From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups
Restructuring World Politics

Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink

The chapters in this volume take us from Santiago to Seattle, covering over twenty-five years of the most recent wave of transnational advocacy. When Chilean activists, exiled by the repressive Pinochet regime in the mid-1970s, took their human rights campaign abroad and requested the support of governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world to bring pressure to bear on the Chilean government to improve its human rights practices, they initiated a form of transnational advocacy that has become increasingly common in the last two decades. This campaign came full circle in 1998, when General Pinochet was arrested in London for human rights violations committed during his government.¹

At the close of the twentieth century, transnational advocacy groups gave a visible and startling manifestation of their power in the massive demonstrations against the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle, Washington, where they contributed to shutting down global negotiations and captured world attention for their cause. The protest in Seattle was not an isolated, spontaneous event but rather a conscious tactic of an increasingly coordinated and powerful movement against globalization that often targets international organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In this volume, we argue that what links the episodes in Santiago and Seattle, and the many other cases explored here, is that all are forms of transnational collective action involving nongovernmental organizations interacting with international norms to restructure world politics. The chapters
in this volume focus on this novel, but increasingly important process and its effects in issue areas from labor to human rights and gender justice to democratization and (sustainable) development. We contribute to a broader debate in the social sciences over the role of transnational relations involving nonstate actors of various kinds, including epistemic communities, professional groups, and foundations, but in particular we highlight the role of nongovernmental organizations and social movements.

One of the primary goals of transnational advocacy is to create, strengthen, implement, and monitor international norms. How they go about doing this, when they are successful, and what the problems and complications are for this kind of transnational advocacy and international norm work are the main themes of this book. In it, we have chosen to look at a wide range of cases around the world where nongovernmental actors attempt to change norms and practices of states, international organizations, and private sector firms. We have also invited leaders from activist organizations to join the dialogue and critically comment on the lessons and challenges for restructuring world politics that emerge from this volume.

We join other scholars and policymakers who now assert that international nongovernmental organizations and transnational social movements are emerging as a powerful new force in international politics and are transforming global norms and practices (see, for example, Risse-Kappen 1995a; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Lipschutz 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Stiles 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Peterson 1992; Florini 2000). Others see these nonstate actors as sources of resistance “from below” to globalization that challenge the authority and practices of states and international institutions that shape the parameters for global governance (Falk 1997; Waterman, Fairbrother, and Eger 1998; Mittelman 2000; Naim 2000; O’Brien et al. 2000). Indeed the networks, coalitions, and movements we study in this volume have, in some cases, become active participants in “de facto global governance” (Shaw 2000). Some analysts even herald the emergence of a global civil society and its corresponding notion of global citizenship (Dorsey 1993; Wapner 1995; Lipschutz 1992, 1996; Falk 1993, 1998; Commission on Global Governance 1995, 1999; Naidoo 2000; Reinicke and Deng 2000). Many different terms are now used to describe these new forms of global governance—“complex multilateralism,” “heterarchic governance,” “multi-level structures of transnational governance,” or “networked minimalism” (O’Brien et al. 2000; Knight 2000; Smith 2000; Nye and Donahue 2000). All stress a similar phenomena—the increase in new nonstate actors, new arenas for action, and the blurring of distinctions between domestic and global levels of politics.

This volume contributes to this dynamic, ongoing dialogue. We provide additional quantitative evidence of the growth of international non-governmental and transnational social movement organizations, and qualitative case studies that explore the dynamics and appraise the effectiveness of the transnational networks, coalitions, and movements in which they are members. The chapters in this volume tell some inspiring yet puzzling stories of historically weak coalitions and networks that contributed to unexpected changes in norms, policies, and practices.

In India, for example, a coalition of local, national, and international nonstate organizations has been able to reform and even stall the construction of a huge set of large dams on the Narmada River. Relatedly, in Washington, D.C., networks of nongovernmental organizations around the globe compelled the World Bank to alter its lending policies and priorities to take social and environmental concerns into account.

But we also examine cases of transnational collective action involving nonstate actors that have been less successful. A campaign to change the conditionality policies of the IMF has, as yet, made little impact. In the 1990s, women around the world convinced policymakers that violence against women was a serious violation of human rights that governments needed to address, but they have had less success in actually helping to reduce the incidence of such violence in domestic contexts.

The chapters in this volume attempt to bridge at least two sets of theoretical literatures: the literature on transnationalism, regimes, and norms in the international relations subfield of political science, and the literature on social movements in sociology and political science. Scholars in these two fields often have not addressed or even acknowledged one another. For international relations scholars and social movement theorists to enter into a theoretical dialogue with each other requires both translation—because sometimes they are talking about similar phenomena but using different words—and grappling with each other’s empirical frames of reference.

