ABSTRACT  The proliferation of a nongovernmental sector held the promise of linking local actors with national and international ones, thereby contributing to a highly participatory, Habermasian ideal in which the formerly marginalized would find greater participation and expression. Yet the role of international agents in community-based resource management projects has recently come under scrutiny. In addressing these issues in this article, I consider the roles of different interlocutors in two contrastive phases in an Amazonian community’s movement to preserve its endangered fisheries. The comparative exercise demonstrates how institutional agents, by establishing a discourse that structures the criteria through which collective demands may be problematized, may inadvertently shift from mediation to domination, and from local partnering to local production. [Keywords: conservation, NGOs, social movements, Brazilian Amazon]

A MID FLASHING CAMERAS, an Amazonian fishing community was awarded international recognition for its exemplary initiative in sustainable development. A gentleman stepped forward to take the microphone. As manager of an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliate that specialized in microenterprises, he announced, with evident pleasure, that his organization was responsible for having “changed the reality of the community” to whom the award was presented (see www.amazonia.org). In this article, I compare the roles of interlocutors in local–global collaborations in two contrastive phases of one community’s movement to preserve its endangered fisheries. Such collaborations are of growing concern as international entities work ever more routinely with local communities in development and resource management projects, in a manner known as “partnering.” Recently, such collaborations have come under severe scrutiny (Bray and Anderson 2005; Chapin 2004).

In this article, I consider the central Amazon town of Silves, Brazil, where resident fisher-families spearheaded an environmental movement, establishing protected-area units based in local meanings and instituting and enforcing regulations when federal agencies failed to do so. The movement spans several polities, having emerged during the authoritarian state of the 1980s and enduring through Brazil’s transition to democratic governance and expanded international articulation.

The wave of new democracies in Latin America in the 1980s brought the expectation of greater participation in local and national governance. After 20 years of authoritarian rule, Brazil’s transition to democracy in 1985 was greeted with optimism by actors and analysts who saw in it new possibilities for civil society. Observers predicted expanded popular expression in social justice and economic equity, long postponed from the national agenda. Whereas collective action in predemocratic Brazil occurred within a context of repressive state mechanisms and the suppression of popular movements, democracy would open new institutional channels, permitting political parties and popular organizations to exercise their right to express their needs and to act freely.

A number of grassroots movements that took hold during the military period persisted in the new civilian state. The matter I address in this article is whether these movements bear out the expectations of a strengthened local sector with broad-based participation. I begin with the first stages of the movement in the early 1980s, then proceed through the democratic transition to the present. A comparison of the two time periods allows us to consider a number of questions, including the following: (1) the implications of locally designed and locally managed conservation efforts versus mediated ones; (2) the roles of different types of mediators in contrastively different historic contexts; (3) the impact of international funding on local...
empowerment; (4) consequences for "community" in different managerial arrangements; and (5) the potential for interlocutors to speak on behalf of, or appropriate, local voices. These questions, in turn, address larger theoretical ones regarding the putatively democratizing role of differently situated interlocutors in social movements and their capacity to generate and shape social change.

I began fieldwork in 1999, six years into the second phase, and continued research with the help of an assistant through 2004. The earlier phases are reconstructed through the accounts of participants who recalled them.

In the article, I compare the transformations in the structures of participation through political change of predemocratic and democratic Brazil. Because the transformations experienced by the community of Silves are manifestations of larger, global processes, they are illustrative of phenomena experienced extensively by similarly situated southern-hemisphere communities within the same time frame.

**LITERATURE BACKGROUND**

Since the late 1980s, international NGOs have become the most prevalent interlocutors in local-global interactions. The role of NGOs as instruments in expanding the participation of local, historically disempowered sectors of civil society is the subject of growing debate. A number of scholars credit NGOs with opening a space for formerly unheard sectors of civil society (Annis 1992; Clark 1992; de Janvry and Sadoulet 1993; Fisher 1998; Meyer 1999:141; Reilly 1995). Carrie Meyer (1999) and Julie Fisher (1998), for example, regard these international actors as forces that invigorate civil society in an increasingly globalized world. Meyer reflects this point of view when she refers to NGOs as the "building blocks in civil society" (1999:143). NGOs and the networks established by them, according to Meyer, strengthen the bonds of civil society because they "enrich the basis of global social capital—the fiber of international relationships, where mutual trust and understanding grow and the ability to solve problems cooperatively is fostered" (1999:143). According to Fisher, NGOs that support grassroots organizations nurture and pluralize civil society by increasing the number of intermediary organizations between the citizen and the state (Fisher 1998). By this means, Fisher argues, foreign donors intensify the voices of otherwise underrepresented constituencies.

Other scholars, such as Fikret Berkes (1995), John Brosius (1997), David Feeny et al. (1990), and Flora Lu Holt (2005), take an opposite approach—arguing that stakeholders’ own management of collective resources both enhances local empowerment and has a stronger probability of success than mediated ones. These authors hold that traditional communities are capable of developing collective management strategies to maintain natural resources in the long term without external direction. Feeny et al. (1990) present ample evidence that local communities can and have effectively promoted ecological conservation by coordinating, regulating, and monitoring use patterns. This approach has as its center an identifiable community of interdependent users who hold a resource in common, controlling access and regulating use (Feeny et al. 1990; McCay and Acheson 1987). These authors hold that local users with territorial or livelihood-related interests may be better managers of their own collectively held resources than outsider Western (or northern) conservationists, who may undervalue or dismiss the participation of resident stakeholders.

A different set of analyses place local-level involvements by environmental NGOs within a larger paradigm of changing global relations. These authors argue that international NGOs, driven by First World interests and rooted in northern hemisphere experience and worldviews, may be inadequate as on-the-ground advisers, because they are prone to regard as universal that which is narrowly Western (McCormick 1989; Mowforth and Munt 2003; Redclift 1984; Sachs 1992; Shiva 1993).

