in each case we assess the degree and kind of autonomy we see. In chapter 2 we identify five different kinds of autonomous behavior that IOs might exhibit with respect to states. IOs might act independently and consistently with, without interfering, mandating and implementing policy in ways that are perhaps unanticipated but are agreeable to states. They also might operate in areas where they are indifferent. They might fail to carry out state interests, oppose state interests, or change state interests. IOs thus have complicated relationships of both autonomy and dependence with a variety of other actors, including states. While state demands matter, they leave much unexplained.

We then attempt to explain the autonomous IO behavior we see. Here, too, our framework provides guidance. We deduce from general principles of bureaucracy a set of expectations about how IOs might behave and the kinds of effects they might have in the world. Using these insights, elaborated in chapter 2, we look inside the IOs at the way they are put together socially and culturally, at their authority, and at their rules and show how these organizational characteristics can explain the behavior we see. The framework suggests that IOs will formulate goals for action that reflect the sources of their authority—their rational-legal character, their mandate from states, and the expertise and moral claims that legitimate them in the broader political scene. It suggests that as bureaucracies and rational-legal entities, IOs will exercise power and further their goals through impersonal rules. In each case we examine the use of rules and their effects, both intended and otherwise, on those inside as well as on those on whom the organization acts. In addition, the framework suggests that the specific sources of authority for an organization will shape its work, and we examine these connections.
izations is crucial. It is not enough to open up the black box and take a snapshot of the organizational culture at one moment in time. Instead, it is critical to follow the sequence of events as they unfold in an organizational and historical context and were subsequently encoded in the organizational culture. Our historical analysis, therefore, involves detailed reconstructions. Just as an investigator analyzing an airplane crash must pay attention to a sequence of contributing factors, not just the pilot's final words, so, too, do we insist that any examination of IO decisions, and especially of pathologies, go beyond the immediate to consider how environmental forces shaped the rules that IO staff use to see the world and make decisions. 16

We also undertake interpretive analysis. We are interested in how IO staff come to create and interpret the bureaucratic rules that shape both how they classify and see the world and how they act in it. 17 It is never enough to stand outside the organization and impose a set of meanings or interpretations of what the rules are. Instead, it is absolutely critical that we ask how and why IO staff interpreted the rules the way they did. To do this, we supplement archival and textual analysis with interviews of many of the key participants in the events we analyze.

Proceeding in this manner allows us to determine how, when, and why IOs are able to act in ways that are not demanded by states and thus to exhibit different kinds of autonomy. It also has an additional advantage: it advances a more complete understanding of IO-state interactions. As should be clear, the approach we develop in no way denies a role for states. On the contrary, the case studies illustrate that states are a central fact of life for each of these IOs. State support is a crucial component of IO authority, states significantly constrain IO behavior, and IOs are keenly conscious of state demands as they formulate policy. We do not want to create a mythical world of IO omnipotence to replace a mythical world of IO obsequiousness. But state demands are only one component of IO behavior. IOs are not simply passive servants of states. They are political actors in their own right, having their own particular resources for shaping political action, and both shaping and being shaped by others. One decided advantage of our approach is that it puts the interactive relationship between states and IOs at the center of analysis rather than presuming that the relationship is a one-way street in which states simply dictate to IOs.

We apply our approach in three case studies. Chapter 3 examines the International Monetary Fund and highlights the authority and autonomy that come from professional expertise. Deploying specialized knowledge to carry out tasks is a hallmark of bureaucracy—one of the rational-legal behaviors that legitimate it—yet it is not clear that we understand this process well. Political scientists have tended to think of expertise as information that exists independently of organizations and creates organizational power by giving an advantage to those who have it. Our examination of the IMF sug-

suggests that neither of these is true. IMF staff had to create the "intellectual technologies" and economic models that made balance-of-payments problems tractable for policymakers. These models were influential, however, not because the IMF kept this knowledge inside the organization but because the Fund disseminated it widely, reducing rather than exploiting information asymmetries. Only by understanding the economic models could states and others be persuaded to follow their prescriptions.

We then consider the relationship between the IMF's expertise, its power, and its growing role in Third World states. The models used by the Fund led it to recommend policies that were designed not only to regulate member states' domestic economies but also, ultimately, to (re)construct them. The IMF faced the challenge of getting deficit governments to accept its recommendations. Toward that end it began to set conditions on use of its resources. Conditionality, however, often did not produce the desired results. When programs failed to solve members' payments problems, the Fund's assessment usually concluded that the original models were too narrow and that new variables had to be included. Policy failure justified expansion, not retrenchment. Over time, the Fund moved from a limited focus on balance-of-payments lending to ever more sweeping structural interventions in members' economies and societies in an attempt to control activities that might contribute to stabilization. Alongside conditionality, the IMF established technical assistance programs that were designed to help develop new economic institutions and enable the country to absorb the knowledge and recommendations imparted by the agency. The IMF thus uses its expert authority both to regulate the economy of Third World societies and to help reconstitute those societies in the process.