The social movements literature has developed intermediate theoretical propositions about when social movements emerge, what forms they take, the roles they play in social life, the types of impacts they have, and (to a lesser extent) the conditions under which they can be effective. Because this literature has always focused directly on nonstate actors, its emerging synthesis of theoretical concepts and propositions provides a potentially rich source of insights for the international relations student of transnational collective action (for example, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). There is an emerging subfield of social movement theory devoted to
the transnational collective action that is the focus of this volume. We will discuss three types of configurations—transnational networks, transnational coalitions, and transnational movements (and associated transnational movement organizations)—involving different degrees of connection and mobilization.

Transnational advocacy networks are the most informal configuration of nonstate actors. Networks are sets of actors linked across country boundaries, bound together by shared values, dense exchanges of information and services, and common discourses (Keck and Sikkink 1995, 1998). While some networks are formalized, most are based on informal contracts. The essence of network activity is the exchange and use of information. Networks do not involve either sustained coordination of tactics, as with coalitions, or mobilizing large numbers of people in the kind of activity we associate with social movements. Advocacy networks are the most common form of transnational collective action found in this volume. All the chapters involve some transnational network activity, with information exchange and shared values being central features to much of the collective action that the authors discuss. Several chapters discuss transnational collective action that goes beyond network advocacy.

A transnational coalition involves a greater level of transnational coordination than that present in a transnational network. Transnational coalitions are sets of actors linked across country boundaries who coordinate shared strategies or sets of tactics to publicly influence social change. The shared strategies or sets of tactics are identified as transnational campaigns, which are often the unit of analysis used when researching and analyzing transnational collective action. Such coordination of tactics requires a more formal level of contact than a network because groups usually need to meet to identify and agree upon these shared tactics, to strategize about how to implement the campaign, and to report regularly to each other on campaign progress. The coordinated strategy or tactic can be "noninstitutional," such as a boycott, but transnational coalitions, like domestic social movements, frequently blend institutional and noninstitutional tactics (Tarrow 1998; Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

Sanjeev Khagram discusses the emergence and work of two transnational anti-dam coalitions that attempted to reform or halt the Sardar Sarovar dam project, developing a campaign with coordinated activities to meet this goal. The transnational network around violence against women, discussed by Karen Brown Thompson, became a transnational coalition prior to the 1993 Vienna Human Rights conference when women's groups developed and coordinated transnationally two tactics: an international petition drive and the
“sixteen-day” campaign of coordinating activism in diverse countries in the same sixteen-day period.

Transnational social movements are sets of actors with common purposes and solidarities linked across country boundaries that have the capacity to generate coordinated and sustained social mobilization in more than one country to publicly influence social change. In contrast to transnational networks and coalitions, transnational social movements mobilize their (transnational) constituencies for collective action, often through the use of protest or disruptive action. This definition of transnational social movements fits with definitions of domestic social movements that stress mobilization and/or disruption as a defining characteristic of movements (Tarrow 1998; Rucht 1996; Kriesi 1996). Social movement theorists argue that a movement’s effectiveness in bringing about social change is linked to its ability to disrupt or threaten a social order (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998).

We would, then, expect transnational social movements, with their capacity for mobilization and disruption, to be more effective than other forms of transnational collective action. We would also expect transnational movements to have a higher level of transnational collective identity.

But transnational social movements are also the most difficult and rare form of transnational collective action. In order to speak of a truly transnational social movement, we suggest that groups in at least three countries must exercise their capacity to engage in joint and sustained mobilization. What often occurs in practice is that members of transnational networks or coalitions are linked to domestic movements in different countries but the domestic social movements themselves are not directly linked to each other. Other times, a cross-national diffusion of ideas occurs between domestic social movements in similar issue areas without efforts at coordinated mobilization.

While we have many examples in this volume of domestic social movements that link up to transnational networks and coalitions, we have few examples of full-fledged transnational social movements. Karen Brown Thompson speaks of an international women’s movement, and this example may be the closest case in the volume to a transnational social movement. The other case that comes close was the short-lived but dramatic example of the First International. Though it carried out network activities like dispensing and exchanging information, the International Working Men’s Association was certainly more than a network because it met periodically to develop and coordinate common strategies and tactics. Among the common tactics it used were active strike-support activities and coordinated antiwar actions. The transnational activists who protested at the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 certainly engaged in disruptive mobilization that may portend the formation of a transnational social movement targeting globalization.