The worldwide growth in environmental NGOs and their role in local partnering can be linked to a shift, beginning in the late 1980s and taking shape in the 1990s, in which the international funding community altered its policies to facilitate interactions with civil society. In the new multilateral funding reconfiguration, NGOs were situated as mediators who would forge and maintain contacts between local communities and the international funding apparatus. Moreover, international funders favored projects that would meet new criteria, phrased as “sustainability” (Ceballos-Lascuráin 1996; International Union for Conservation [IUCN] 1980), to generate local income while minimizing environmental destruction. By this means, NGOs became collaborators in an emergent transnational environmental–development alliance (Finger 1994:186–216; Princen and Finger 1994). Projects such as ecotourism, which combined development with conservation, were favored because of their potential for profitable revenues, often in foreign currencies, with less destruction than conventional land use methods (Honey 1999:17). As mediators between the international funding apparatus and local participants, environmental NGOs occupied a strategic position squarely in the ganglia of international funding and restructuring.

Recently, David Bray and Anthony Anderson conducted a multicase study of NGO involvement in community projects for Latin America. Their survey finds that “very little is known publicly about project success and failure for the global conservation NGOs, [and] their relations to local communities” (Bray and Anderson 2005:71). The authors attribute this to inadequate standards for accountability on the part of large, international NGOs. On the basis of data collected, however, these authors expressed concern that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, global environmental NGOs appear to overlook or subordinate local peoples in their programming.

As the debate continues, the environmental journal World Watch devoted two issues exclusively to international NGO involvement in local communities. In the first of these (December 2004), the anthropologist Mac Chapin criticized large conservation NGOs for excluding local communities from their agendas. In spite of policy statements
that NGOs present in practice, a studied lack of interest toward partnerships with... local communities of any stripe" (Chapin 2004:21). Chapin’s article stimulated commentaries that were published in the subsequent issue of the journal (World Watch 2005:5–20). Although Chapin blames large NGOs for failing in their stated mission to strengthen civil society, he falls short of developing the argument to address the shortcomings of the partnerships themselves or the factors driving their failure. As pointed out by Bray and Anderson (2005), the debate lacks sufficient data with which to carry out a responsible evaluation.

In this article, I address issues of mediation by NGOs to make several main points. First, although NGOs may attempt to serve the goals and meet needs as defined by grassroots organizations, they are also capable of replacing these with alternative agendas of their own. Second, the act of mediation, when conducted by outsider interlocutors, may undermine local community initiatives. Finally, even in attempting to empower local communities, NGOs may benefit one subgroup and exclude others, thereby creating dissent rather than collaboration and reducing rather than expanding participation.

AMAZON TOWN: SILVES IN A CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Over the past four hundred years, links between the peoples of the central Amazon and the global economy have been intermittent, with a few periods of rapid growth interspersed with longer periods of stagnation. The most lucrative extractive resource to originate in the Amazon basin was the milky sap collected from Hevea brasiliensis, the Brazilian rubber tree. Although rubber was exported from the Amazon starting in the mid-19th century, the so-called “boom” epoch reached its height by 1896 and was in collapse by 1912—lasting only 18 years. As Charles Wagley pointed out in 1953, and as subsequent studies substantiate (Chernela 2003; Nugent 1993; Pace 1998), poverty—with less panache than short-lived peaks of wealth—has been the persistent characteristic of what Wagley called the “Amazon towns” along the main channel of the river (Wagley 1953).

The rubber years brought new populations and cultural influences into the Amazon, contributing to a contemporary Amazonian ethnicity, known by the terms caboco and ribeirinho—a synthesis of Amerindian, AfroBrazilian, and European cultural traditions. Neither wholly indigenous nor European, caboco society has been rendered “invisible” by decision makers and analysts alike (Nugent 1993). Social movements among these peoples of the river edge have been virtually unknown or underreported.

Silves, a constellation of small fishing villages, typifies the majority of Amazon “towns” whose dwellers live in small settlements along the river margin and make their living fishing nearby lakes and streams, planting and raising animals on the seasonally emergent floodplains, and extracting fruits and other nonwood products on forested high ground. Fish, provided by local fishermen using rudimentary fishing technologies, is a dietary staple, accounting for about 50–75 percent of all animal protein consumed.

Silves, with a total population of about 4,000, is a municipality located 380 kilometers (236 miles) east of the large urban center, Manaus. The events leading up to mobilization at Silves began in the 1960s when the Brazilian government instituted a number of development projects to integrate the Amazon, long marginalized and underdeveloped, into the modern Brazilian economy. Among the government’s schemes to economically spur and, thus, integrate the north, was the creation of the Manaus Free Trade Zone (Zona Franca de Manaus). In 1967, 10,000 square kilometers (3,863 square miles) were set aside to create an industrial and commercial center in Manaus, a former rubber hub at the confluence of the Negro and Solimões Rivers, in the heart of the Amazon basin. Once a riverfront city that stagnated after the collapse of the rubber boom, Manaus ranked, in 1990, as Brazil’s largest manufacturing center after São Paulo (Chernela 2000). The population of Manaus rose from 173,000 in 1960 to 1,500,000 in 1990 (Superintendencia Da Zona Franca De Manaus [SUFRAMA] 1990). The growth of Manaus placed increasing pressure on local fisheries to meet the demands of its burgeoning population. Adjacent waters were quickly overfished, as commercial fleets ventured ever farther from Manaus in pursuit of fishing grounds. Silves, a municipality with highly productive lakes within a day’s motorized river travel from Manaus, was a preferred fishing location for commercial fleets.

A number of topographical and geochemical features coincide at Silves to produce unusually productive fishing conditions. It is located on the southern rim of the Guiana Shield, one of the oldest geological formations in the world. The senile soils that blanket Guiana Shield are poor in nutrients and highly acidic. Rivers that flow over these soils are correspondingly low in nutrients and resident fish populations, earning them the attribution “Rivers of Hunger” (Meggers 1971). Organic compounds leached from leaf litter stain these waters, accounting for their customary designations as “black water rivers.” The town of Silves is located on a high embankment surrounded by the depauperate black waters that flow off the adjacent uplands. The mainstream of the Amazon River flows nearby, laden with nutrient-rich floating sediments transported thousands of miles from the Andes. These floating particles impart the Amazon with a milky cast, and its waters are accordingly called “white”—in contrast to “black”—waters.