Chapter 4 examines the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the way it used its moral authority to expand the category of refugee and its scope of action. It then explores the emergence of a repatriation culture and rules governing repatriation that led to the violation of refugee rights, that is, pathological behavior. When states created UNHCR in 1951, they gave it a three-year life span, almost no autonomy, and a very circumscribed mandate. UNHCR was to provide legal, not material, assistance only to people who had been displaced by events in Europe prior to 1951. Yet the agency was able to capitalize on refugee-producing events and use its institutional position and moral authority to expand the concept of refugee, to widen its assistance and protection activities, and to significantly extend its sphere of operations. By the late 1970s it was no longer a small European refugee agency but a global humanitarian organization.

UNHCR was established to help find "permanent solutions" to refugee circumstances and to do so in accord with the refugee regime's foundational principle of nonrefoulement: refugees cannot be returned against their will to a situation that continues to represent a threat to their existence. In the
early decades of its life, the organization’s favored solution involved resettling refugees in some new country. Over time, however, the organization has increasingly favored “voluntary repatriation” as a solution for refugees that satisfies political dilemmas and still respects refugee law principles. In fact, voluntary repatriation has become so ingrained in the organization’s culture that beginning in the late 1980s there was growing evidence that the organization was sponsoring repatriation exercises that were hardly voluntary and clearly violated refugee rights. To illustrate this repatriation culture at work, we detail UNHCR’s handling of the Rohingya refugee flight in 1994, one of the largest refugee flights of this or any period. In response, UNHCR authorized the repatriation of the Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Burma in ways that violated the principle of voluntary repatriation.

Chapter 5 considers the case of UN peacekeeping and the theme of pathology in the UN Secretariat’s policy toward Rwanda through late April 1994. Before 1989 the UN operated with clear peacekeeping rules involving consent of parties, impartiality, and neutrality in any mission. The state of missions authorized in the early 1990s involving humanitarian emergencies, domestic conflict, and nation-building suddenly made those rules unworkable and led the organization to use much more assertive rules to carry out these new, more ambitious missions. Failure of these missions, particularly the one in Somalia that departed from consent-based rules and used force, made UN officials fear that these new missions and the departure from the rules of classical peacekeeping threatened the survival of peacekeeping as an enterprise. As a consequence, they reassessed old rules emphasizing neutrality and impartiality in autumn 1993 and directed that peacekeeping be used under very restrictive conditions. These rules, in force by the time of the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide on April 6, 1994, guided UN officials to see the genocide as a civil war and to conclude that there was no basis for intervention to stop the killing of eight hundred thousand people.

This array of cases has several advantages for our purposes. First, choosing IOs working in security (UN Security Council), finance (IMF), and humanitarian affairs (UNHCR) helps us demonstrate the utility of this approach across many issue areas. Second, selecting cases where there are obvious and often widely accepted statist explanations of the behavior of IOs makes these good test cases for our argument. The Secretariat did not push the Security Council to authorize intervention to stop killings in Rwanda because powerful states who opposed intervention (particularly the United States) pressured it into silence. IMF staff advocate particular economic models and intrusively apply them around the world because those are the models of powerful states, home to powerful capitalists. UNHCR made repatriation the durable solution to refugee plights and engaged in acts of involuntary repatriation because states wanted to repatriate refugees in places like Burma. The existence of robust counterexplanations rooted in state demands makes these cases hard ones for our autonomy hypothesis. Third, these cases offer some variation in the sorts of controls that states place on IOs and the ways in which IOs are dependent on states. Financial dependence varies. The IMF is largely self-financed, paying for its operating budget with money returned on the funds it manages. The UN levies annual dues but has no sure way to collect them should states decide to withhold payment. UNHCR, by contrast, must pass the hat for voluntary contributions. Similarly, voting structure and governance arrangements vary. The IMF and the Secretariat are both under very immediate direction by state representatives who are constantly present in the building when business is conducted. Although UNHCR’s Executive Committee helps to set broad policy directions, it is much less involved in daily operations. Finally, we selected cases that provide variation in one of the key elements of bureaucracy identified in chapter 2—authority. Each of these IOs traffic in a different mix of authority claims. The IMF relies heavily on expert authority, the Secretariat on moral authority, and UNHCR on a mix of moral and expert authority. While such a limited number of cases permits only provisional generalizations, variation in authority types helps us to begin to understand how different types of authority have different consequences for organizational behavior.

In the concluding chapter we explore both empirical and normative implications of our argument. Empirically, one consistent finding is that IOs tend to expand. Our framework provides reasons why this should be true, and our case studies illustrate how these theoretical mechanisms play out on the ground. Consistent expansion of IOs raises questions about the future shape of politics, however. It raises the prospect of an ever more bureaucratized world, with international organizations becoming steadily more involved in more aspects of our daily lives. This, in turn, raises questions about whether such increasing bureaucratization, which we suspect is inevitable, is a good thing. On the one hand, a strong thread running through the ever-expanding world of IOs is their substantively liberal character. Most IOs were founded by Western liberal states and are designed to promote liberal values. To the extent that one likes political liberalism, IO expansion is, indeed, good. However, the liberal norms embodied and promoted by these organizations are generally not matched with the accountability or participation procedures that liberalism favors. These are emphatically not democratic organizations. This raises the possibility that at the global level we face an undemocratic liberalism, and we explore this possibility at the end of the book.