These three forms can be viewed as ascending levels of transnational collective action. Often, a transnational coalition will emerge only after a network of communication has first developed, and a transnational movement will add the mobilizational element to an existing transnational coalition. Conversely, a sustained transnational network may be initiated from a shorter-term campaign of transnational coalition. It is difficult to imagine a movement emerging without prior network or coalition activity, and we do not have examples of it in this volume. While the definitions of transnational networks, coalitions, and movements are not necessarily comprehensive or mutually exclusive, they do highlight the dominant modality of each type of transnational collective action:

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<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Dominant Modality</th>
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<td>transnational network</td>
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The members of transnational networks and coalitions can be identified expansively to include all the relevant actors working to influence social change in an issue area. This more inclusive definition would mean that although nongovernmental organizations and social movements are the primary actors of transnational collective action, (parts of) states and intergovernmental organizations, as well as other nonstate actors such as foundations, research institutes, epistemic communities, corporations, domestic interest groups, and social movements could also be included. This is what is sometimes refereed to as “mixed actor coalitions” (Shaw 2000). Some of the authors in this volume use this more expansive definition. So, for example, Daniel Thomas, in his chapter on Helsinki norms, makes the surprising (from a social movement perspective) assertion that the U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe became a “network bastion” within the U.S. government.

On the other hand, transnational coalitions, networks, and social movements can be defined more restrictively to include only domestic and international NGOs and social movements. Some scholars believe that this narrower conceptualization helps focus on the conscious linkages made to other actors as factors conditioning the emergence and/or effectiveness of transnational collective action rather than as a part of the network by definition.
Thus foundations might be critical to the formation of transnational networks by providing financial resources; transnational coalitions that ally with particular state agencies, intergovernmental organizations, political parties, and/or dominant domestic groups might increase their chances of impact; and the knowledge provided by epistemic communities or research institutes could provide a common discourse for the persistence of transnational networks. Activists may also believe that a restrictive definition is necessary to preserve the character or autonomy of the movement or network. In this volume, for example, August Nimitz discusses how the First International limited membership to societies of workers to free it from middle-class or aristocratic patronage.

All our cases have a transnational dimension but the cases differ on whether they involve transnational sources of problems, transnational processes of collective action, and/or transnational outcomes (Imig and Tarrow 1999). In this volume, all the cases involve some kind of transnational process, either the transnational exchange of information or tactics and mobilizations coordinated across borders. Some of our cases also involve transnational sources and transnational outcomes, such as the debt and structural adjustment networks discussed by Elizabeth Donnelly and Paul Nelson. But in many cases, activists use transnational processes to generate domestic outcomes—such as improved human rights practices in Chile, a stop to dam building in India, or the promotion of sustainable development and democracy in Indonesia.

In two cases in the volume, Paul Nelson’s chapter on the World Bank and Elizabeth Donnelly’s chapter on debt issues, the focus of the campaign is an international organization—the World Bank and the IMF. Donnelly also examines private transnational banks. These campaigns demand policy changes at international institutions that would have far-ranging implications for a wide range of countries. The sources of the campaign, its targets, and its outcomes are intrinsically international. In Thalia Kidder’s chapter on transnational labor organizing, the source of organizing is both the transnational nature of the target, in this case, transnational corporations, and the emergent structures of a tri-national trade agreement, NAFTA. The source of the campaign is transnational, but the demands are often quite local—activists frequently ask for specific collective bargaining outcomes in particular plants. Two chapters focus primarily on bringing about change in a single country, Darren Hawkins’s chapter on Chile and James Riker’s on Indonesia. The transnational campaign has domestic sources or origins in the practices of a particular state. The international dimension emerges from the tactics and processes used to try to influence the target actor, not by the nature of the actor itself.

Makers and Managers of Meaning: Norms and Framing in Transnational Collective Action

The emergent transnationalist research program is intrinsically linked to concerns with the influence of ideas and norms on world politics (see Karzeneitin 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; see also Kratochwil 1989; Lumsdaine 1993; Klotz 1995; Thomson 1990; Finnemore 1993). Because most transnational nongovernmental actors are relatively weak, their ability to influence international politics is often based on the use of information, persuasion, and moral pressure to contribute to change in international institutions and governments. As Daniel Thomas argues in his chapter, the “deployment and engagement of competing justifications becomes a highly significant political process, and justifications themselves become a source of political power.” Most of the chapters also highlight the important role that key individuals and movements have played as “moral entrepreneurs” in instigating campaigns around particular normative demands (Nadelman 1990).

The nongovernmental sector is an increasingly important and distinctive actor in this international society. As an ideal type, it represents a third sector distinct from but interacting with government and business, in which the characteristic form of relation is neither authority or hierarchy (as in government and bureaucracy), nor the market, but rather the informal and horizontal network. If the business sector has been characterized by the drive for profit and the government sector by the use of authority, the third sector, or nongovernmental sector, could be characterized by the search for meaning. The individuals and groups in this sector are primarily motivated to shape the world according to their principled beliefs. Of course, many government and business activities are also involved in managing meanings, but for NGOs and movements it is their raison d’être, rather than an ancillary motivation for action.