The annual flood cycle causes a continual flux in the landscape, its appearance, and the distribution of productivity as it seasonally merges the two aquatic systems. When water levels are lowest, as they are in October and November, waters are confined to their discreet, permanent channels. During these periods, the great Amazon-constructed floodplains of mud, silt, and sand occupy about five–eight kilometers (three–five miles) between Silves and the main Amazon. For several months, these emergent floodplains are used to cultivate fast-growing crops and to graze animals. Water levels begin to rise in December, peaking around March at between eight and 11 meters (9–12
yields. In March and April, runoff from local black water rivers begins to inundate the inner and central portions of the floodplain. By May, the swelling waters of the Amazon surpass the locally supplied black waters. White waters from the mainstem overspill their banks, covering the floodplain with some five–six meters (5.5–6.5 yards) of water and delivering nutrients into the formerly depauperate lake system. The displacement of black waters by white waters may be said to produce a seasonal mixing, or “meeting,” of the waters.3

As the Amazon overflows its banks, large amounts of fish disperse onto the floodplains and into the lakes of Silves, accompanying the nutrient-rich waters. When the floodwaters recede, fish and other biota that have been flushed into the lakes are trapped, creating ideal conditions for capture. In these seasons, a few deepened channels, known locally as furos, permit vessels to enter the lakes from the main river (Chernela 2003; Chernela et al. 2002).

A brief two years after the military government declared Manaus a duty-free zone, commercial fleets began to fish the waters of Silves. In 1970, records in the municipality indicate that 135 fishing vessels were registered in the region. By 1980, the number of registered vessels had grown to 728 (Salati et al. 1983). Entrepreneurial fishermen from Manaus, accompanying the geometric growth in that Amazonian urban center, had begun to threaten fishing as a livelihood for local residents.

ETHNOGRAPHY OF A MOVEMENT: CHURCH, STATE, AND COMMUNITY ACTION IN PREDEMOCRATIC BRAZIL

The community movement at Silves emerged within an authoritarian state that restricted civic participation. In 1964, a military coup d’état overthrew the government of João Goulart, bringing into power a strong central state that focused on national security, limited civil liberties, suspended judicial processes, and suppressed popular expression at all levels of society. Repression was most acute after Costa e Silva’s Fifth Institutional Act in 1968, which led to the imposition of the harshest censorship ever known in Brazil. In 1973, the economy entered a sustained period of hyperinflation and unmanageable indebtedness, contributing to an overall political crisis. By 1985, in the face of spiraling inflation, the military peacefully transferred the government to civilian control.

The period of military rule coincided with a policy shift within the Latin American Church following the papacy of John XXIII (1958–63). The new ecclesiastical model attempted to revitalize the church by focusing support on marginalized sectors of society. This new ideology, outlined in the encyclicals of 1961 (Mater et Magistra) and 1963 (Pacem in Terris), was embraced by a majority of Brazilian clerics. A 1965 address by the Archbishop of Brazil, entitled “Priests for Development,” was a notable turning point in social and religious relations between the church and grassroots society. Brazilian clergy launched a “Church of the Poor” (Igreja dos Pobres), directing efforts to the “pastoral,” or practical, aspects of religious life and church participation. As the principal, and perhaps, only, advocate of popular opposition movements during this period, the Brazilian Church of the 1960s to 1980s helped to buttress a public sector evacuated by the state.

In the new evangelical paradigm to bridge the spiritual and the practical, the most important structural constituents were the Christian Base Communities (Comunidades Eclesiales de Base), known as CEBs. Organized at the local level, these cells or modules were linked to larger representative entities within the church. Tens of thousands of CEBs formed in Brazil. In the Amazon, formerly isolated settlements were unified into community clusters that met regularly in homes to worship and discuss local concerns and needs. Occasional assemblies brought together all communities of the local prelacy.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, with dozens of commercial fishing vessels regularly entering the lakes at Silves, scarcity in fish supply became a primary concern. Local families began to note declines in fishing yields. The first indicator was the scarcity of preferred fish species: Villagers found themselves subsisting on catches formerly out of favor, including scaleless fish, believed by many to carry leprosy. When the assembly of CEBs gathered in Silves in January 1981, the main concern was fish supply. Discussion and comparison of experience produced a consensus of opposition among the fisher families of Silves: Declining fish yields were caused by outside fishermen whose use of illegal technologies were exhausting the fish supply in the Silves lake system. The two Brazilian agencies charged with environmental affairs and fishing regulations—IBDF (the Brazilian Institute for Forestry Development) and Sudepe (the Superintendency for Fisheries)—had prohibitions in place against fishing practices defined as “predatory.” These regulations included the closure of bodies of water by nets, fishing in spawning grounds, and prohibitions on other practices deemed predatory. Enforcement of these regulations was, however, negligible.

The CEB assembly of Silves sent a document reporting breaches of federal and state environmental laws and the illegal invasions of local lakes to the responsible government agencies (Aranha de Oliveira Ribeiro 1991:139). If the writers of the document could demonstrate widespread support, the federal environmental agency, IBDF, agreed to guarantee the defense of the lakes. Hundreds of local fishermen signed a petition to enforce existing regulations and end commercial fishing within their municipal borders.

However, the petition remained unacknowledged, and, after nine months, commercial fleets began their return to fish in the lowering waters. With no word from the government, the communities resolved to enforce the law themselves. They closed the entrance to the fishing grounds.

In November of 1981, commercial fishermen arriving at Silves found the usual entry point blocked with logs. They withdrew to a nearby town where they recruited a convoy of soldiers. When the entourage returned to Silves, it was met by villagers who emerged from the shores and encircled the intruders in canoes carrying men, women, and children (O’Kane, correspondence with author, November 21,
American Anthropologist • Vol. 107, No. 4 • December 2005

2001; Aranha de Oliveira Ribeiro 1991:149). The commercial party withdrew. When they returned once again, two helicopters and more than 100 military police accompanied them. Rather than enforce its own laws, the federal government acted in defense of those who breached them. A violent confrontation was narrowly avoided with the arrival of the then-mayor of Silves, João Farias.

Hostile encounters of this type served to stimulate participation in the community’s collective efforts to protect the fisheries from outside invasion. Meetings were held in rapid succession during January and February of 1982, in which new strategies were considered. One meeting, held in February in the village of São João, is retrospectively recognized by its participants as the start of the “community movement in defense of fish, rivers, and lakes of Silves” (lit., movimento comunitário em defesa dos peixes, rios e lagos de Silves). A groundswell of villagers turned out to declare themselves participants of the movement.

In the absence of constitutionally mandated action on the part of federal and state environmental agencies, the local peoples of Silves took matters into their own hands. They distributed study information on environmental legislation throughout the villages of the region and coordinated citizen action networks with volunteer guards and rudimentary personal communication networks. Through nonviolent strategies that relied heavily on voluntarism and direct negotiation, they coordinated efforts to remove commercial fishermen.

At the same time that protective action and self-education were underway, community participants considered measures to ensure long-term protections of the local fisheries and the environmental conditions that sustained them. The villagers designed a managerial plan involving two types of aquatic preserves with differing sets of attached regulations. The first, the sanctuary lake (lago santuário), is a category of absolute protection in which no fishing or hunting is permitted; these lakes would be preserved as reproductive grounds for fish stocks. The second, the restricted lake (lago de conservação), is a category that allows fishing for local subsistence but prohibits commercial harvesting. Residents selected nine lakes (a number that was later reduced to six) for absolute protection. All the rest—for four lakes and 12 waterways—were placed under the “lago de conservação” category, restricted to local subsistence fishing using simple technologies. Signs indicating the new prohibitions were posted at entry points. It was 1982. The first grassroots, locally generated system of aquatic preservation in the Brazilian Amazon had been established.

By bringing to bear local meanings, closely related to perceived needs, the caboclo fishermen of Silves had developed a system of sustainable resource use in which those who created the regulations were of the same constituency that would be subjected to them. The impetus for participation and commitment was based in the high stakes involved; for most, the issue was one of livelihood. Conservation, in this instance, was motivated by an immediate need for reliability in a fundamental resource. The awareness of the necessity to sustainably manage a critical resource was triggered by a perceptible threat that functioned as an indicator—declining fishing yields.

As the numbers associated with the movement grew, the governor of the state of Amazonas, Gilberto Mestrinho, placed himself in the visible role of advocate. He signed a decree outlawing commercial fishing in the two lakes where the mobilization originated. The coordinated efforts to protect local fish stocks from outside commercial fleets now showed visible results. The highwater season of 1982 produced a fish harvest as abundant as any could remember. Inspired by the communities’ successful defense of their lakes, young community members authored a play that they titled “Power of the People” (O’Kane, correspondence with author, November 19, 2001; Aranha de Oliveira Ribeiro 1991).

For many who defended the closing of the fishing grounds, the mobilization itself came to be regarded as a spiritual endeavor, a “pastoral of fishing.” The effort and results were often phrased in religious allegory. A mass was celebrated in which the central theme was the miraculous multiplication of loaves and fishes. Both critics and supporters said that “in the conflict between commercial fishermen and local ribeirinhos, the Church had taken sides with the latter” (Aranha de Oliveira Ribeiro 1991:143). Church clerics and lay volunteers were actively involved in the efforts to protect the lakes. Many of the clergy, who were educated abroad, situated themselves as resources for organizational strategies toward social justice. Setbacks were treated by clergy as opportunities for learning, part of the process of “consciousness raising” (lit., conscientizar o povo). The lesson is well stated by a pastoral volunteer, Sylvia Aranha de Oliveira Ribeiro, who witnessed and later described these events: “Each time people came away more convinced that they could not count on authorities, but had to rely instead on their own capabilities” (Aranha de Oliveira Ribeiro 1991:143). When challenges were most difficult, the clergy inquired whether villagers chose to continue. Aranha de Oliveira Ribeiro reports that they would respond energetically, “Yes, in spite of everything!” (1991:142). One priest, who accompanied prelacy activities between 1961–70 and 1980–86, described the role of the clergy this way: “Our objective as religious leaders was to reach out to people on the margins… to get them involved as a community, and to look at their problems. We tried to help the communities gain strong leadership to make their own decisions apart from the influence of the political parties and patrons” (O’Kane, correspondence with author, November 21, 2001). Cleric and lay pastoral workers, then, regarded the specific relations of commercial interests and local subsistence needs as a microcosm for larger class relations and an opportunity for political education or consciousness raising. The problem of fish scarcity was, thus, placed within a larger context of social and political relations.

As successful as the mobilization effort was, the commercial fishermen were not easily thwarted. Entrepreneurs of fishing fleets attempted to circumvent the system by purchasing local land to fish as legal residents. It was not long before fish scarcities were felt again. In July, 1983, communities submitted a new petition to Governor Mestrinho
demanding an injunction that would absolutely prohibit commercial fishing in Silves. In spite of hundreds of signatories and several meetings with the governor’s staff and representatives of Sudepe, the agency in charge of fisheries, no response was heard. With no government support, residents resolved once again to defend the lakes alone. They were aware, however, that unlicensed attempts at enforcement were illegal and dangerous. To adequately monitor the region, resources would be necessary to provide authorized surveillance.

**NGOS, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND NEOLIBERALISM IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON**

In the late 1970s, Brazil’s military regime, burdened with unmanageable debt, began steps toward a peaceful transfer to civilian government. The eventual shift to democracy in 1985 coincided with increasing global integration. Social movements in Brazil that span the transition reflect a double historic process, combining two interrelated phenomena: (1) the restructuring of civil society within a national process of democratization, and (2) negotiating space for local rights within a context of growing internationalization. A simultaneous proliferation of international NGOs would bridge the gap between internal local processes and global ones.

At the same time, the Church’s preferential attitude toward the poor was being replaced by a more conservative ideology, introduced by Pope John Paul II, who assumed the Papacy in 1978. Support for pastoral work among marginalized sectors of society was sharply reduced. NGOs claimed the interlocutory space vacated by the Church.