International arenas such as intergovernmental organizations are key meeting places where governments and businesses interact with transnational nongovernmental actors. These interactions are often far from harmonious, as they represent a clash, not only of forms of organization, as vertical hierarchy encounters horizontal network, but also a clash of purposes, as the purposes of states encounter and conflict with (or converge with) those of businesses and nongovernmental organizations. While most accounts of international organizations succeed in conveying the conflicts of interest, few have captured the role of these organizations as arenas for “consensus mobilization” or the “battle of justifications,” nor have they understood the unique role of the nongovernmental sector in these struggles.
All of the chapters in this volume describe and analyze these struggles over meaning. These struggles are not divorced from power politics, but are rather enmeshed in them. The efforts to get Chile or Indonesia to accept international human rights and democracy norms, discussed by Darren Hawkins and James Riker, were not only about the power of those norms and the role of international institutions in enforcing them, but also about the survival of the Pinochet and Suharto regimes. But the struggle cannot be understood if we use only the lens of state power and interest to analyze it. Nor are issues of individual or collective self-interest unrelated to struggles for meaning. For example, the transnational campaign for norms on violence against women, discussed by Karen Brown Thompson, was in the “self-interest” of women around the world who could use these norms to protect themselves from bodily harm, but it also involved new ways of thinking about their roles and relationships to family, culture, and the state.

Analyzing the third sector has been so difficult exactly because of the intractability of sorting out these kinds of struggles over meaning. Yet we cannot understand transnational networks or coalitions unless we grasp that a significant amount of their activity is directed at changing understandings and interpretations of actors or, in other words, the creation, institutionalization, and monitoring of norms. International relations theorists have tried to conceptualize these processes by thinking about persuasion, legitimacy, socialization, and communicative action (Finnemore 1996; Risse 2000; Risse and Sikkink 1999). Social movement theory can be quite useful in this regard, because scholars from this tradition have been working for decades on these issues, although usually within the bounds of a single state.

Social movement theorists have long been preoccupied with the process of meaning creation, and in the 1990s “the social construction of meaning has become a central part of social movement theory” (Klandermans 1997, 204). Movements help to create and recreate meanings through “framing” or “the strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” According to Sidney Tarrow, frames are not ideas, but ways of packaging and presenting ideas. Movements then use these frames to attempt the “mobilization of consensus,” that is, persuasive communication aimed at convincing others to take their side.

The notion of “framing” from the study of social movements is similar to the process called “strategic social construction” recently identified in IR (Klandermans 1997). Social movements and NGOs often take new ideas and turn them into frames that define issues at stake and the appropriate strategies for action. Carrying this task out transnationally is far more daunting than doing so domestically, but where successful, such activity can have far-reaching effects. Framing occurs not only through what movements say, but also through what they do—through their choices of tactics and the connections between their actions and their rhetoric (McAdam 1996, 354). Sanjeev Khagram’s chapter on big dams makes this point. In the course of a little more than a decade, transnational coalitions have succeeded in altering common understandings of big dams, so they have gone from being seen as obvious and natural tools for (and symbols of) development and modernity to being seen as increasingly controversial and problematic projects. But these movements successfully changed policy not only through their ideas and speeches, but also through mobilizing thousands of tribal peoples who were to be displaced by dams, helping them to bring their plight dramatically to the attention of the media and domestic and international publics.

Social movement scholarship suggests that it will be particularly difficult to form transnational social movements. In particular, social movement theories suggest that the conditions contributing to the emergence and effectiveness of social movements will be difficult to find and sustain transnationally (Tarrow 1999). For example, they argue that the framing processes critical to social movements will happen among “homogenous people who are in intense regular contact with each other” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 9). But transnational social movements usually start with participants who are not homogenous. How do we explain why and how non-homogeneous people sometimes engage in transnational collective action?

Likewise, few examples exist of truly transnational collective identities. Social movement theory suggests that social movements emerge from “mobilizing structures” in communities—families, friendship networks, and the “informal structures of everyday life,” including schools and churches (McAdam 1988; McCarthy 1996). Yet such mobilizing structures and interpersonal networks are largely absent from the transnational arena. In one sense, these arguments are consistent with our finding, and that of others, that there are very few examples of true transnational social movements. But we still need to explain the emergence of the many international NGOs, transnational networks, and transnational coalitions we discuss in this book. Can certain aspects of social movement theory be modified to help explain the emergence and effectiveness of these other forms of transnational collective action?