A nascent NGO sector, cut short by the military coup of 1964, was revitalized in the mid-1980s by the collapse of the military government and new donor support (Scurrah 1996). From the late 1980s through the end of the millennium, aid from NGOs was the principal source of financing for organized parts of civil society in most South American nations. Figures for 1995 show an average annual flow of US$55 billion from U.S. and European foundations to southern civil society (Tomlinson 1996:241–242).

Democracy brought with it the expectation of greater participation in local and national governance. A concomitant growth in the nongovernmental sector held the promise of linking local actors with national and international ones, thus contributing to a highly participatory, Habermasian ideal in which the formerly marginalized would find greater participation and expression. The role of NGOs as mediators between grassroots sectors and government agencies was fundamental in the vertical linkages between different sectors of civil society. However, new questions have emerged.

**FUNDING DIPLOMACY AT THE MILLENNIUM**

With the formation of new democracies in Latin America and the fall of the Iron Curtain, capital from multilateral financing institutions began to flow southward. Biodiversity preservation was high on the agenda of the new financial diplomacy project. Funds from First World donors for rainforest conservation and sound management practices were funneled to Brazil via networks involving consortiums of governmental agencies and international NGOs.

The increase in global willingness to pay for biodiversity conservation from the 1990s to the present has generated a number of competing explanations. One of these is the contention that international indebtedness of Third World countries in the mid-1980s prompted multilateral funding institutions to favor programs that would generate foreign currency (Enloe 1990:32; Honey 1999:14–17). A different explanation is the pressure placed on international lenders to meet standards and guidelines for “wise development.” Whatever the cause, the World Bank issued its first official statement of intent to protect wildlands and promote alternative land-use management in 1986. These earliest statements emphasize the need “to include local people in the planning and benefits of wildland management projects” (Honey 1999:15, 16). By the mid-1990s, powerful international agencies—including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), USAID, and the World Bank—were supporting a variety of programs and projects under the rubrics of environmental protection and sustainable development.

A major source of international financial assistance to Brazil was made available through the Pilot Project for Rainforest Protection (Programa Piloto para a Proteção das Florestas Tropicais do Brasil). PPG–7, as the initiative was known, was formulated in 1990 by the Group of Seven industrialized nations (G–7), the Netherlands, and the European Union. The German and British governments also participate directly through their development organizations DFID, GTZ, and KfW. Formally launched at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992, the project was extended with Brazilian counterpart parts in 2002 (Rio92+10) and is expected to continue through 2010. The funds, generated through multilateral agencies, governments, and private sources, are administered by the Rainforest Trust Fund (RTF), which is managed by, but not within, the World Bank. The Brazilian Ministry of the Environment participates in the coordination of all projects. Unlike the World Bank’s former, more restricted procedures, which transferred loans to government recipients alone, these funds are provided in the form of grants and are distributed to a wide range of recipients. Given the goals of the pilot project to link public and private sectors at international, national, and local levels, NGOs are well situated as mediators.

**DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION**

The PPG–7 project shows the greatest divergence from World Bank traditional undertakings in its “downward reach”—the extension of funding to the most local levels. From its inception, the pilot program sought to strengthen articulations between stakeholders at distinctly different levels of decision making, including governments, donors,
and civil society (World Bank 1998). The program favors the involvement of grassroots and intermediary social and environmental civil-society organizations that have historically been excluded from policy making and project implementation. The latter group of civil-society organizations—which, in international funding parlance, are called “CSOs”—includes impoverished communities—the so-called “beneficiary populations” of conventional development projects.

A PPG–7 project of great relevance to the community at Silves is the Amazon Floodplains Project, known as Pro-VÁRZEA (World Bank #BRRN6570, Manejo dos Recursos Naturais da Várzea). The associated networks linked through Pro-VÁRZEA well demonstrate the intent of PPG–7 to bring together independent entities with diverse goals to solve common problems. Pro-VÁRZEA works with government entities, scientific research institutes, private enterprises, and local communities as well as large international NGOs and national southern NGOs.

Another First World development agency with relevance to funding at Silves is USAID. By the mid-1990s, USAID had over $2 billion invested in projects with conservation components (Honey 1999:17). Funds were channeled through U.S.-based NGOs, rather than through government programs, a departure from the pattern prior to 1980. USAID’s program in Global Climate Change was “aimed at developing economically and ecologically sustainable forest management alternatives that would…improve the living conditions of the local communities while minimizing environmental degradation” (World Wildlife Fund [WWF] 2004:2). As in PPG–7, the involvement of the community was championed: Local participation was recognized as “crucial for the success of any project involving protected areas” (WWF 2004:16). NGOs would serve as mediating recipients for funds targeted to local communities. The entity through which USAID carried out most of its conservation projects was the World Wide Fund for Nature, known as WWF.  

WWF is a leading actor in global environmental efforts. Founded in 1961, WWF was, by the 1990s, the largest international conservation organization in the world. WWF reports a presence in over 90 governments, a membership of 4.7 million supporters, and some 40 affiliated offices throughout the world (Bray and Anderson 2005; see also www.wwf.org).

The overall goal of WWF is to protect the natural environment by stemming the decline in animal and plant species. To this end, WWF works with multilateral donors, governments, industry, other NGOs, and the public. With the recognized decline of biodiversity in the world’s remaining tropical rainforests and the new funding opportunities available for partnering with resident communities, WWF expanded its activities in 1990 to the Brazilian Amazon.  

Since that time, it has received support from PPG–7, USAID, and other sources for wildlife conservation and sustainable development for its role in partnering with local counterparts in the Brazilian Amazon. Silves, with its usual record of committed grassroots conservation action, was an attractive partner.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AT THE MILLENNIUM

WWF began to support community-level conservation efforts at Silves shortly after the onset of PPG–7 in 1993. Among the initial steps taken by WWF in its early work at Silves was the formation of a legally registered organization known as ASPAC—Environmental and Cultural Protection Association of Silves (Associação de Silves pela Preservação Ambiental e Cultural). A collectivity such as this—that could legitimately receive funds to carry out local projects—had not been an option during the military years. The charter of the new organization, composed with WWF advisors, states that the principal objectives of ASPAC are to preserve the environmental and cultural patrimony of the communities of Silves. The charter is far more ample and explicit in its environmental goals than it is for either cultural or social ones. It states: “The Association works to generate local awareness of the importance of the lake reserves, establish, monitor and enforce regulations. It also generates ecodevelopment projects that provide local resources while at the same time preserve the fragile riverine ecosystem” (ASPAC 1993). No such specificity is formulated for cultural or social projects. Eight villages within the municipality of Silves joined the association.