One of the main ways these efforts at transnational collective action work is by creating and enforcing international norms. Norms in the IR literature are defined as shared expectations held by a community of actors about appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Katzenstein
1996; Finneemore 1996). They are standards for how different actors “ought” to behave. Three aspects of this definition merit attention when specifying norms: (1) What are the shared expectations about appropriate behavior, or how do we know a norm when we see one? (2) Who are the actors that hold these expectations? (3) To which actor identities do these norms apply?

The IR literature also distinguishes between ideas (beliefs held by individuals) and norms (intersubjective beliefs about proper behavior) and makes the useful distinction between causal and principled ideas: causal ideas are ideas about cause and effect, while principled ideas are about right and wrong. Causal ideas are supported by evidence, often scientific evidence; principled ideas may be related to causal ideas, but cannot easily be resolved by appeals to evidence (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). When principled ideas are accepted by a broad range of actors, they become “norms,” which are intrinsically intersubjective and held by communities. Like social movement theorists, norms scholars are very interested in the processes through which beliefs held by individuals are transformed into collective beliefs and norms.

In this volume, we will reserve the use of international norms to speak of the shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior accepted by states and intergovernmental organizations that can be applied to states, intergovernmental organizations, and/or nonstate actors of various kinds. Most often states work together to make norms in the context of international organizations. Other transnational actors that promote or accept international norms may be international epistemic communities, multinational corporations, transnational professional groups, and so forth.

Many international norms serve the needs of states for coordination and stability of expectations. But there is a subset of international norms that are not easily explained. They do not promote economic and political coordination and the stability of states. They do not necessarily serve the interests of private firms in maximizing profits. It is this subset of somewhat puzzling norms that is the topic of this book. Why would public authorities adopt norms that limit their own ability to treat individuals, groups, or their physical environment the way they please? Why would public authorities (or for that matter private firms) alter their practices?

We argue that you cannot understand the emergence and effectiveness of this subset of international norms without paying attention to the crucial role of transnational networks, coalitions, and movements. A critical mass of actors must accept the standards of behavior before they can be considered as norms. Because we are concerned about international norms, a certain number of states must accept principles before we can refer to them as norms.

In the international arena, different states have more weight than others when it comes to promoting new norms. Nevertheless, as a working operational definition, we suggest that approximately one-quarter to one-third of the actors must support and accept new standards of behavior before we can speak of the existence of new norms (Finneemore and Sikkink 1998).

How do we operationalize these definitions of norms? We can think of norms as having a “life cycle” with a continuum from norm emergence to a norm threshold or tipping point, followed by a “norms cascade” and ending in a situation of norm internalization. Different measures are necessary for different stages in the life cycle (Finneemore and Sikkink 1998). Emergent international norms are often signaled by international declarations or programs of action from international conferences. The entry of a treaty into force or the adoption of new policies by intergovernmental organizations can often be used as an indicator of a norm reaching a threshold or tipping point. Widespread and rapid treaty ratification can be a signal of an international norms cascade. Not all issue areas, however, are governed by treaties, and soft law and other policy guidelines and statements may serve as indicators of international norms.

Where international relations theorists talk of norms, social movement theorists tend to talk of collective or shared beliefs (Klandermans 1997). We distinguish between international norms (standards of appropriate behavior held by a critical mass of states) and collective beliefs (or transnational norms) held by transnational networks, coalitions, and movements. This distinction allows us to inquire about the relationship between the collective beliefs of linked NGOs and movements, and international norms. Groups must first work to develop “collective beliefs” or collective action frames for the movement.

In the transnational arena, transnational networks, coalitions, and movements share some collective beliefs or collective action frames. In this process international norms can form part of the “resources” and “political opportunities” from which actors draw to develop their collective beliefs. Other times transnational networks, coalitions, and movements may attempt to transform their collective beliefs into international norms.

This focus on norms is one main distinction among the cases in this volume. In some cases, for example the case of Chile or the Helsinki case, activists draw on already existing international norms to help construct their collective action frames. In some of the other cases, strong international norms did not exist and the first task of the activists was to build new international norms by mobilizing international consensus around their collective action frames. This is what the anti-dam coalition attempted to do
when it urged the World Bank to change its policies regarding large dam building. In a recent, self-conscious attempt at international norm building, a World Commission on Dams was set up to generate new international criteria and guidelines on planning, implementing, operating, and decommissioning large dams (Khagram 2000b). The success of these efforts to create new norms varies greatly. Other groups engage in “frame bridging” or “frame amplification” by building on already existing norms but attempting to expand the domain to which these norms apply (Snow and Benford 1988). This framing process is what women’s rights groups did when they worked to get their campaign about “women’s rights are human rights” accepted as an international norm.

Once international norms are in place they empower and legitimate the transnational networks and coalitions that promote them. Daniel Thomas argues that “nonstate actors that are otherwise weak can exploit the legitimacy inherent in international norms to construct transnational networks and transform prevailing conceptions of state interests.” In this way, he says, “networks serve . . . as ‘teachers of norms’ to reluctant states.” A number of the chapters stress the constitutive aspects of the norms. Networks promote norms that not only stress the appropriate behavior, but help define the very notion of what a state is. Thus, Karen Brown Thompson stresses the ways in which the norm about women’s human rights reconstitutes the boundaries between the public and the private spheres. Human rights norms also demarcate the boundaries of the appropriate limits of international intervention and define the behavior that constitutes the necessary attributes of the liberal state.

One way that networks assist in “teaching norms” is by internationalizing domestic policy disputes (Finnemore 1993). In the issue of the environmental network in the World Bank, for example, Paul Nelson argues that NGOs amplify, interpret, and legitimate local claims by appealing to international norms. Networks use the international arena as a stage or mirror to hold state and international organization behavior up to a global judgment about appropriateness. They attempt to display or publicize norm-breaking behavior to embarrass public authorities and private firms so they will conform to norms. Human rights activists have called this action the “mobilization of shame.” Activities that might have stayed hidden before the advent of transnational networks are exposed to the glare of international scrutiny. In these efforts to publicize norm breaking, the media can be a crucial outlet and an ally of networks and much network activity is directed at gaining media attention.

The chapters in this volume generally do not pose normative arguments against rationalist arguments, but rather suggest that norms are present in most debates in world politics. In any discursive terrain, there are always contradictory norms present, and over time certain norms are increasingly emphasized while others lose influence. This dynamic process is what Dan Thomas refers to when he says that “[a]t states whose practices are delegitimized by international norms find that the political terrain has been tilted in favor of political challengers (both state and nongate) committed to implementation of the new norms.” Transnational networks, coalitions, and movements are not the only normative actors in world politics, but rather they lend their weight to certain normative positions vis-à-vis others.

Domestic and International Opportunity Structures and Transnational Collective Action

One of the fundamental insights from social movement theory is that certain features of the political opportunity structures within which movements operate affect their chances of success (Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986). Political opportunity structures are those consistent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for or constraints on people undertaking collective action. (Tarrow 1998). Political opportunities often provide resources for leverage and spaces for access.

We also need to keep in mind that political opportunities are not only perceived and taken advantage of by social movements, but they are also created. There are numerous examples of how social movement activists have helped create political opportunities at the international level. A number of chapters argue that international norms, in particular, are key examples of political opportunities created in part by activists that in turn empower and create more opportunities for social movement activity.

Many social movement theorists examine social and political opportunity structures in liberal democracies. Thus, the phrases “open” or “closed” opportunity structures generally refer to a continuum within liberal democracies, depending on how porous they are to social organizations (Kitschelt 1986). These studies thus overlook the “really closed” opportunity structure of the authoritarian or semiauthoritarian regime, as compared to the “relatively open” structures of most democratic regimes. The ultimate “closed” domestic political opportunity structure is the repressive authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Not only is the regime “not porous” to societal influences, but it may be actively engaged in physically eliminating its opponents, or actively undermining their capacity to organize. The Chilean government under Pinochet is the most obvious example in this volume, but the actions of the Suharto government toward domestic social movements in Indonesia is another example of an essentially closed opportunity structure.
This volume includes diverse cases and allows us to make the basic but often overlooked comparison between democratic and authoritarian regimes (see Khagram 2000a, b). So, for example, Sanjeev Khagram argues in his chapter on the Narmada Dam that the effectiveness of coalition pressures was enhanced by the procedurally democratic institutions in India, so that internal groups had direct access to and influence on state and national governments. Likewise, in Daniel Thomas’s chapter on Helsinki norms and U.S. foreign policy, the democratic structure of the U.S. Congress made it more open to the influence of the human rights networks. Network influence in Chile and Indonesia took a longer time to develop because the authoritarian nature of these states made it more difficult for domestic groups to have influence. Yet recently, both cases have shown remarkable breakthroughs due to persistent action where international norms have led Chile’s courts to reject Pinochet’s immunity and Indonesia to embrace democratic forms of governance.

However, it is not enough to think about the effectiveness of transnational collective action only in terms of domestic opportunity structures. In addition, we need to think systematically about transnational political opportunity structures—that is, what are the consistent dimensions of the international or transnational political environment that provide incentives or constraints for collective action? Social movement theorists are increasingly aware that social movements operate in both a domestic and an international environment: they speak of “multilayered” opportunity structure, including a “supranational” layer or a “multilevel polity,” or they highlight how international pressures influence domestic opportunity structures (Oberschall 1996; Klandermans 1997; Marks and McAdam 1996; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998, 1999).