Like its predecessor IBDF, the new federal environmental agency of Brazil (IBAMA, The Institute for the Environment) was theoretically responsible for enforcing federal environmental laws and yet incapable of doing so. It lacked the financial resources and training to carry out its charge. If federal environmental regulations were to be enforced, the responsibility would, in most cases, fall on the communities. Those with the greatest stakes, such as communities like Silves with threatened local fisheries, would have to monitor protected areas themselves if they were to restrict access. When it came to keeping outsiders in check, the communities at Silves had in place a rudimentary, but persistent, system of monitoring based on volunteer guards. This grassroots-generated surveillance system was most vulnerable when it came to implementing regulations that governed the behavior of local residents who could easily be relatives or acquaintances of the monitors. WWF persuaded ASPAC to institute a program of rigorous surveillance by trained personnel. Revenues would have to be generated to provide training and salaries for guards and biodiversity monitors. With assistance from WWF, ASPAC received a PPG–7 grant to improve monitoring.

WWF’s goal was to create revenue-generating ventures that would ultimately support conservation. It set a time frame of six–ten years for a financially independent, self-sustaining conservation infrastructure at Silves. WWF consultants recommended an ecotourism enterprise as an appropriate choice for income generation. In the 1990s, ecotourism had an impressive record, having surpassed traditional exports as a source of foreign revenue in Costa Rica,
Tanzania, and Kenya (Honey 1999:18). As an economic alternative for local communities, ecotourism held potential for income generation, wise management, and forest protection.

The project called for hotel construction, a service staff, travel managers, and nature guides. Negotiating on behalf of ASPAC, WWF brought in additional donors, or “partners,” including WWF–Sweden and the government of Austria. (The number of First World “partners” conventionally exceeds the number of local organizations. With one grassroots association and several First World “partners,” the imbalance toward First World decision making is compounded.) Although community leaders were not part of the decision-making apparatus to proceed with the project, once funds were raised leaders assumed the position that economic development from employment and training associated with the lodge would benefit and empower the community (dos Santos, conversation with author, August 8, 1999). Construction of the ecolodge, called Aldeia dos Lagos (lit., village of the lakes), was underway in 1994; by 1999, it was open for visitors. Initial demand was low. With the exception of my field class in that first season, visitors did not fully occupy the facility. Information about the lodge was distributed through the limited network of former pastoral workers, some of whom had returned to their home countries and were able to publicize the lodge at Silves through word of mouth.

Brazil dedicated US$200 million to develop ecotourism in Amazonia beginning in 1997. A large portion of these funds went to NGOs to evaluate and improve the quality of ecotourism services. Western tourism evaluations of the Aldeia dos Lagos at Silves found it to be “lacking in professionalism.” A WWF marketing specialist and a federally funded ecotourism evaluation team conducted the evaluations. The assessments agreed that services rendered by the community did not fulfill the expectations of international visitors. As evaluators explained to me informally, the lodge and its services were, in their words, “too caboclo” (conversation with author, March 19, 2002).

For the ecotourism effort to succeed, from the point of view of WWF and other outside advisors, it would have to undergo professionalization. A grant from USAID for the Alternative Sound Land-Use Systems program enabled WWF to develop a capacity building project for ecotourism.8 A WWF–USAID program in ecotourism would support forest communities through its goals to promote “conservation and economic sustainability in protected areas, . . . train . . . guides and managers of protected areas, and contribute to the creation of standards of quality leading to certification” (WWF 2004:16). Together, USAID and WWF arranged training programs for hospitality services and guide interpretation. Hotel management operations, such as bookkeeping and reservations, were contracted to outsiders. In a move that provoked strong reaction from the community, a European replaced a fisherman as lodge manager; the fisherman had been one of the earliest founders of the protection movement. In 2001, in spite of community opposition, but with funds from its budget, the resort apartments were outfitted with air conditioning and refrigerators. With other international funders, WWF and USAID produced a manual to enable communities to carry out ecotourism programs according to a standardized set of principles and guidelines.

By 1999, therefore, community organization had shifted directions. Outside consultants, provided by WWF, would direct the transformation of the lodge into a profitable enterprise. With oversight from a large international funding agency, deadlines had to be met, records kept, funds accounted for, work attendance regulated, and role assignments based on standardized, not personalized, criteria. Work schedules that had been flexible to accommodate household and family needs were now fixed. Salaries reflected the values assigned to different tasks and the disparities among them. Whereas family ties had previously been a principal determinant of participation and access to unskilled contract employment, now only depersonalized objective criteria were considered. WWF consultants hoped to limit the “negative influences” of community and family ties that had impeded the earlier stages of ASPAC (Neves, conversation with author, August 2, 1999). The new policies privileged rationality and fiscal responsibility over inclusiveness. ASPAC would be shaped to meet criteria that could maximize profits and efficiency.

By the late 1990s, WWF had the largest portfolio of ecotourism projects in Brazil (WWF 2004:27). It posted promotional material about Silves’s ecolodge on the WWF website. The grassroots origins of the lodge, although detrimental to its operation, were advantageous to its promotion. The website cast the enterprise as a model of grassroots participation, environmental preservation, and sustainable development. The site also directed consumers to a designated international travel agency that would book reservations. Outsourcing of this kind was efficient and effective. The worldwide dissemination of information increased exposure and demand. When I visited again in the summer of 2001, the apartments were full for two consecutive months.