But international pressures are still mainly seen as some form of “exogenous shock” to primarily domestic processes. Social movement theorists have been skeptical about the existence of a true transnational political opportunity structure. Doug McAdam, for example, argues that social movements target institutionalized power and since such institutionalized power is rare in the transnational arena, we cannot speak of a true transnational political opportunity structure, with a few exceptions like the European Union.

We argue that international institutions indeed present clear political opportunity structures for transnational advocacy (see also Tarrow 1999). An international opportunity structure will not displace a domestic political opportunity structure, but will rather interact with it. To understand the effectiveness of transnational collective action, we must understand the dynamic interaction between an international opportunity structure and the domestic structure. This dynamic interaction may be similar to the logic of two-level games spelled out by Robert Putnam, but without the chief negotiator sitting as the linchpin in the center of negotiations (1988).

There appear to be characteristic patterns in this interaction of domestic and international opportunity structures. The “boomerang” pattern and the “spiral model” could both be thought of as models of the interaction between domestic opportunity structures and international opportunity structures (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999). Both models suggest that it is blockage in the domestic society that sends domestic social movement actors into the transnational arena. This blockage is often due to repression, authoritarianism, or both. The combination of a closed domestic opportunity structure and an open international opportunity structure initiates the boomerang and the spiral. The interaction in the “spiral model” is more complex. Closed domestic polities generate transnational linkages as domestic activists are “pushed” outward, often to protect their existence. But one of the main goals of the move to the international arena is to liberalize and open domestic regimes. So the spiral model generated sustained change only when it was able to help create a more open domestic opportunity structure—usually through regime change (Risse and Sikkink 1999).

Thus, a two-level interacting political opportunity structure produces outcomes that would be counterintuitive for those only looking at domestic political opportunity structure. For example, it is generally assumed that the state’s capacity or propensity for repression will diminish domestic social movement activity (Tarrow 1995; McAdam 1996). But the boomerang model suggests that repression may simultaneously move actors into international arenas to pursue their activities. Repression is the most obvious form of blockage, but a lack of responsiveness may also compel groups to work internationally. For example, feminist groups and groups of indigenous peoples have often found the international arena to be more receptive to their demands than domestic political institutions are.

The perceived degree of openness of international opportunity structures is not absolute, but is rather relative to the openness of domestic structures. For a Chilean human rights activist, the international arena was permissive and open compared to harsh repression at home. But activists in countries with very open domestic opportunity structures may perceive a move to an international institution as one that provides less room for influence. This is the basic argument about the democratic deficit in the European Union. Similar arguments are being made by labor rights activists like Mark Ritchie, who writes in this volume about the WTO and NAFTA. Some activists charge that governments prefer to move policy decisions to
some multilateral institutions exactly because those institutions are less open to societal influence. In many cases transnational activists have developed strategies to try to influence these more closed international institutions, but they see this action as a necessary defensive response, rather than as a desirable strategic move. Where domestic groups have open domestic opportunity structures and responsive national governments, they will not seek out international institutional access, even though the source of their problems is transnational in nature. Rather, they will pressurize their own governments to represent their interests in international arenas (Tarrow 1995).

Some have asked about the long-term effect of internationalization on domestic actors—"Does it empower them or disempower them?" (Tarrow 1999). Our volume suggests there is no single answer to that question because it depends on the nature of the domestic opportunity structure and the issue area. For the NGOs and movements in the repressive society (the examples of Chile, Eastern Europe, and Indonesia in this volume) it seems unambiguous that internationalization of the movement empowered them, and, to the degree that it contributed to democratization, opened previously closed space domestically for action. But this unambiguous empowerment is only relative to the very disempowered position they originally occupied in their societies. For the labor activists discussed by Thalia Kidder and Mark Ritchie, globalization has disempowered them locally, and the move to transnational arenas is more of a defensive move to try to reclaim lost levels of empowerment.

The possibilities for dynamic interactions among domestic and political opportunity structures are far reaching. For example, one basic aspect of the domestic opportunity structure is the presence of elite allies and support groups. By considering international opportunities, the universe of potential allies and support groups is dramatically expanded. At the same time, however, these allies may be more difficult to mobilize in transnational space because of distance, language, and cultural differences. Just as potential allies multiply, so too do potentially antagonistic sectors. In other words, the "multiorganizational fields" within which the transnational networks, coalitions, and social movements operate are more complex than those of their domestic counterparts (Klandermans 1997).