Initial fundraising success and its visible results led to new funding opportunities. Between 1993 and 2001, ASPAC received grants from numerous international organizations including the nongovernmental Swiss AVINA Foundation and the British Department for International Development (DFID). In addition to a more profitable and business-worthy ecotourism product, advisors and evaluators encouraged more income-generating schemes geared toward export production. A microenterprise utilizing renewable forest materials in the manufacture of cosmetics was introduced.

The new NGO, formed in Silves in 1999, was the Vida Verde Association of Amazonia known by the acronym AVIVE. WWF provided a support technician and an accountant. This enterprise, initiated by a European with start-up funds from WWF, explored the possibilities of exporting body-care products made from forest extracts. Sustainable Business Services, a Friends of the Earth–Brazil affiliate with assistance from the government of the Netherlands...
to offer free services to local Amazonian microenterprises (www.amazonia.org), provided management training, legal advice, technical support, market strategies, certification, and instruction in basic English.

By 2002 AVIVE was working with about 30 local women to produce soaps, candles, and other items from aromatic extracts of locally available tree species Rosewood (Aniba roseadora), Andiroba (Carapa guianensis), and Copaiba (Copaifera officinalis). The products were exported overseas by WWF–Brazil and a private German enterprise, Nature’s Light. AVIVE’s monthly average production was approximately 1,000 units per month in 2002. At R$3–5 per unit, with an average exchange rate for that year of R$2.5: US$1, monthly gross earnings would average US$1,600. According to reports, 30 percent of the return was reinvested in primary resources and fixed costs while the remaining 70 percent was divided among AVIVE members. If these figures and their calculations are correct, this would amount to US$1,120 per month to be divided among all members. My supposition is supported by a UNDP document for 2002 that describes $1,000 divided among 33 people for one month’s labor (www.amazonia.org). This distribution amounts to US$33.30 per person per month, less than 25 percent of the Brazilian national minimum wage.

In 2002, AVIVE was awarded the international Equatorial Initiative Prize at the Worldwide Summit for Sustainable Development. The prize, awarded by the UNDP with the government of Canada, the NGOs IUCN, and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), recognizes exemplary initiatives in sustainable development. An award of US$30,000 accompanied the prize. According to AVIVE’s European manager, the money would go toward large-scale production with expanded facilities, including laboratories for drying and packaging. José Carlos Reston, manager of Sustainable Business Services, is cited as saying that his organization “changed the reality of the community of Silves” (www.amazonia.org).

As Reston’s statement illustrates, the AVIVE project, like the lodge, exemplifies the new direction in project development for which market principles are the driving force. By attaching preservation of forest resources to microenterprises such as ecotourism and body care, the environment itself is valued as an income source. Both AVIVE and the lodge were top-down introductions by outsiders who considered them sound choices from both environmental and financial standpoints. In each instance, the decision makers and consumers were from industrialized countries. The desires and preferences of this affluent clientele would be translated by NGO interlocutors and would determine, to the extent possible, the nature of the enterprises.

PARTICIPATION AND RATIONALITY

The revenue-generating activities instituted at Silves target an overseas consumer market. To successfully compete in the international funding arena, the community was urged to undergo internal transformations, including reorganiza-

When we worked with the church we had no resources but we had will power—we were a force. We did a lot with little. We did it voluntarily, out of passion. Now, it’s rarely voluntary. I’m disappointed because people have become used to funding and I worry about the way work is perceived. …When we worked with the Church we had the will of the community, but no resources. Today we are without church discourse. Instead, we have a conservationist discourse that makes it much more difficult to involve the communities. [conversation with author, June 2, 2002]

CONSERVATION AND LIVELIHOOD

A hallmark of the Silves project was its locally derived resource management plan with units of absolute preservation and regulated-use areas to manage an aquatic system threatened by poaching fishing vessels. The case of Silves contributes to a growing body of evidence showing that communities that exclude outsiders from a collectively owned resource and regulate their own activities are often effective managers (Feeny et al. 1990; Holt 2005; McCay and Acheson 1987). The management of common-property (or common-pool) resources requires collective decision making, cooperation in resource use, and enforcement of
agreed-upon rules among group members (Feeny et al. 1990; McCay and Acheson 1987). Actions at Silves were spurred by what residents regarded as unlawful and damaging invasion of community fishing grounds. Fishing yields, perceived to be in decline, were temporarily restored by denying access to all but the local community, then devising a system of local regulations to avoid overexploitation. The response to declining resources underscores the argument that recognition of scarcity—whether as a reality or a potential prospect—is a significant determinant in a community’s decision to take up the organizational challenges of managing resources (see Holt 2005:201, 206).

Local action in the 1980s was driven by the urgency of maintaining fish populations for long-term consumption harvesting. Resource management was equated with livelihood security. Actions were cast as the collective struggle of the poor for their own survival. In these early phases of the local movement at Silves, goals were framed in terms of social justice and economic need. The Brazilian state of the 1980s did not enforce its own environmental laws; worse, it designed programs that would break them or actively allied with illegal poachers, as was the case when the military and federal police intervened to protect commercial fishers.

In response, villagers were forced to pool their meager resources—people, the single form of capital they had at the time—against powerful interests. By conceptually and operationally constructing local conservation models rather than receiving federal ones lacking both local meanings and effective enforcement, the residents of Silves assigned local significance to the principles underlying Brazil’s own disregarded environmental legislation.

The formation of a collectivity in defense of resource rights was accomplished, at least in part, through the mediation of the Catholic Church, whose representatives at the time found following by identifying with the poor. Church-affiliated outsiders, comprising both clerics and lay volunteers, perceived themselves as translators of local demands. They regarded their agency as a religious service informed by principles of social justice; the organizational skills they brought were instruments with which to negotiate with powerful actors, including governments, to achieve increased democratic participation and assurance of livelihoods. To a marginalized constituency, these actors brought skills of negotiation and an effective organizational infrastructure in the form of CEBs. The specifics of the struggle were allegorically phrased in biblical terms and politically framed as class struggle. Challenges or obstacles were treated as opportunities with which to strengthen participation in the political process.