Chapter Overview

The chapters in this volume point to a very diverse set of cases and relations between transnational collective action and international norms. As August Nimitz's historical chapter on the formation of transnational workers networks in the First International makes clear, transnational organizing is not a

new phenomena. NGOs have been involved in international governance since the 1800s and have experienced a continuous, though uneven, growth since that time (also Charnovitz 1997). By looking at a case from this early period, we see the role of transnational nongovernmental actors in an atmosphere prior to the formation of formal international organizations. By contrasting this case with Thalia Kidder's charter on transnational labor organizing across the Mexico-U.S. border in the 1980s and 1990s, we see the differences in transnational advocacy in the dense international institutional context of the late twentieth century compared to the thin context of the mid-nineteenth century.

In chapter 2, Jackie Smith and Kathryn Sikkink highlight the significant growth in transnational advocacy international NGOs (TNGOs) or transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) since the 1950s. This growth has occurred across all issues, but to varying degrees in different issue areas. At the same time as the overall number of international NGOs has increased, they have also increased and diversified their contacts with intergovernmental organizations and with other NGOs. Although the networks discussed in this book represent only a subset of the total number of networks, these include the issue areas around which the largest number of international nongovernmental social change organizations have organized. Together, human rights, women's rights, and the environment account for over half of the total number of international nongovernmental social change organizations.12

Daniel Thomas's chapter on the Helsinki accord examines how transnational nongovernmental actors used "soft international law" in the area of human rights to help successfully alter and influence the foreign policy of a superpower, the United States, vis-a-vis its major competitors, the USSR and Eastern Europe. In Darren Hawkins's chapter on the influence of transnational actors in promoting human rights in Chile, nongovernmental actors call on existing international human rights norms embodied in international treaties and in international organizations, such as the UN Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, to pressure the Chilean government to improve its human rights practices. Karen Brown Thompson discusses the role of transnational actors and international organizations in instigating and institutionalizing new global norms about women's rights as human rights.

In the chapters by Elizabeth Donnelly on the IMF and Paul Nelson on the World Bank, transnational nongovernmental actors direct their campaigns and strategies at international financial institutions to attempt to alter their policies and practices. In Sanjeev Khagram's chapter on big dam
construction, transnational coalitions influence international organizations like the World Bank and in turn use the leverage of these international organizations to change the domestic politics of dam construction in India. Likewise, with the creation of a transnational nongovernmental forum to parallel the annual meeting of donor countries providing aid to the Indonesian government, James Riker’s chapter examines how NGOs, transnational networks, and international development agencies have strengthened civil society and reshaped the discourse about sustainable development and democracy in Indonesia.

Together these cases highlight the changing dynamics, policy arenas, and possibilities for restructuring world politics through transnational collective action. At the same time, the growing role of nonstate actors at both the state and international levels raises fundamental questions about their authority, legitimacy, and accountability. International nongovernmental organizations increasingly play an advocacy role in a wide range of global public policy networks that define and shape global policy and practice from human rights to human development and security (Reinicke 1999/2000; Bryer and Magrath 1999; Brown et al. 2001). The detailing of the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle in November 1999 has prompted much debate about whether and how such nonstate actors should have a voice and participate in these forums (Economist 1999; Cardoso 2000, 42). These fundamental issues are highlighted and addressed in the volume’s conclusions.

Notes

1. The British government eventually determined General Pinochet was too ill to stand trial and allowed him to return to Chile, but only after several pathbreaking legal decisions establishing that he did not have immunity from prosecution for human rights violations committed during his government. The Chilean Supreme Court has likewise ruled that Pinochet does not have immunity from prosecution.

2. With the exception of Sidney Tarrow (1999; 1999), whose recent work is serving as a bridge between these two fields. See also Brysk 1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Smith 2000; Schmitz 2000; and Khagram 2000a, b.

3. Doug McAdam, presentation at the University of Minnesota, 17 November 1999.

4. These distinctions are based on Khagram 1999.

5. The emphasis here is on those NGOs engaged in transnational advocacy for the public interest (see Gordenker and Weiss 1995b). For other definitions of NGOs, see the World Bank (Malen 1995), the United Nations (UNDP 2000), the

6. The Yearbook of International Organizations identifies international NGOs as organizations where there is voting participation from at least three countries. See chapter 2 in this volume for a more detailed description of a data set of international NGOs from the Yearbook.

7. See a similar definition of a transnational social movement by Doug McAdam: "organized, coordinated transnational collective action designed to promote change in more than one country with active and equal participation of actors from multiple countries." Presentation at the University of Minnesota, 17 November 1999.


9. David Snow and his colleagues have adapted Erving Goffman’s concept of framing. Definition from McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996 (6).

10. On the distinction between ideas and norms see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.

11. There are notable exceptions such as Escobar and Alvarez 1992.

12. They constitute about half of the INGOs listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations (see Sikkink and Smith, this volume).