**CONVERSIONS**

With the transition to democracy in 1985, the rural populace was faced with the task of reinventing civil society. The new Brazilian democratic state emerged in a context of cultural internationalization and economic neoliberalism. At the same time, the Church shifted its resources away from the pastoral sector and removed support from the CEBs. New institutional actors, including transnational NGOs, filled the political space formerly occupied by the Church. Unlike the military government, the new democratic state allowed international linkages, enabling local actors to attract transnational environmental allies. NGOs supplied new vertical linkages between the local, the national, and the global. Environmental NGOs, drawn to the preservation accomplishments of the community of Silves, directed funding to projects that would fall within the goals and guidelines of their organizations and First World donors. These criteria included public–private partnerships that furthered environmentally and financially sound microenterprises.

In the language of the newly framed goals, the local is no longer generative; instead, it is the object of the actions of outsiders. The community association, once broad based, now serves to articulate a limited constituency with transnational funding sources. It acts on the local community to achieve the rigorously defined objectives of a First World environmental movement rooted in northern hemisphere experience and worldviews. A clear articulation and commitment to these objectives is requisite to membership, overriding community status or record of participation in the early phases of the preservation movement. The values of efficacy and efficiency replace those of solidarity and inclusiveness. In the most recent phase, interlocutors are those who work closest to the funding sources. There is little evidence of capacity building, considering that tasks such as accounting or lodge and factory management are outsourced to First World personnel.

The recent phase of community participation requires a “conversion” to a set of environmental and entrepreneurial principles. Through the environmental NGOs of the 1990s, the community was introduced to a decontextualized environmental advocacy that lacked grounding in local thought and linkage to need. Whereas the early stages of the movement were broad based in participation and phrased in terms of social justice, now the community effort to preserve the lakes required a shift in perceptions, as community organization became increasingly dependent on the environmentalist agendas of donor agencies. A language, based in the assumptions of the “rights of nature” and derived from a burgeoning international environmental movement, replaced an earlier framework whose discourse was centered on the concepts of the “rights of man” and survival.

Aspirations associated with a new democratic Brazil included increased civic participation by grassroots-level organizations. Although ASPAC, the community NGO created at Silves, established legitimacy and forged linkages with wider national and international networks of environmental advocacy, its support at the local community level dramatically declined. With its altered priorities, narrowing foci, and selected membership, ASPAC can no longer be said to represent the community. The image of “community” becomes a commodity with which to justify and demonstrate
project success in the language of First World environmental advocacy. The grassroots component is appreciated for its performative appeal. The community controls neither its own representation nor its goals, as the linguistic and technical resources employed to represent them are now out of their control.

It could be argued, then, that in the most recent phase, community per se is no longer valued for its own sake. Social values that prioritize inclusion have been replaced. Assistance from outsiders, so fundamental to project advancement, may be a source of alienation and divisiveness if social factors are disregarded. By not attending to them, the environmental NGO may have inadvertently contributed to the breakdown of a communal property mechanism that had been effective in managing a fragile resource. Consequences, impossible to evaluate here, could affect both the outcome of the resource management project as well as community cohesion and local empowerment.

CONCLUSION

After nearly two decades of experimentation in “partnering” between NGOs and local communities, we are ready to evaluate these collaborations. Recent studies by Bray and Anderson (2005), Brosius (1997), and Chapin (2004) reflect a growing skepticism about large, internationally financed NGOs that attempt to partner with local communities. Chapin (2004) goes so far as to suggest the inevitable failure of such projects. But although Chapin blames large NGOs for failing in their stated mission to benefit local populations, he does not examine the shortcomings of specific collaborations and the factors that drive their failure. Bray and Anderson (2005) emphasize the lack of substantive data with which to evaluate project arrangements between large NGOs and local communities. It is important to disassemble these partnerships to identify outcomes and link them to process.

If the case presented here may be treated as exemplary, the relationship between local constituencies and external ones is not only mediated by transnational actors but also dominated by them—to an extent not recognized by either theorists or actors. The roles played by outside agents in the two phases discussed for Silves influenced the structures of community participation as well as that which Bray and Anderson refer to as the “locally-based visions of appropriate conservation activities” (2005:65). These data substantiate concerns framed by other theorists, such as Brosius (1997), that in the process of brokering the relationship between international funders and local recipients, NGOs may play an active role that does not reflect local realities, goals, or values.

Participation in civic life has been mediated by the discourses of different interlocutors whose roles contribute not only to the strategies of local practice and action but also to the very production of them. The change in interlocutors, within two contrastive social and political contexts, makes exceedingly apparent the power of the mediating agency to create and control the language that frames collective demands, shapes community participation, and creates meanings. In considering the roles of different actors in local–international interchange and collaboration in this article, I have pointed to the power of mediating agents in constructing the frameworks that define the criteria through which collective demands can be defined and problematized. Here, the interlocutor is shown to play a creative, not passive, role in the production of community membership and values. Rather than being limited to the role of facilitator or agent, these intermediaries, it is argued, contribute actively to a production of “the local.”

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NOTES

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1. This study is part of an ongoing, collaborative research project that involves an interdisciplinary team. The assessment here, a social and political analysis, builds on work I carried out with the help of a graduate research assistant and members of the community. It builds on the hydrological findings of Robert Meade and other members of the research team. Events prior to 1999 were reconstructed on the basis of interviews I conducted with current and founding community members of the movement as well as electronic correspondence with pastoral volunteers and clerics who were present in the 1980s.

2. Some, such as Honey (1999), attribute the shift in the international financial policy to a need for foreign currencies in Third World nations to repay steep international debts.

3. The more widely known “Meeting of the Waters” refers to the site where the black waters of the appropriately named Rio Negro flow into the white waters of the Amazon mainstream, known at that point in Brazil as the Rio Solimões.

4. Among the donor governments, Germany is the largest, responsible for 41 percent; the second largest, the European Union, is responsible for 23 percent.

5. The full names of these acronyms are Department for International Development (DFID); Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the German Development Bank.

6. WWF is the acronym for the international conservation organization that has been known since 1986 as the World Wide Fund for Nature. In the United States and Canada, WWF retains its earlier name, World Wildlife Fund.

7. The Fund established WWF–Brazil in 1996.

8. This was USAID Grant #512-0784-G-00-0041-00.
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